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An external management audit is defined as an independent 
examination of an organisation resulting in a statement 
to external users on the performance of the management 
function. External management auditing has links with, 
but also important differences from external financial 
auditing, internal operational auditing and management 
consultancy. The reasons for conducting external 
management audits are considered particularly in relation 
to the accountability of corporate management in society 
and the interests of various potential user groups. 
External management auditing is not merely a proposal 
but a reality with examples such as the Indian cost 
audit. 
Given the lack of British empirical evidence on 
users' views of external management auditing, bankers 
were surveyed to determine whether or not they would 
express any demand for external management audit reports 
on companies. A postal questionnaire was sent to a 
sample of 466 branch managers and head office staff in 
the three Scottish joint -stock banks with a resulting 
63% response rate. Over 85% of respondents agreed that 
they would find the external management audit report 
useful in their corporate lending decisions and would 
always or sometimes use the external management audit 
report as part of the information on which to assess 
corporate management. The respondents considered that 
the external management audit report should include 
assessments both of the general management function and 
of the individual business functions. The responding 
bankers did express a demand for external management 
audit reports. 
A sample of 354 bankers with experience of corporate 
overdraft decisions received a simulation exercise 
involving an overdraft decision. The response rate was 
58% and the main conclusion of this simulation exercise 
was that the addition of an adverse external management 
iii 
audit report did have a statistically significant effect 
on the responding bankers' corporate overdraft decision 
outcomes. The results of both the questionnaire survey 
and the simulated overdraft decision show that bankers 
would be interested in receiving, and would use, external 
management audit reports on their customer companies. 
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CHAPTER 1 
ROOTS OF EXTERNAL MANAGEMENT AUDITING 
Objectives of thesis 
This thesis has three main objectives. The first is to 
explore the meaning of external management auditing in 
order to have a basis for developing a questionnaire 
survey on external management auditing. This will 
involve considering the links of external management 
auditing with external financial auditing, internal 
operational auditing and management consultancy. 
Furthermore, the reasons for external management 
auditing together with proposals for and actual examples 
of external management audits will also be examined. 
The second objective is to survey by postal questionnaire 
one out of several potential user groups, namely bankers, 
to determine whether or not any demand exists for 
external management audit reports on companies and, if 
so, what information they would like included in such 
reports. The third objective is to attempt to determine, 
by means of a simulation exercise, whether or not such an 
external management audit report (based on the findings 
of this questionnaire survey) would have a significant 
effect on the corporate overdraft decisions of bankers. 
Introduction 
An external management audit is an independent 
examination of an organisation resulting in a 
statement to external users on the performance 
of the management function.1 
The above definition of an external management audit is 
the one which will be used throughout this thesis which 
concentrates on the external management audit of one 
particular type of organisation namely the limited 
liability company. However, examples will be drawn from 
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beyond the corporate sector to illustrate certain 
developments in external management auditing. Furthermore, 
at the very beginning it should be admitted that a lack of 
agreement exists on terminology and definitions in this 
area. 
Comprehensive auditing - as exemplified in the title 
of the Canadian Comprehensive Auditing Foundation 
established in 1980 - is only one of several phrases which 
may be used with the same meaning as the above definition 
of external management auditing. Other phrases sometimes 
used synonymously with external management auditing 
include expanded scope auditing, value for money auditing, 
performance auditing, efficiency auditing and operational 
auditing. Terms such as operational auditing and 
management auditing must therefore be interpreted in 
context. Indeed one survey2 found the terms management 
auditing and operational auditing to be synonymous. 
However, Churchill and Cyert3 have distinguished between 
these two terms with the operational audit being 
conducted, by an internal auditor, FOR the company 
management; and the management audit being conducted, by 
an external auditor, OF the company management for 
external users such as shareholders and bankers. This 
distinction will be made in this thesis. 
One common characteristic of management auditing and 
the other alternative terms listed above is that they all 
include the word 'auditing'. In the definition of an 
external management audit at the beginning of this chapter, 
auditing is linked with the management function. However, 
the term 'external audit' has been used for so many years 
in the context of an opinion by an independent professional 
accountant on the financial statements produced by the 
management of the organisation that this is considered by 
many to be its only meaning. For example, the 1978 Cohen 
Report of the American Commission On Auditors' 
Responsibilities emphasised this relationship between 
2 
auditing and accounting: 
'Auditing involves an independent examination 
to determine the propriety of accounting 
processes, measurements and communication. 
Stated simply, the accountant prepares 
financial information; the auditor checks it. 
The distinction, however, cannot be made in 
practice. To perform his function, the 
auditor must continually evaluate accounting 
activities and presentations; he must be, 
and is, trained as an accountant and an 
auditor.14 
Similarly, the explanatory forword to the British 
auditing standards and guidelines links auditing with 
accounting by means of the financial statements: 
'An audit is the independent examination of, 
and expression of opinion on, the financial 
statements of an enterprise by an appointed 
auditor in pursuance of that appointment 
and in compliance with any relevant 
statutory obligation.'S 
Therefore, to help place external management auditing in 
perspective and to consider some of its roots, a brief 
review will be made of external financial auditing 
including a comparison between these two types of auditing. 
External financial auditing 
The basic idea of auditin 
Mesapotamia in 3,600 B.C. 
can be traced back to 
However, Woolf has suggested: 
'Auditing, as we understand it now, has its 
roots two or three hundred years ago, in 
the first division of interests between 
those engaged, in a business undertaking 
(the enterpreneurs) and those who made the 
finance available without necessarily 
becoming directly involved in day -to -day 
management.'7 
In order to compare external management auditing and 
external financial auditing, this discussion will be 
restricted to the external audit of the financial 
statements of limited liability companies. 
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Historically the corporate form of organisation and 
in particular limited liability companies are relatively 
recent phenomena. The growth of joint -stock companies 
was restricted by the collapse of the South Sea Company. 
Court concluded: 
! After 1720, the foundation of joint -stock 
companies was controlled by the so- called 
Bubble Act of that year, a panic measure 
passed by Parliament as a direct 
consequence of the public scandal caused 
by the collapse of the South Sea Company. 
This law prohibited the formation of new 
joint -stock companies unless sanctioned 
by private Act of Parliament or Crown 
charter. The law stood unrepealed until 
1825.'8 
After the repeal of the 'Bubble Act' the number of joint - 
stock companies increased and the Trading Companies Act 
of 1831 gave the Board of Trade power to grant 
incorporation to companies, conferring legal powers but 
not limited liability. 
Until 1844 no statutory company audit existed but 
the 1844 Joint Stock Companies Act required all 
incorporated companies to have their balance sheet 
audited. Between 1856 and 1862 a series of Acts 
conferred full legal power and limited liability on all 
jointLstock companies on registration. In relation to 
these Acts Checkland found: 
'This very great increase in new projects 
called into being a frightening number of 
new companies, under limited liability, 
in the years 1863 and 1864. The new 
principle invaded most parts of banking, 
commerce, transport and industry.1 9 
This new principle of limited liability meant, of course, 
that if a company failed, the shareholders' financial 
liability was restricted to the amount of capital which 
they had originally subscribed to that company. 
Prior to this increase in the number of limited 
liability companies, the 1856 Companies Act repealed the 
audit provision of the 1844 Act and it was not until the 
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1900 Companies Act that the audit of the balance sheet was 
again required by law. Between 1844 and 1856 the practice 
was to appoint a shareholder to conduct an audit but by 
1900 it was common practice to appoint a professional 
auditor to act on behalf of all the shareholders.10 
Nevertheless, it was not until 1948 that the Companies 
Act required the auditor to be professionally qualified 
and this Act required that, in addition to the balance 
sheet, the profit and loss account must also be audited. 
The main reason for this brief historical review of 
the statutory audit of the financial statements of limited 
liability companies is to emphasise the comparatively 
recent development of the external financial audit of 
companies. It is only during the last 140 years that the 
statutory external financial audit has developed and it 
is only since 1948 that the current British statutory 
audit requirement for limited liability companies has been 
in existence. Furthermore, as Shaw has argued: 
'Auditing, which is to do with accounting 
and accountability is equally socially 
responsive .... The present conventional 
view of the audit role will similarly be 
modified and developed in response to 
inevitable social change.'11 
External management auditing is one such possible future 
development. Two such past modifications and developments 
in external financial auditing with implications for 
external management auditing are the changes in the 
objectives of the company audit and the greater 
consideration given to the future of the company being 
audited. 
Firstly, the objectives of the statutory company 
audit have changed over time. Lee12 has summarised the 
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This summary highlights that the company audit 
objective of the detection of fraud and error has moved 
from being a primary to a secondary objective. External 
financial auditing of limited liability companies has 
developed from a need to protect shareholders - particularly 
in situations where the shareholders are divorced from the 
management of the company. The shareholders wish 
confirmation that the managers are accounting fairly to 
them. 
The emphasis of the external financial audit has been 
on the honesty of the stewardship whereas the efficiency 
of the stewardship has been neglected. For example, the 
external financial auditor will not report to the share- 
holders that the resources of the company have been used 
inefficiently as long as such resources have been 
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accounted for fairly. In contrast, the external 
management auditor is interested in 'the performance of 
the management function' and would comment on the 
inefficient use of corporate resources. In his survey of 
the perceptions of company financial management regarding 
the external financial audit Lothian concluded his study 
with a quotation from one respondent who voiced the 
general feeling as follows: 
'It's high time the professional bodies 
channelled some of these resources into 
helping the finance director work towards 
corporate solvency and profitability on 
which we, and our auditors, ultimately 
depend.'13 
In summary, the external management auditor is interested 
in the efficiency of management's stewardship of the 
company's resources as distinct from simply the honesty 
of that stewardship. 
A second development in external financial auditing 
which has implications for external management auditing is 
the greater consideration being given to the future of the 
company being audited. External financial auditors have 
been criticised for concentrating on the past and ignoring 
the future. In recent years external financial auditors 
have been forced to pay more attention to the future with 
changes such as inflation accounting, post balance sheet 
events, the 1981 Companies Act requiring the auditor to 
review the directors' report and the question of whether 
or not a company is a going concern. 
With regard to the going concern concept, the 
external financial auditor must assess whether 'the 
enterprise will continue in operational existence for the 
foreseeable future'.14 This means that the auditor will 
review cash flow forecasts, a process which involves 
assessing the reasonableness of management's assumptions 
about the future such as forecast sales, costs, capital 
expenditure and dividends. To decide whether or not a 
company is a going concern, the external financial auditor 
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must use his judgment about the future. This is an 
interesting development from the viewpoint of the 
external management audit because the external management 
auditor will need to consider the future to be able to 
comment on the performance of the management function'. 
External financial and external management auditing 
have other similarities. Firstly, in both types of 
auditing the auditor must be independent of the management 
of the company. This means that the auditor is 
independent in terms of his attitude of mind and because 
of this external financial auditors have attempted to 
ensure that they are seen to be independent by including 
certain rules in their ethical guide. For example, one 
such rule is that the recurring fees paid by one client 
or group of connected clients should not exceed 15% of the 
gross fees of the practice. If the auditor is not 
independent of the management of the company, the 
auditorTs opinion would mean little. The auditor must be 
objective and unbiased. 
Secondly, the final product of both the external 
financial audit and the external management audit is a 
report to users outside the company. Thirdly, both types 
of audit opinion require the collection of evidence which 
in terms of the external financial auditing standards and 
guidelines is described as 'relevant and reliable audit 
evidence sufficient to enable him to draw reasonable 
conclusions therefrom'.15 It can be seen, therefore, that 
some of the roots of external management auditing lie in 
the field of external financial auditing. However, 
despite the above similarities, external financial audit- 
ing differs from external management auditing in several 
important respects.16 
Firstly, as already mentioned, external financial 
auditing concentrates on the past and the present whereas 
external management auditing concentrates on the present 
and the future. The external management auditor will look 
at past management decisions but from the point of view of 
the decision process to highlight any weaknesses in this 
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process which might cause problems for the company in the 
future. This highlights a second difference in that the 
external financial audit is primarily protective whereas 
the external management audit is primarily constructive. 
The external financial auditor aims to protect the 
shareholders by ensuring that the management of the 
company account fairly to them through the annual 
financial statements. In contrast the external manage- 
ment auditor aims to highlight any weaknesses in the 
performance of the management function so that such 
weaknesses can be improved. 
Thirdly, the external financial auditor relies on 
financial information as the primary source of evidence 
whereas the external management auditor relies on both 
financial and operational information as primary sources 
of evidence. The external financial auditor may use 
operational information but only so far as it relates to 
the financial information (eg. stock valuation). However, 
the external management auditor is interested in 
operational information for its own sake such as market 
share, productivity measurements or labour turnover 
statistics. Fourthly, the external financial auditor 
determines whether adequate controls and procedures are 
being followed whereas the external management auditor 
determines whether corporate resources are being used 
efficiently and effectively. This is linked to the fifth 
difference with the external financial auditor emphasising 
the verification of profit and the external management 
auditor emphasising the improvement of profit and the 
achievement of other corporate objectives. 
In summary, the differences between the external 
financial audit and the external management audit are 
greater than their similarities. The external financial 
audit is restricted in scope with its opinion on the truth 
and fairness of a company's financial statements compared 
to the broader external management audit with its opinion 
on the performance of the management function. The 
production of annual financial statements forms only one 
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part of the corporate management function. Indeed it can 
be argued that external management auditing has as close 
links with internal auditing as with external financial 
auditing. Internal operational auditing is another of 
the roots of external management auditing. 
Internal auditing 
Internal auditors have existed in one form or another for 
many centuries and in limited liability companies internal 
auditors were originally employed by the management to 
check internal financial reports such as the monthly 
accounts. However, the literature and practice of 
internal auditing have extended beyond this checking of 
internal financial reports. For example, in the British 
literature the book by Chambers17 entitled 'Internal 
Auditing' illustrates how internal auditing has developed 
with chapters on 'internal auditing and risk management' 
and 'operational auditing with reference to research and 
development'. The Institute of Internal which 
was not established until 1941 in the United States of 
America, has issued the following definition: 
'Internal auditing is an independent 
- appraisal function established within 
an organisation to examine and evaluate 
its activities as a service to the 
organisation.'18 
This definition would encompass internal financial 
auditing but it is also much broader than simply internal 
financial auditing because in recent years operational 
auditing has become an increasingly important part of 
internal auditing. 
From a 1973 survey The Institute of Internal 
Auditors concluded: 
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'An operational audit is a future - 
oriented, independent, and systematic 
evaluation performed by the internal 
auditor for management of the 
organisational activities controlled 
by middle and lower -level management 
for the purposes of improving 
organisational profitability and 
increasing the attainment of other 
organisational objectives.'19 
This definition of an internal operational audit has 
similarities with that of an external management audit. 
For example, both types of audit are 'future -oriented' 
and concerned with a 'systematic evaluation of 
organisational activities'. Similarly, the purpose of 
both an internal operational audit and an external 
management audit include 'improving organisational 
profitability and increasing the attainment of other 
organisational objectives'. Some of the roots of 
external management auditing lie in the field of internal 
operational auditing. 
Nevertheless, the differences between internal 
operational auditing and external management auditing 
are important. Firstly, the above definition of an 
operational audit includes an 'independent evaluation' 
but in this case the internal operational auditor is 
only independent of 'middle and lower -level management' 
and not independent of top management because the 
internal operational auditor is employed by the company 
and reports to top management. In contrast the external 
management auditor should be independent even of top 
management because he is not an employee of the company. 
Secondly, as already mentioned, the internal operational 
auditor conducts the audit FOR the company management 
whereas the external management auditor conducts an 
audit OF the company management for external users such 
as shareholders and bankers. The objective of the 
internal operational auditor is to serve the needs of 
management whereas the external management auditor aims 
to meet the needs of external users. Thirdly, top 
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management will usually direct the internal operational 
auditors to examine certain parts of the company whereas 
the external management auditors will decide for themselves 
the parts of the company on which they will concentrate. 
The external management auditor has greater freedom of 
action than the internal operational auditor. 
Despite these important differences between the two 
types of auditing, some of the roots of external 
management auditing stem from internal operational 
auditing. The growth in internal corporate operational 
auditing in recent years may be one source of pressure for 
external management auditing in the future. A survey20 of 
internal auditing in the United Kingdom in the mid 1970s 
did not specifically cover operational auditing. However, 
an indication of the extent of operational auditing was 
given in a 1979 international survey21 which showed that 
the internal audit departments concerned spent 
approximately half of their efforts on operational audits 
and approximately half on financial audits. In addition, 
a 1977 American survey of internal auditing concluded: 
'The majority of companies interviewed 
report that, over the past ten years the 
trend has been towards increased and 
broadened operational audits.,22 
Furthermore, Chambers has argued: 
'The adoption of operational auditing and 
efficiency and effectiveness auditing 
has been by means of a reallocation of 
effort away from financial and compliance 
auditing.'23 
An important reason for the growth of operational 
auditing has been that, increasingly, managers cannot 
directly oversee all operations, because of the increase 
in size and complexity of companies. For example, with 
the growth of multinational companies, managers have 
become responsible for units located throughout the world. 
The internal operational auditor has filled a role as the 
eyes and ears of top management. The external management 
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auditor could fulfil a similar role for users outside the 
company. 
An internal operational audit is not usually 
conducted exclusively by accountants but by a multi- 
disciplinary team. For example, in the American survey24 
already mentioned, 95% of the companies employed one or 
more non -accounting specialists as internal auditors with 
expertise in various fields such as EDP, statistics, 
engineering, general management, marketing, economics, 
production, purchasing and law.25 Similarly, it is 
generally agreed that a multidisciplinary team will be 
required to conduct an external management audit. This 
implies that external management auditing is about 
management in addition to being about auditing. In 
particular management consultancy is another of the roots 
of external management auditing. 
Management consultancy 
Even during the twentieth century very different views on 
management have been proposed by writers such as Argyris, 
Drucker, Follett, Herzberg, Likert,, Mayo, McGregor, Simon, 
Taylor, Trist and ti-doodward.26 To consider just three 
examples, Taylor emphasised the importance of time and 
motion study and considered mainly repetitive tasks while 
regarding the employee generally as a tool similar to a 
machine. In contrast, Mayo stressed the importance of 
factors such as the informal organisation, social values 
and group interaction while the emphasis by Argyris was 
on the lack of congruency between the needs of healthy 
individuals and the demands of the formal organisation. 
The variety of management practices is also illustrated 
by the different types of management leadership which 
have been proposed such as situational, functional, 
bureaucratic, charismatic and leadership by objectives to 
name only a few. 
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The present state of the management literature 
implies that, depending upon the particular circumstances 
of each company, many different types of management 
practice may fall into the category of good management. 
It can be suggested that management principles and 
practices are at present as well - or as poorly- developed 
as accounting principles and practices. However, this 
problem of the range of accounting principles and 
practices has not stopped the external financial auditor 
from reporting his opinion on the financial statements of 
companies and, therefore, the problem of the range of 
generally accepted management principles and practices 
need not necessarily deter the external management 
auditor. 
The analogy can perhaps be drawn between good 
management and good health. Both are easier to recognise 
when seen, than to define in advance. Similarly, even 
the best management and the fittest individual have areas 
of relative weakness. The external management auditor 
may be able to act in much the same way as the general 
medical practitioner, by identifying the problem areas 
and, if necessary, suggesting that specialist advice be 
sought. Depending upon the particular problem, this might 
mean the management consultant. Indeed the management 
consultant (with skills such as analysis and problem 
identification) could be a valuable member of the external 
management audit team. 
External management auditing and management 
consultancy have certain similarities. For example, both 
the auditor and the consultant come from outside the 
company although both require the cooperation of the 
companyes employees. One advantage of both the external 
management auditor and the management consultant is their 
objectivity. Furthermore, both also share the advantage 
of having seen the operations and management of many 
other companies. Indeed, both the external management 
auditor and the management consultant may have been 
involved with another company in the same industry. 
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Furthermore, Falk has suggested: 
'Absolute objectivity, a disinterested 
approach, and, above all, the precious 
ingredient of untrammelled time have 
combined to make responsible 
management consultancy an important 
new profession.' 27 
The same argument of 'untrammelled time' could be 
applied to external management auditing. Is external 
management auditing, therefore, the same as management 
consultancy? 
The answer is generally in the negative for three 
main reasons. Firstly, the external management auditor 
would be employed by a third party such as shareholders 
whereas the management consultant is usually employed by 
the management of the client company. Secondly, the 
management consultants' report is generally only available 
to those within the company and not to any external group. 
Thirdly, very often the management of a company hire 
management consultants for their advice in relation to a 
particular problem whereas, in contrast, the external 
management auditor would decide on which areas to report. 
Therefore, the development of external management 
auditing has roots in external financial auditing, 
internal operational auditing and management consultancy. 
However, these three activities also differ considerably 
from external management auditing. Why has external 
management auditing developed at all? The following 
chapter considers the reasons for this development. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REASONS FOR EXTERNAL MANAGEMENT AUDITING 
Accountability 
Several reasons have been suggested for conducting 
external management audits and these will be considered 
using quotations from various sources. For example, 
Foster has concluded: 
'I started with the old presumption of a 
divergence of interest between share- 
holders and management which led to the 
logical, if idealistic, conclusion that 
all joint stock companies should be 
subject to periodic efficiency auditing.'1 
This is the reason of performance evaluation of corporate 
management on behalf of the shareholders. 
In the context of external financial reporting, the 
Corporate Report considered other user groups as well as 
shareholders and concluded: 
'Having reviewed the rights and needs of 
user groups we conclude that corporate 
reports may be able to contribute to 
user information needs in: 
(a) Evaluating the performance of the 
entity. 
(b) Assessing the effectiveness of the 
entity in achieving objectives 
established previously by its 
management, its members or owners 
or by society. This includes but 
is by no means limited to, 
compliance with stewardship 
obligations. 
(c) Evaluating managerial performance, 
efficiency and objectives.'2 
The emphasis in external management auditing would be on 
(b) and (c) above namely on the efficiency and effective- 
ness of managerial performance. It is recognised that a 
company's performance may at times be affected by factors 
outwith the control of management. This is why external 
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management auditing would concentrate on the performance 
evaluation of corporate management. As with the Corporate 
Report, NIVRA in Holland has widened this idea beyond 
shareholders to other user groups: 
'A growing belief was expressed that it 
would become essential for users of 
financial statements to be adequately 
informed with respect to decision - making 
processes.13 
In his book 'The Board and Management Audit' 
Washbrook, like Foster, has started from this divergence 
of interests between shareholders and management and has 
argued: 
'What is needed in the modern situation 
of professional managers and 
administrators who are not the complete, 
or even the substantial owners of a 
business, is some form of overall 
management and administration audit as 
an independent assessment of the sound- 
ness of the business unit and its ability 
to face the business problems of the 
future. The results should be for the 
benefit of the shareholders, the stock 
exchanges and the general investing 
public.'* 
Both Foster and Washbrook begin from the divergence 
of interests between the shareholders and managers which 
is the underlying reason for the external financial audit 
and take this argument to its logical conclusion which 
implies an external management audit. However, Washbrook 
has developed the reason for external management auditing 
from performance evaluation of corporate management to an 
assessment of the ability of the company to face the 
business problems of the future. By its nature such an 
assessment with regard to the future would be very 
subjective on the part of the auditors but might be of 
use to different user groups. 
Taking the future into account Baden has given 
another reason for conducting external management audits 
on limited liability companies: 
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'It may be some time before the results 
of bad management become reflected in the 
accounts, and by then it may be too late 
for the shareholders to do anything about 
it .... The intention is not only to 
protect the outside or minority share- 
holders, who may be completely 
indifferent and apathetic, but also to 
prevent the inefficient and wasteful use 
of national resources.'5 
Baden has broadened the argument from the viewpoint of 
the shareholders to the viewpoint of society and the 
waste of finite resources. At present what happens when 
a management team is inefficient? Little pressure can be 
exerted on such inefficient management except in the 
extreme cases of a take -over bid or receivership. 
In suggesting a further reason for conducting 
external management audits, Flint has developed this 
theme of society's viewpoint: 
'Referring to the private sector, the 
development of the concepts of the 
operational audit and the management 
audit are important as further 
illustrations of the operation of the 
interaction of ethical standards, 
social values and environmental 
circumstances to develop the audit to 
monitor conduct and performance as 
measured against the perceived 
norms.'6 
This raises the whole question of accountability which 
has received increasing attention during recent years. 
For example, Tricker has suggested: 
'The independence of outside directors, 
audit committees, non -executive 
director reports and similar ideas are 
also being developed. These are all 
reflections of the search for an 
accepted concept of accountability.'7 
The external management audit is one of the 'similar 
ideas' which is being developed in this 'search for an 
accepted concept of accountability'. 
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In the North American context Churchill et al have 
argued: 
'We may think of "comprehensive audit" as 
representing the ultimate extension from 
preoccupations with financial accounting 
and opinion audits, as in the past and 
present, to a future in which ALL phases 
of management will be subject to audit 
as part of an external (ultimately 
comprehensive) accountability for 
corporate behaviour.'8 
The above 'comprehensive audit' can be equated with an 
external management audit. Steckmest has clarified one 
of the reasons for the necessity of such 'external 
accountability for corporate behaviour': 
'While large corporations have become 
quasi- public in their nature, they are 
governed essentially as private 
institutions and therefore should be 
made more accountable to a variety of 
interests.19 
In the British context Sherer and Kent have made 
this link very explicit between external management 
auditing and accountability not only to the shareholders 
but also to other participants such as bankers, employees, 
consumers, government and the local community: 
'However, the interpretation placed on 
management auditing in this book 
emphasises the potential role that a 
management audit has within the 
accountability process between an 
organisation and its external 
participants.'10 
This emphasis on accountability not only to the share- 
holders but also to other user groups could be an 
important source of pressure for companies to have 
external management audits. 
User groups 
The above reasons for external management auditing 
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emphasise that the basic objective underlying the idea 
of the management audit is to attempt to fulfil the need 
for additional data which external users may combine with 
existing data to evaluate a company's performance. What 
evidence do we have that external users are interested in 
a report on the performance of the management function? 
First of all we have the views of authors such as 
Campfield: 
'There is every indication that, in the 
future, the various publics - investors, 
taxpayers, creditors, labour unions, etc - 
will be clamouring for more "independent" 
evaluation of managers' performances.'11 
Burton has developed a similar theme to Campfield: 
'Investment analysts today recognise that 
the evaluation of management is of 
crucial importance and, at the same time, 
extremely difficult for any outsider .... 
Similarly, stockholders - particularly 
those who control large holdings in trust 
for others - may want more assurance that 
their capital is being effectively used. 
Finally, there is an increasing tendency 
for the public to feel that corporate 
management has the responsibility of 
using assets under its control effectively 
as a service to society as well as its own 
-stockholders.'12 
Evidence is also available from some empirical 
surveys13 For example, in a survey of financial analysts 
in the United States of America, Mautz14 found that the 
analysts identified 'managerial ability' as the second 
most important company characteristic out of a list of 
six. Similarly, in another American survey Baker and 
Haslem 5 found that individual investors ranked 'the 
quality of management' as the second most important factor 
out of thirty -three factors. In a survey of investors 
conducted this time in Australia by Chenhall and Juchaul6 
'the quality of management' was ranked fourth in 
importance out of thirty -seven factors. In another 
Australian survey of shareholders in the early 1970s, Beck 
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asked specifically about external financial auditing and 
71% of the respondents agreed with the statement that 
'you expect the work of the auditor to give you assurance 
that management is efficient'.17 How many other users 
think that the existing external financial audit report 
is giving an /assurance that management is efficient'? 
In addition to the above empirical evidence certain 
arguments can be advanced why various user groups might 
be interested in a report on the performance of the 
management function. The percentages of the total market 
value of shares in U.K. companies held by different 
categories of shareholders in 1963, 1975 and 1981 changed 
as follows :18 
1963 1975 1981 
/0 % % 
Individuals 54 37 28 
Insurance companies 10 16 21 
Pension funds 6 17 27 
Unit trusts, investment trusts 
and other financial companies 13 15 10 
Other investors 17 15 14 
100 100 100 
This table shows the decline in the percentage of 
the total value of shares held by individual investors 
and the increase in the percentage held by institutional 
investors - particularly the pension funds and insurance 
companies. At present institutional investors make 
assessments of the performance of the management function 
from many sources including published financial 
statements and informal meetings with the top managements 
of companies. The external management audit report could 
provide another piece of the total picture which the 
institutional investor is seeking. Of course the 
individual investor would also be interested in the 
external management audit report but it is more difficult 
for the individual investor, compared to the institutional 
investor, to bring pressure either to introduce such 
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audits or, if such audits are introduced, to influence 
the performance of the management function. 
An argument can also be advanced that the external 
management audit could prove to be a useful tool for 
bankers. In the lending decision a crucial factor is the 
ability of the borrowing company to pay the interest and 
to repay the loan in the future and this will depend at 
least partly on the future performance of the management 
function. This decision by bankers about the ability of 
a company to repay a loan may therefore be aided by an 
external management audit report. 
A similar argument can be applied to creditors. 
Suppliers have a continuing relationship with a company 
and are interested in its ability to pay existing and 
future debts. Furthermore, suppliers are almost always 
unsecured creditors whereas the banker may have some 
security from the company. Therefore it is important for 
suppliers to be able to anticipate problems with their 
major customers so that credit may be withdrawn or at 
least reduced. An external management audit report might 
help suppliers to identify potential problem customers. 
Other user groups might combine the external 
management audit report with the existing data available 
to them. For example, trade unions, employees and 
potential employees of a company are particularly 
interested in the long -term prospects of that company and 
the external management audit report could be a useful 
source of information. Various governmental agencies, 
such as the Department of Industry, might be interested 
in the overall picture presented by external management 
audit reports. These reports taken together would 
reflect on the general state of British corporate 
management. 
In this chapter various reasons have been suggested 
why external management audits might be conducted. 
Perhaps the most persuasive of these reasons is the 
accountability of the corporate management to the various 
external user groups. This implies the evaluation of 
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corporate management performance in terms of the 
efficiency of the stewardship of that company's resources. 
However, this chapter has also illustrated that the 
external management audit can be interpreted in various 
ways for example Foster with 'periodic efficiency 
auditing', NIVRA with 'information about decision - making 
processes' and Washbrook with an 'overall management and 
administration audit'. Such variety is not surprising 
with external management auditing being at a relatively 
early stage of development in historical terms. The 
following chapter therefore considers some specific 
proposals and examples of external management auditing to 
clarify some of the possible aspects of the performance 
of the management function on which the external 
management auditor could report. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PROPOSED AND ACTUAL EXAMPLES 
OF EXTERNAL MANAGEMENT AUDITING 
Using the definition that an external management audit is 
an independent examination of an organisation resulting in 
a statement to external users on the performance of the 
management function, a number of proposals and actual 
examples can be found with at least an element of external 
management auditing. Some of these proposals for external 
management audits in the private sector will be considered 
first because many of the actual examples of external 
management audits have been influenced by these proposals. 
Proposals for external management auditing 
Two proposals were developed over many years during the 
first half of the twentieth century in both the United 
States and Great Britain by Benedict and Rose respectively. 
Benedict in the early 1900s discussed a measurement and 
rating system which culminated in his 'Yardsticks of 
Management11 in 1948. Benedict listed his yardsticks in 
great detail but his major divisions of management 
analysis were weighted as follows: 
50 points Corporate and financial factors 
50 " Integrated management plan 
40 " Product design and engineering 
30 " General accounting 
20 it Publicity and advertising 
15 " Toolmaking 
10 " Public relations 
5 " Storeroom facilities 
The great detail of Benedict's yardsticks can be seen from 
the fact that he listed over 140 subdivisions in his 
management analysis. 
In Great Britain a similar approach to that of 
Benedict was suggested by Rose2 in 1932 in his book 
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entitled 'The Management Audit'. It is interesting that 
both Benedict in the United States and Rose in Great 
Britain developed their ideas on management auditing over 
many years. Rose argued that 'the management audit would 
concern itself with the whole field of activities of the 
concern from top to bottom'.3 The survey proposed by 
Rose covered the following areas: 
1. Organisation chart 







(f) Internal transport and dispatch 
(g) Buildings and layout 
4. Distribution: 
(a) Sales records 
(b) Sales policy 
(c) Service 
(d) Publicity 
(e) Sales control 
5. Product development and market research 
6. Accounts and finance 
7. Legal and secretarial 
8. Personnel and industrial relations. 
Rose, however, emphasised that the management auditor 
would not question the general policy of the organisation. 
The objective of Rose's management audit was to check the 
means by which such policies were implemented. 
Both Benedict and Rose developed their proposals for 
external management audits in great detail during the 
first half of the twentieth century. Since the late 1960s 
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a number of proposals for external management audits have 
been put forward by Burton, Langenderfer and Robertson, 
Robertson and Clarke and Burton and Fairfield in the 
United States and by Baden, Rhys Williams, Bishop and 
Washbrook in Great Britain. For example, in 1968 Burton 
proposed an external management audit with the emphasis 
on the development of management performance standards to 
evaluate the procedures and results of organisations. 
Burton suggested that a first step would be the develop- 
ment of a managerial control measure and he outlined the 
following possible classification of areas of managerial 
control :5 
1. Organisation control 
2. Planning and information systems 
3. Asset management 
4. Marketing system 
5. Production system 
All of the above categories were further subdivided into 
four more specific aspects of managerial control. 
Management control is also one of the five main 
topics in Langenderfer and Robertson's6 1969 proposal for 
'A Theoretical Structure for Independent Audits of 
Management'. To date this is probably the most complete 
attempt at a theoretical approach to management auditing. 
Langerderfer and Robertson put forward nine hypotheses of 
independent management auditing and concluded: 
'Thus the topics of management representations, 
decision systems, management control, 
standards of rational management, and 
comprehensive disclosure remain as 
potentially fruitful areas for investigation. 
At the very least, existing knowledge of these 
concepts could be integrated more fully into 
the management audit concept.'7 
Robertson and Clarke8 later researched the first of these 
topics namely 'Verification of Management Representation: 
A First Step Toward Independent Audits of Management' 
which was published in 1971. Management representations 
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were defined as 'all informational disclosures that 
management currently presents to the public, with the 
exception of pictures and the traditional audited 
financial statements'.9 Robertson and Clarke considered 
that insufficient evidence existed for verifying the 
annual report content taken as a whole, but they suggested 
that generally accepted financial auditing procedures 
could be used as a starting point for an audit of 
management representations. Robertson and Clarke 
concluded: 
'Management- related auditing will remain 
in the theoretical realm until the 
concepts and problems are tested in 
practice.'10 
It is interesting that these various proposals for 
external management audits should be published in the 
United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, 
Burton in particular has maintained his interest in 
external management auditing and in 1982 in an article 
Evolution in a Changing Environment' 
Burton and Fairfield11 proposed: 
'A second product which might be developed 
is an independent audit of various manage- 
ment processes and functions which focus on 
the efficiency and effectivess with which 
tasks are accomplished... A management 
audit product might also deal with decision 
making systems rather than achieved results ... 
Outside parties have a legitimate interest 
in managerial performance which goes beyond 
the results presented in the financial 
statements.'12 
However, it is not only in the United States that 
proposals have been put forward for external management 
audits. Several British proposals have also been made 
since the 1960s. 
In 1968 Baden13 was considering the situation from 
the viewpoint of the shareholders and argued that share -. 
holders could do little in a situation where the manage- 
ment of a company are inefficient except hope for a 
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takeover bid. Baden therefore suggested: 
'There would seem to be no prima facie 
reason why the efficiency of management 
should not be capable of assessment by 
some impartial third party, and a 
report on this made to shareholders.'14 
This proposal for an external management audit was in 
fact developed by Sir Brandon Rhys Williams, M.P., who 
in 1969 attempted to introduce a form of statutory 
external management audit. 
The private Members' Bill of Rhys Williams15 would 
have enabled a shareholders' representative committee to 
make a formal inquiry into the efficiency of the company's 
operations. The exact terms of the reference of inquiry 
would have been settled by the committee appointed. 
However, section 6(1) of this Bill defined a management 
audit as 'an inquiry into the advisability of any of the 
policies of the directors in furthering the objects of 
the company as defined in the memorandum, or into the 
efficiency with which they are securing the execution of 
those policies'. This Bill failed owing to a lack of 
Parliamentary time although it successfully completed the 
House of Commons Standing Committee stage. The journal, 
'The Accountant' of July 26th 1969, commented: 
'The significant fact is that the Bill 
made as much progress as it did; and 
while, no doubt, it may be claimed 
that the opposition of influential 
bodies such as the allied accountancy 
bodies and the Chartered Secretaries 
was effective, the simple fact was 
that the Bill attracted a lot of 
sympathetic notice, not least in the 
House of Commons.'16 
The above quotation implies that in 1969 the British 
accountancy bodies were opposed to this type of external 
management audit. 
Given this opposition from the British accountancy 
bodies it is ironic that in 1974 Bishop17 proposed that 
28 
an external management audit could be developed from the 
existing statutory financial audit function. One part of 
Bishop's proposal for an 'operations audit' was that the 
auditors' report to directors on the adequacy of the 
internal control procedures should also be included in 
the audit report given to shareholders. However, Bishop 
also suggested: 
'As part of the statutory audit, the larger 
firms of accountants often review the cash 
flow and profits forecast in order to 
satisfy themselves that the value of the 
company's assets should be viewed as a 
continuing entity. This function and an 
extension of the review to include the 
total management information system 
should become a statutory requirement, and 
be called the operations audit.'18 
Bishop developed this argument and concluded that auditors 
should report on the effectiveness and adequacy of the 
management information system to the shareholders. 
Bishop and the other British proposals already 
mentioned considered the external management audit to be 
very much for the benefit of the shareholders of the 
company. Washbrook's19 proposal in 1978 takes a similar 
viewpoint with the results of the external management 
audit being used for the benefit of the shareholders and 
the general investing public. Washbrook proposed a wider 
form of external management audit than that suggested by 
Bishop namely an overall management and administration 
audit. Washbrook in fact concluded: 
'I should like to think that the audit of 
directors as managers and administrators 
will become a legal requirement.'20 
Washbrook viewed the external management audit in the same 
light as the existing external financial audit. 
These are some of the American and British proposals 
for external management audits of companies. Although 
these proposals generally begin from the viewpoint of the 
shareholders, the details of the proposals are diverse 
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but two general themes can be identified. The early 
proposals of Benedict and Rose concentrate on the 
efficiency of management and this theme can be seen also 
in the proposals of Burton and Fairfield, Baden and Rhys 
Williams. However, Burton and Fairfield and Rhys 
Williams combine this theme of the efficiency of manage- 
ment with a second theme of the effectiveness of manage- 
ment and the proposals of Bishop and Washbrook also 
develop this theme of the effectiveness of management. 
These, therefore, are some of the proposals for external 
management audits and some actual examples will now be 
examined. 
Actual examples of external management auditing 
Many of the developments in external management auditing 
have taken place in the public sector which provides more 
examples at present than the private sector. Henley has 
emphasised the similarities between the public and 
private sectors in this field: 
'The public and private sectors share the 
need for a common approach to some aspects 
of efficiency, for example cost control 
and the pursuit of value -for -money and 
common techniques could be applied 
therein.'21 
Therefore, some public sector examples both in North 
America and Great Britain will be considered. 
(a) Public sector 
In the area of governmental auditing, the U.S. General 
Accounting Office provides one of the most complete 
existing examples of external management auditing. The 
Congress created the General Accounting Office (G.A.O.) in 
1921 to maintain fiscal accountability over appropriated 
funds. The G.A.O. has evolved into the control arm of 
the Congress. The Comptroller General heads the G.A.O. 
and is appointed by the President for a 15 year term 
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subject to removal only by the action of the Congress. 
The staff of the G.A.O. consists of approximately 3,000 
auditors with a large percentage being non -accountants. 
The Comptroller General prepares an annual report for 
Congress summarising the results of the year's audit and 
review activities. 
In 1972 the G.A.O. issued 'Standards for Audits of 
Governmental Organisations, Programs, Activities and 
Functions' and these Standards state: 
'The full scope of an audit of a governmental 
program, function, activity or organisation 
should encompass: 
(a) An examination of financial transactions, 
accounts, and reports, including an 
evaluation of compliance with applicable 
laws and regulations. 
(b) A review of efficiency and economy in 
the use of resources. 
(c) A review to determine whether desired 
results are effectively achieved.'22 
These three types of audit conducted by the G.A.O. are 
generally known as: 
(a) Financial and compliance audits 
.(b) Economy and efficiency audits 
(c) Programme results (or effectiveness) audits. 
The G.A.O. Standards also include a specific reporting 
standard stating that copies of the reports should also 
be made available for public inspection. Indeed the 
G.A.O. issues a monthly list of its reports with 
summaries of the main findings. 
A former Director of the G.A.O., Herbert,23 has 
written a book partly based on the work of the G.A.O. 
entitled 'Auditing the Performance of Management'. In 
this book Herbert argues: 
'And whereas the purpose of auditing the 
performance of management used to be to 
ensure compliance with laws, policies 
and regulations, the primary purpose 
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today is to improve managerial 
performance, to determine whether an 
organisation, activity or program has 
been managed economically, efficiently 
or effectively.'24 
It is perhaps rather too easy to discuss economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness without defining these terms. 
Dewar has attempted to distinguish between these three 
terms in the following diagram: 
Actual Input > Efficiency > Actual Output 




Planned Input Planned Output 
Even in this helpful diagram perhaps the distinction 
between efficiency and effectiveness is clearer than the 
distinction between economy and efficiency. 
In addition to the G.A.O's economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness audits at the national level in the United 
States, external management auditing is also expanding at 
the individual state level. For example Brown, Williams 
and Gallagher have argued: 
'In 1938 there were five states where 
sole post -audit responsibilities rested 
with an appointive legislative auditor; 
the number changed to eight in 1951, 15 
in 1960 and 25 in the late 1970s. 
There are now over 40 states in which 
the audit function is part of the 
legislative branch. Performance 
auditing is closely correlated with 
the increased role of the appointed 
auditor.'26 
Such performance audit reports are generally available to 
the public. 
American education is another public sector area 
where external management audits have been attempted. 
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For example, an independent performance audit of a school 
district was completed in September 1979 for a group of 
citizens and industrialists in Columbus, Ohio. The 
consultants defined their task as being 'an external, 
objective and systematic review of available and 
retrievable data developed by the school district to 
determine how well it has developed its objectives, 
managed its resources and obtained the results that it 
desires'.27 Such an audit examined both the efficiency 
and the effectiveness of the school district. A further 
example illustrating the possible range of external 
management audits is the performance audit of the 
Department of Public Safety in the City of Sunnyvale28 
conducted by Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co. in 1974. 
Since the early 1970s the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (A.I.C.P.A.) has shown an 
active interest in external management auditing in the 
public sector. For example, in 1973 the A.I.C.P.A. 
issued 'Auditing Standards Established by the G.A.O - 
Their Meaning and Significance for CPAs'29 and in the 
Management Advisory Services Guideline Series in 1977 the 
A.I.C.P.A. issued 'Guidelines for CPA Participation in 
Government Audit Engagements to Evaluate Economy, 
Efficiency and Program Results'.30 These Guidelines 
emphasised the distinction between external financial and 
management auditing in the public sector: 
'The CPA should keep in mind the following 
significant distinction between financial 
auditing and engagements to evaluate 
efficiency, economy and program results. 
While there are some variations encountered 
in conducting financial audits, a 
practitioner skilled in examining account- 
ing records, financial statements and 
internal controls should encounter few 
material differences in the skills and 
knowledge required of him when moving from 
one government entity to another. This is 
not true for evaluation of economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness.'31 
American accountants are very much involved in external 
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management auditing in the public sector. 
A similar situation to the United States prevails in 
Canada.32 The Auditor General Act of Canada of 1977 
requires the Auditor General of Canada to report, like 
the G.A.O. in the United States, where: 
(1) Money has been expended without 
due regard to economy and efficiency. 
(2) Satisfactory procedures have not been 
established to measure and report the 
effectiveness of programmes where such 
procedures could appropriately and 
reasonably be implemented. 
In Canada the Canadian Comprehensive Auditing Foundation 
(C.C.A.F.) is one of the world's leading organisations in 
actively promoting the whole area of internal operational 
and external management auditing. The C.C.A.F. was 
established in 1980 with the main objective of serving as 
a focal point for collecting and communicating 
comprehensive auditing knowledge and experience. 
The C.C.A.F. organises a methodology interchange 
programme which has included audit guides such as 
'Auditing of Efficiency'33 and 'Auditing of Procedures 
for Effectiveness'34 One of the C.C.A.F's publications 
has stated: 
'When comprehensive audit reports are made 
available to the public, taxpayers obtain 
assurance that their elected or appointed 
representatives, or the governing body 
will be kept informed as to whether the 
organization's mandate is being pursued 
in an economic, efficient and effective 
manner. The public is given information 
to help it judge whether resources are 
being managed with due regard to value 
for money.'35 
As in the United States, the amount of external manage- 
ment auditing is increasing in the Canadian public sector. 
Similarly, in Great Britain we have many examples of 
external management auditing in the public sector. In 
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Great Britain we have had a Comptroller and Auditor 
General of the Exchequer and Audit Department but the 
range of audits has been narrower than the G.A.O. in the 
United States with the main emphasis being on financial 
auditing with some compliance and efficiency audits but 
almost no effectiveness audits.36 However, in January 
1984 a new National Audit Act came into force and this 
established the National Audit Office with the Comptroller 
and Auditor General as its head and with staff being 
transferred from the Exchequer and Audit Department. 
Section 6(1) of the National Audit Act reads as follows: 
'The Comptroller and Auditor General may 
carry out examinations into the Economy, 
Efficiency and Effectiveness with which 
any Department, Authority, or other body 
to which this section applies, has used 
its resources in discharging its functions.' 
Macrae has pointed out: 
'The Exchequer and Audit Department used 
to devote a little over a quarter of its 
time to such exercises and, given the 
current encouragement to increase the 
proportion of time spent on such work, 
it will be interesting to see the effect 
of this on resources.'37 
This example of the National Audit Office is therefore 
very recent but it can be expected to be an increasingly 
important example of external management auditing in the 
British public sector. 
The Competition Act of 1980 allows Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission to conduct external management audits 
in the public sector. Under Section 11 of this Act the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission can be directed to 
investigate certain public bodies including the 
nationalised industries on the basis of efficiency and 
costs and the service provided. Hatch and Redwood38 
have pointed out that the first reference made under 
this Act was British Rail's commuter services in London 
and the South East with this report being published in 
October 1980. 
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Local authorities are also experimenting with a form 
of management audit where a firm of management consultants 
prepares a report on the local authority which is 
available to the general public. For example, two such 
studies have been commissioned for Cheshire County 
Counci139 and Hereford and Worcester County Council.40 
'Value for Money', a report on behalf of Cheshire County 
Council, was made by PA Management Consultants in 1979. 
Although the trade unions did not cooperate with the 
consultants, the findings of this study included 
criticisms of Cheshire's committee system, the over- 
lapping and over -extended services and a failure to adjust 
to a falling demand. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. and 
Coopers & Lybrand in 1980 completed a manpower review of 
Hereford and Worcester County Council reviewing this 
authority's corporate processes and its organisation and 
procedures. The consultants' reports were presented to 
several interest groups and were publicly debated. 
Hereford and Worcester County Council committed itself to 
implement most of the consultants' recommendations. 
Several local authorities are now experimenting with 
such external management audits which are very much one - 
off studies. However, the 'Standards for the External 
Audit of Local Authorities and Other Bodies in 
Scotland'41 require the annual external audit to include 
value for money auditing. Similarly, Section 15(1) of 
the Local Government Finance Act of 1982 reads as follows: 
'In auditing any accounts required to be 
audited in accordance with this part of 
this Act an auditor shall by examination 
of the accounts and otherwise satisfy 
himself ... (c) that the body whose 
accounts are being audited has made 
proper arrangements for securing Economy, 
Efficiency and Effectiveness in its use 
of resources.' 
In legislation affecting the public sector, the 3 Es 
(economy, efficiency and effectiveness) are taking their 
place alongside the financial audit. 'The Code 
of Local 
Government Audit Practice for England and Wales'42 
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expands on this requirement for value for money auditing 
by the external auditor. 
At The Institute of Cost and Management Accountants' 
1983 National Conference on 'Value Assurance' Sir Kenneth 
Sharp43 made an interesting comparison between the 
requirements of the 1983 National Audit Act and the 1982 
Local Government Finance Act. In relation to the 
National Audit Act Sharp argued: 
It is interesting to note two important 
points. Firstly the word "examinations ". 
There is no suggestion that the C & AG is 
auditing; secondly the use of the past 
tense. The examinations are to be 
directed to how the body has used its 
resources. There is no suggestion that 
this is other than a retrospective 
review of past performance.'44 
In contrast, in relation to the 1982 Local Government 
Finance Act Sharp pointed out: 
'This phraseology carries a much stronger 
recognition that it is the duty of 
management actively to "secure" the three 
Es with a view to the future, in contrast 
to the National Audit Act which has much 
more the ring of a post- mortem.'44 
The amount of management auditing being carried out 
in the local government sector can be seén from two 
publications namely the Price Waterhouse 'Value for Money 
Auditing Manual'45 and the C.I.P.F.A. et al 'Local 
Government Value for Money Handbook'46 which contain over 
one hundred examples. These can be classified as external 
management audits because the results are available to 
those outside the organisation being audited - for 
example via the Audit Commission. It is interesting that 
in Volume 1 of the 'Local Government Value for Money 
Handbook' all the examples were submitted by local 
authorities but Volume 2 included contributions from such 
firms as Coopers & Lybrand, Ernst & Whinney, Finnie Ross 
Allf ields, Hay Management Consultants, Inbucon, Peat 
Marwick Mitchell & Co, Price Waterhouse and Thornton 
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Baker. The general conclusion is that external management 
auditing is very much on the increase in the public sector 
both in the United States and Great Britain. 
This trend is also evident in other countries. In a 
United Nations publication 'Public Auditing Techniques 
for Performance Improvement' the representative from the 
World Bank noted that 'performance auditing had become a 
universal concern of Governments and Supreme Audit 
Institutions.'? In addition the 'Lima Declaration of 
Guidelines on Auditing Precepts' stated: 
'The traditional task of Supreme Audit 
Institutions is to audit the legality and 
regularity of financial management and of 
accounting. In addition to this type of 
audit, the importance and significance of 
which is undisputed, there is another 
type of audit which is oriented towards 
performance, effectiveness, economy and 
efficiency of public administration.'48 
Phrases such as value -for -money auditing and the 3 Es 
(economy, efficiency and effectiveness) have been helpful 
in promoting external management auditing. External 
management auditing is expanding in the public sector but 
what about the private sector of the economy? 
(b) Private sector 
In the North American private sector it is perhaps 
appropriate to begin with two examples which would fall 
into the public sector in Great Britain namely hospitals 
and utilities. In the United States 'utilisation reviews' 
are conducted which involve the audit of a hospital by an 
independent Professional Standards Review Organization. 
This utilisation review has been described as 'a tool to 
control and direct medical professionals in hospital 
administration contexts.'49 
In North America an external management audit of 
utilities is also becoming more common. Tanaka has 
suggested that pressures exist on 'utilities to justify 
both to the public and to regulatory commissions that 
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they are operating effectively, and that the requested 
rate increases are legitimate'.50 For example, in Canada 
the accounting firm of Clarkson Gordon have conducted a 
value -for -money audit of Ontario Hydro.51 In the United 
States, for example, external management audits have been 
carried out on Consolidated Edison by Arthur D. Little, 
Detroit Edison by Theodore Barry & Associates, Duke Power 
Company by Booz Allen and Niagara Power and Light by 
Arthur Young & Co.51 
However, these two examples of external management 
auditing of hospitals and utilities are relatively recent. 
In contrast, in the 1920s the Northwestern Mutual Life 
Insurance Company52 of Milwaukee adopted byelaws to 
establish an examining committee of five policyholders. 
This committee could examine any aspect of Northwestern's 
operations and could issue independent reports to the 
other policyholders. This system has been operating for 
over fifty years. In 1940 we have another example in the 
insurance field with the 'Outline for a Management 
Audit'53 by the Policyholders Service Bureau of the 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. This outline 
consisted,of a checklist of questions on fundamental 
management policies and practices. 
A very important type of external management audit 
was developed by Martindell,54 of the American Institute 
of Management, in 'The Scientific Appraisal of Management'. 
The following points system was used by the American 
Institute of Management55 as a comparative guide: 
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Optimum Minimum Rating 
Rating For Excellence 
Economic function 400 300 
Corporate structure 500 375 
Health of earnings 600 450 
Service to stockholders 700 525 
Research and development 700 525 
Directorate analysis 900 675 
Fiscal policies 1,100 825 
Production efficiency 1,300 975 
Sales vigour 1,400 1,050 
Executive evaluation 2,400 1,800 
10, 000 7,500 
The detailed questionnaire of the American Institute of 
Management, which has been used extensively, contains 
over 300 questions. The basic objective was to appraise 
the overall performance of management. 
Another type of external management audit which has 
been proposed and also carried out is the social audit. 
In 1955, Bowen argued for 'independent outside experts 
who would evaluate the performance of the business from 
the social point of vieir'.56 Abt Associates, for example, 
commissioned eight successive annual social audits in the 
1970s 'to estimate the social performance of Abt 
Associates in relation to our four constituencies: 
clients, community, stockholders and staff'.57 
From the accounting point of view an interesting 
external management audit originating in the United States 
is the peer review where one professional accounting firm 
reviews the work of another such firm. At first such 
peer reviews did not fall into the category of external 
management audits because the results were not disclosed 
outside the firm being reviewed. However, in the United 
States this situation has changed. The American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants (A.I.C.P.A.) has 
established a division for CPA firms and has created two 
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sections within this division namely a Securities and 
Exchange Commission (S.E.C) Practice Section and a 
Private Company Practice Section. One condition of the 
S.E.C. Practice Section is a mandatory periodic peer review 
by another CPA firm with a public report being issued 
stating the conclusions and recommendations of the review. 
The A.I.C.P.A. has established standards for such peer 
reviews and CPA firms which do not satisfactorily pass a 
peer review cannot remain a member of the S.E.C. Practice 
Section. 
American public accountants have also become 
involved in management auditing in the private sector 
although sometimes they do not fall into the category of 
external management audits because no statement is 
available for external users. Edds has suggested that 
'public accountants first undertook to get involved in 
operational auditing in the late 1960s1.58 Three 
publications illustrate this involvement of American 
accountants. Firstly, in 1972 two members of a CPA firm 
Lindberg and Cohn published 'Operations Auditing',59 
secondly in 1980 the A.I.C.P.A. published 'Operational 
Auditing by CPA Firms'60 and, thirdly, in 1982 the book 
by Flesher and Siewert 'Independent Auditor's Guide to 
Operational Auditing'61 contained twelve chapters of 
detailed audit programmes to aid the independent auditor. 
However, these publications were basically aimed at the 
external auditor participating in a form of consultancy 
which was closer to an internal rather than an external 
audit. Nevertheless, Flesher and Siewert recognise the 
possibility of external management auditing: 
'The report should be addressed to the 
persons who made the arrangements to 
have the audit performed. This could 
include a senior officer, the board of 
directors or even a third party.'62 
However, it must be admitted that the examples of 
external management auditing in the North American 
private sector are not that numerous although they appear 
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to be on the increase. The examples in Great Britain are 
even fewer than in North America. It is extremely 
difficult to find examples of external management audits 
in the British private sector. One unusual type of 
example is provided by Sayle63 with his assessment of the 
quality assurance management systems of companies. 
Certain British government agencies also carry out 
activities in relation to companies which can be viewed 
as having at least elements of an external management 
audit. Factory, alkali and water board inspectors all 
audit companies from a specific viewpoint and make known 
any adverse findings to those outside the company. For 
example, factory inspectors audit the safety function of 
management and if their findings are sufficiently 
important, factory inspectors can order a plant to close 
until the management rectifies the safety problems. 
Another British example, which stretches the meaning 
of external management auditing to its very limit, is 
when a prospectus for the issue of shares is released it 
includes a profit forecast. The rules of the Stock 
Exchange64 require that the auditor and any reporting 
accountant must comment on this profit forecast by 
addressing a report to the directors. This Accountant's 
Report which is included in the prospectus gives: 
(1) An indication in general terms of 
the work carried out such as a 
review of accounting bases and of 
the calculations on which the 
profit forecast is based. 
(2) An expression of an opinion as to 
whether forecasts are properly 
compiled on the basis of assump- 
tions made by the Board, and 
whether the figures are presented 
on a basis consistent with normal 
practices. 
This second part of the Accountant's Report can be viewed 
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as having some of the elements of an external management 
audit. For example, it is an independent examination 
resulting in a statement to external users on the 
performance of at least one small part of the management 
function. However, the Accountant's Report is as much an 
external financial audit as an external management audit. 
The basic conclusion is that external management audits 
are rare in the British private sector. 
External management audits in the private sector, 
however, are conducted elsewhere than in Great Britain 
and North America. For instance, since the seventeenth 
century Swedish and Finnish external auditors have been 
required to decide whether the managers of an organisation 
have adequately fulfilled their responsibility for 
administration. Today the Swedish and Finnish company 
audit reports include the statement 'that the board of 
directors and the managing director be granted discharge 
from liability for their management for the period 
covered by the annual report'. Nevertheless, Bomeli's 
argument of 1964 still applies today that 'meeting the 
requirements of the Corporation Acts in Sweden and Finland, 
which have grown out of a long history requiring comments 
regarding management performance does not really produce 
an opinion regarding the efficiency of management'.65 
Another European country where examples of external 
management audits can be found is Holland. In 1978 the 
Netherlands Instituut van Registeraccountants published a 
committee réport on management audit and this report 
contained a small survey consisting of 43 questionnaires 
with 24 respondents. An interesting finding was that the 
principals for the management audit investigation were as 
follows 66: 
Top management 19 
Supervisory directors 15 
Government 9 
Lenders 3 
Trade unions 2 
Other 3 
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Although the first category of top management and perhaps 
even the second of supervisory directors would fall under 
the heading of internal management auditing, the remaining 
17 cases provide evidence of external management audits 
being conducted in Holland. If the supervisory board is 
classified as an external user group, then Germany also 
provides an example of external management auditing. 
Baden has described how: 
'In Germany the auditor's report to the 
supervisory board of an A.G. includes 
comments on sales and production 
volumes, capacity and utilisation of 
plant, work- force, etc. mainly in 
comparison with the preceding year; 
expansion plans and other financial 
plans are also discussed.'67 
This German example illustrates some of the topics on 
which an external management auditor could comment. 
Moving beyond North America and Europe, the Indian 
Companies Acts were originally modelled on the British 
Companies Acts but they have developed in their own 
distinctive way. In 1965 an amendment to the 1956 Indian 
Companies Act was passed to incorporate a cost audit. As 
a result, some members of the Institute of Cost and Works 
Accountants of India now concentrate on this statutory 
cost a.udit68 which can be described as a form of external 
management audit. During 1978, 707 cost audits were 
initiated in 25 different industries (although 457 of 
these audits were in the cotton textile industry) with 
the average length of cost audit report being 
approximately 20 pages (excluding appendices). Several 
Indian authors such as Raob9 and Shome and Banerjee70 
describe the cost audit in terms of efficiency, 
productivity, added value and socio- economic benefits. 
The objects of the Bill introducing the requirement to 
maintain proper costing records referred to the 
'efficiency audit' which is a term 
usually associated 
with this management audit type of approach. 
In addition, the Cost Audit (Report) 
Rules of 1968 
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include requirements for the Indian cost auditor to act 
as an external management auditor, for instance: 
1. The cost auditor may give 'comments 
on the incentive schemes, if any, with 
particular reference to its contribution 
towards increasing productivity and its 
effect on cost of production' 
.71 
2. Under the section entitled Auditor's 
Observations and Conclusions the cost 
auditor may report on: 
(a) 'the adequacy or otherwise of budgetary 
control system, if any, in vogue in the 
company'; 
(b) 'suggestions for improvements in 
performance, if any, for example, by - 
(i) rectification of general imbalance 
in production facilities; 
(ii) fuller utilisation of installed 
capacity; 
(iii) concentration on areas offering 
scope for cost reduction and 
increased productivity; 
(iv) improved inventory policies'.72 
During a short visit to India cost auditors quoted me 
several examples of findings contained in cost audit 
reports. One example was a firm which added water as an 
input process in order to add hydrogen. The cost auditor 
asked why the waste oxygen was not collected. After 
further work, the cost auditor found that with a small 
amount of additional expenditure the oxygen could be 
collected and sold at a reasonable profit. Examples such 
as this fall into the category of external management 
audits. In another example the external management 
auditor reported not only that the recommended stock 
levels for raw materials were being exceeded but also 
that, in the auditor's opinion, these recommended stock 
levels were too high. 
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In relation to the Indian cost audit Prasad has 
argued: 
'External cost audit highlights the 
following features for the benefit of the 
shareholders or taxpayers: 
(a) Efficiency or otherwise of 
management; 
(b) Proper utilisation of resources; 
(c) Productivity of labour, material 
and machines; 
(d) Weak or strong points in the 
organisation.'73 
There are similarities between the above German example 
and the Indian cost audit with their emphasis on sales 
and production volumes, utilisation of the plant and the 
work-force. 
At this stage three limitations of the Indian cost 
audit as an external management audit should be mentioned. 
Firstly, although the cost auditor is appointed at the 
Annual General Meeting, the cost auditor's report does 
not go to the shareholders of the company but instead to 
the Company Law Board with a copy to the top management 
of the company. However, under a 1974 amendment, extracts 
from a cost audit report may be brought to the attention 
of the Annual General Meeting. Secondly, the Indian cost 
auditor concentrates on only certain defined aspects of 
corporate management's performance. Thirdly, the time 
allowed for the cost audit is very short being basically 
only thirty days. Indeed Ramaiya74 questions whether it 
is possible to conduct a cost audit as envisaged in the 
Indian Companies Act within the stipulated time. The 
answer to this question lies in the contents of the cost 
audit reports produced to date. Nevertheless, despite 
such limitations the Indian cost audit is, in my opinion, 
one of the best existing examples of external management 
auditing in private sector, although in the management 
auditing literature the Indian cost audit is almost 
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completely ignored. Obviously the economic situation, 
culture and environment are very different in India and 
Great Britain, nevertheless this Indian example is 
particularly interesting because the Indian Companies 
Acts have been developed from the British Companies Acts. 
Conclusions 
The above proposed and actual examples illustrate many 
possible forms of external management auditing. Perhaps 
the main conclusion of this chapter is the variety of 
examples which can be classified under the heading of 
external management auditing. One common theme through- 
out many of the proposed and actual examples of external 
management auditing both in the public and private 
sectors is the assessment of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of management. However, the variety remains 
wide and has ranged from product design to internal 
transport, from asset management to management control, 
from decision- making systems to management 
representations, from management information systems to 
administration and from utilisation reviews to fiscal 
policies. At its existing stage of development, external 
management auditing is still very broad and very flexible. 
Many new developments have taken place in the last twenty 
years. During this period more developments in external 
management auditing have taken place in North America 
than in Great Britian and almost all of these 
developments have happened in the public sector rather 
than in the private sector. 
Some reasons can be suggested for the predominance 
of the public sector in the field of external management 
auditing. Firstly, in recent years the public sector has 
faced increasing pressure to justify the resources being 
used and to provide value for money. Both internal 
operational auditing and external management auditing 
have been useful responses to such pressure. In 
particular external management audit reports provide 
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evidence to those outside the public sector organisation 
on how efficiently and effectively resources are being 
used within that organisation. Secondly, the output of 
many public sector organisations is difficult to measure. 
External management auditing has been one way of 
developing performance indicators in the public sector. 
Thirdly, in contrast to the public sector, the 
success of companies in the private sector is still very 
much judged by their profitability. Earnings per share 
remains an important performance indicator. In recent 
years with the liquidity problems of many companies the 
use of profitability as the only measure of a company's 
performance has been questioned. Furthermore, users have 
begun to realise the flexibility of the accounting 
measurement involved in determining a company's profit- 
ability. Neverthless, profitability remains the 
predominant performance indicator in the private sector. 
Fourthly, companies face possibilities such as bankruptcy 
or take -over bids which are not real alternatives for 
many public sector organisations. 
Fifthly, companies have developed their internal 
operational auditing capabilities. Corporate management 
would generally prefer to keep their problems to 
themselves rather than have the extra pressure of external 
users asking informed questions about what is happening 
within a company and perhaps even being critical of a 
company's top management. The reasons for external 
management auditing discussed in chapter two have not yet 
gained sufficient support either to persuade corporate 
managements to choose to undergo voluntarily external 
management audits or to persuade Parliament to legislate 
for compulsory external management audits. For example, 
institutional investors still generally prefer to switch 
investments rather than become involved in helping the 
management of companies with severe problems. Similarly, 
the ideas of accountability and the efficiency of 
management's stewardship have not yet gained sufficiently 
wide support to force change in the private sector as has 
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happened in the public sector. 
Another reason for the lack of development of 
external management audits in the private sector could be 
that various user groups have shown no interest in any 
form of external management audit. The fact that certain 
of these management audits have been conducted for many 
years in other countries implies that some external users 
find such audits useful in their decision - making process. 
In contrast, some external management audits have started 
and ceased, and other have not progressed beyond the 
proposal stage. What, therefore, do various user groups 
think of some form of external management audit? The 
following chapter considers the results of empirical 
surveys in this area of external management auditing. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SURVEYS OF OPERATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT AUDITING 
Several surveys have been conducted in the areas of both 
internal operational auditing and external management 
auditing. The internal operational auditing surveys are 
of interest because of the implications of their 
findings for external management auditing. The existing 
surveys are mainly American and - as with most areas of 
accounting empirical research - one major problem is the 
diversity of the studies making it difficult to draw 
general conclusions. 
Internal operational auditing surveys 
(a) Extent of internal operational auditing 
Several American surveys give an indication of the extent 
of internal operational auditing but the existing British 
surveys (such as Santockil and the Institute of Internal 
Auditors2) do not give a satisfactory corresponding 
figure for Great Britain. As already mentioned, in the 
United States a 1977 Research Report from the Conference 
Board by Macchiaverna concluded: 
'The majority of companies interviewed 
report that, over the past 10 years, 
the trend has been toward increased 
and broadened operational audits.'3 
However, comparing their 1975 and 1979 surveys (covering 
mainly the United States and Canada) the Institute of 
Internal Auditors found: 
'The percentage of time devoted to 
financial audits versus operational 
audits continues to be approximately 
50 %.'4 
Details of the number surveyed and the response rate for 
each survey cited in this chapter are given in 
note 27. 
In his British survey, Santocki5 used 
the term 
50 
'management audit' to cover both internal operational 
auditing and external management auditing but from the 
replies it became apparent that almost all the respondents 
had equated this term with internal operational auditing. 
Therefore, the 34% who replied that their organisation 
had been subject to management audit provided some 
evidence that internal operational audits are being 
conducted in Great Britain. 
In an attempt to overcome the definitional problem 
illustrated by the Santocki study, in a survey of 
controllers of the 200 largest industrial corporations in 
the Fortune 500 list San Miguel, Shank and Govindarajan6 
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This matrix highlights the problem of what type of audit 
actually should be included under the heading of internal 
operational auditing. One possible definition would be 
to include the entire non -financial column and the 
efficiency and effectiveness components of the financial 
column giving a total of 56.8 %. These surveys 
demonstrate that - particularly within North America - 
operational auditing forms a considerable percentage of 
total internal audit efforts. 
(b) Nature of internal operational auditing 
The nature and main characteristics of operational 
auditing have been the subject of investigation by several 
researchers. For example, in three separate surveys of 
internal operational auditing by Denis7, Macchiaverna8 
and Santocki9, very strong support was given to the task 
of evaluating control systems: 
% of Respondents Agreeing 
with Statement 
Denis Macchiaverna Santocki 
Evaluate control systems 97% 
Evaluate adequacy of 
systems, procedures and 
controls 98% 
Appraise management 
systems of planning and 
control 88% 
Of course, 'evaluating control systems' is also a 
characteristic of internal financial auditing and it 
would be interesting to know exactly what the respondents 
perceived as 'control systems'. Were they the same as 
internal control systems (with the emphasis on financial 
systems) or were they broader to include other systems 
such as production control and quality control? Certainly, 
in Santocki's survey, the 'management systems of planning 
and control' suggest that at least these respondents were 
thinking of more than the financial auditor's internal 
control systems. 
Some other statements which were strongly supported 
as being characteristic of internal operational auditing 
included: 
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% of Respondents Agreeing 
with Statement 
Denis10 Santocki 11 
Identify problem areas 97% 
Identify existing and potential 
weaknesses in all functions 
and operations within an 
organisation 
Evaluate group policies 
Appraise business organisation 
structure 
Appraise overall results to 
determine if the objectives 





It is significant that the two highest response rates 
(97% and 94 %) in two separate studies relate to the 
identification of existing and potential problem areas by 
the internal operational auditors. 
The three other responses in the above table 
illustrate at least partly non -financial aspects of 
operational auditing. Similarly, in the Macchiaverna12 
study, the following percentages of the 282 companies 
replying audited various non -financial activities and 
functions: 
Management information systems 67 
Production 62 
Personnel 60 
Marketing /advertising 53 
Again these responses emphasise the central importance of 
the audit of the management information systems (compare 
the above emphasis on planning and control systems) for 
internal operational auditing. 
Given the terminology problem even within internal 
auditing itself, it is interesting that the Institute of 
Internal Auditors13 included within its questionnaire a 
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series of characteristics which the respondents 
identified with particular types of internal auditing. 
From the point of view of this thesis, the most relevant 
distinction was between internal financial and 
operational auditing. Over 80% of the respondents agreed 




Safeguard company assets 88 
Check accuracy and reliability 
of accounting records 94 







The verbs in these phrases illustrate an important 
difference in emphasis between financial and operational 
auditing with the protective nature of financial auditing 
implied by 'safeguard' and 'check' and the constructive 
nature of operational auditing suggested by 'promote' 
and 'increase'. 
The above survey findings on internal operational 
auditing have relevance for external management auditing. 
These surveys illustrate the widespread nature of 
internal operational auditing (particularly in North 
America), the experience gained by operational auditors 
during their evaluation of control systems (in the 
broadest sense of that phrase), their audit of various 
activities which financial auditors would generally 
ignore and their identification of existing and potential 
problem areas in an organisation. Although the external 
management audit has different objectives from the 
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internal operational audit, this experience of internal 
operational auditors could prove extremely useful for 
the development of external management auditing - 
especially in relation to audit approach and techniques. 
However, some surveys have also been conducted on 
external management auditing. 
External management auditing surveys 
Several surveys have been conducted with the objective of 
discovering accountants' opinions about external manage- 
ment auditing. Interestingly, fewer surveys have sought 
the opinions of user groups. The need and demand for the 
external management audit has often been assumed without 
any evidence being produced in support of such an 
assumption. Nevertheless, the existing surveys provide 
some further insights into the external management audit. 
(a) Accountants' Opinions 
Four separate American surveys have asked Certified 
Public Accountants (C.P.A.$) their opinions of the 
external management audit. Norgaardl* interviewed 
partners and managers in C.P.A. firms on whether the 
public accounting profession should become involved in 
external management auditing. Her conclusion was a lack 
of consensus among these accountants on this issue. In 
general these C.P.A.s held the view that the external 
management audit is an extension or modification of the 
traditional audit and not an extension of the special 
management services engagement. It would have been 
interesting to know whether the potential users of such 
external management audit reports would have taken the 
same view. 
In a similar conclusion to that of the Norgaard 
survey, Imke15 found a lack of support for the idea of 
the external management audit. From a survey - including 
both public accountants and controllers - Imke 
concluded: 
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'Attesting to the efficiency of a company's 
management, or 'management audits', is not 
an appropriate application of the attest 
function of C.P.A.s, according to the 
accountants who participated in the 
survey.116 
The main reason for this lack of support for the external 
management audit could be traced to the perceived absence 
of practical and meaningful standards of measurement. 
The findings of a study by Moscove17 lend support to 
the hypothesis that C.P.A.s do not favour an external 
management audit and do not consider such an audit to be 
feasible. In Moscove's18 survey less than one -third of 
the C.P.A.s thought it feasible for the auditor to attest 
to non -financial information and only one -quarter of them 
considered it desirable for non -financial information to 
be included in the audit. 
The survey with the highest percentage level of 
support from C.P.A.s for the external management audit 
(over 50 %) is that of Smith, Lanier and Taylor19 but this 
survey suffers from a low response rate of 19% with only 
19 C.P.A.s replying. In addition to C.P.A. s, the Smith 
et al survey included controllers, financial analyst and 
mutual fund managers. Only 34 controllers responded to 
this questionnaire and less than 20% of them considered 
that a need existed for C.P.A.s to attest to the manage- 
ment function today.20 From these four surveys of 
accountants it can be concluded that American accountants 
in general do not consider that public accountants should 
conduct external management audits. 
(b) Management Consultants 
One of the earliest surveys relating specifically to 
external management auditing was carried out by Miller21 
for his 1959 doctorate. Miller assumed that management 
consultants would be the most appropriate group to 
conduct such audits and in a survey of them he obtained 
the following results about their methods of conducting 
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external management audits:22 
(1) One third of the management consultants 
replying expressed the belief that the 
management audit is basically conceptual 
and therefore not reducible to analysis 
by check list criteria. 
(2) Just under one -third used no formal 
check lists but developed a type of 
check list as a means of facilitating 
completeness as the management 
consulting engagement progressed. 
(3) Approximately one -sixth used check lists. 
(4) Approximately one -sixth of those reply- 
ing possessed a management consulting 
speciality unrelated to management 
auditing. 
It is perhaps surprising that so many American management 
consultants had assignments in the 1950s which were at 
least related to the external management audit. 
(c) Users' Opinions 
Both management consultants and accountants could produce 
external management audit reports but what do the 
potential users of such reports think about the external 
management audit? Two of the surveys already mentioned, 
namely Smith et al19 and Moscove17, included certified 
financial analysts and mutual fund managers as respondents. 
Smith et al23 asked both groups whether there is a need 
for C.P.A.s to attest to the management function today. 
Approximately half of both the financial analysts (44%) 
and the mutual fund managers (55.6 %) agreed that the need 
for such an audit existed at present. Another important 
finding of the Smith et al survey was that 'the audit 
should cover both performance and means'.24 The means 
utilised by management included information and control 
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systems, policies, procedures and organisation structure. 
The Moscove17 survey found stronger support among 
security analysts for a particular type of external 
management audit than the Smith et al survey. More than 
70% of the security analysts - compared to less than 20% 
of C.P.A.s - classify non -financial information as 
important for the purpose of advising on investments 
especially: 
(1) Future research plans 
(2) Overall evaluation of managerial 
efficiency and effectiveness in 
operating the business.25 
Furthermore, Moscove concluded: 
'Security analysts think it is feasible 
for the auditor to examine and attest 
to non -financial information ... 
Security analysts favour non -financial 
information being examined and attested 
to in the audit function.'26 
Conclusions 
This chapter highlights the lack of British empirical 
evidence even in the field of internal operational 
auditing and particularly in the field of external 
management auditing. The empirical evidence which is 
available shows that the experience of internal 
operational auditors would be useful for external 
management auditing particularly in the areas of 
evaluating organisational efficiency and effectiveness 
and of assessing corporate management information systems. 
From the users' surveys considered it can be very 
tentatively suggested that users see a greater need for 
external management audits than do accountants. However, 
perhaps the major conclusion in this area of users' 
opinions of external management audits is the general 
lack of empirical evidence. In addition, the empirical 
evidence which is available is American and is restricted 
to a limited number of user groups. The question posed 
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in the previous chapter namely what do various user 
groups think of some form of external management audit 
remains unanswered. Therefore, it seemed important to 
attempt to survey at least one user group in Great 
Britain to begin the long process of determining whether 
or not any demand for external management audit reports 
can be identified in Great Britain. The following 
chapter describes the reasons for choosing bankers as the 
user group to be surveyed and the way in which the 
questionnaire survey was developed. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DEVELOPMENT OF QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 
Choice of user group 
In Chapter 1 it was argued that several user groups such 
as shareholders, financial analysts, bankers, creditors, 
trade unions and various governmental agencies might be 
interested in external management audit reports. Of this 
list of user groups institutional shareholders, financial 
analysts, bankers and creditors regularly use corporate 
financial statements as part of the information on which 
they base their decisions and are therefore familiar with 
the financial audit report. All four groups would rank 
high on the priority list for being surveyed about 
external management auditing. 
An important reason for choosing bankers as the 
group to be surveyed on external management auditing is 
the results of research into the financial audit report. 
First of all it should be admitted that the results of 
almost all the existing empirical studies1 on the use of 
the financial audit report suggest that it ranks low in 
terms of usefulness in comparison with other items in 
companies' annual reports. For example, Epstein2 in a 
survey of American shareholders found that the auditor's 
report was ranked as the least useful in a list of eight 
items in the annual report namely the income statement, 
balance sheet, funds flow statement, footnotes, auditor's 
report, president's letter, essay and pictorial material. 
Similarly, in a British survey of shareholders of one 
particular company, Lee and Tweedie3 found that the 
auditor's report is the least read of seven items in the 
annual report namely chairman's report, profit and loss 
account, directors' report, balance sheet, notes to the 
accounts, statistical data and auditor's report. 
Nevertheless, accepting this relatively low ranking 
for the financial audit report, which group of users 
read the financial audit report most carefully? Three 
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studies can help us to answer this question. Firstly, 
Brenner has surveyed financial analysts, shareholders 
and bank loan officers. Brenner asked about various 
items in the annual report and the results for the 
financial audit report were as follows:5 
Bankers Financial Shareholders analysts 
Read very carefully 43 32 14 
Read somewhat carefully 27 29 24 
Did not read carefully 20 26 27 
Did not read 7 11 25 
No answer 3 2 10 
100 100 100 
In Brenner's survey, therefore, of the three user groups 
the bankers read the financial audit report most 
carefully. 
A second study in 1977 for the Commission on 
Auditors' Responsibilities by Fess and Ziegler also 
surveyed the same three groups namely bankers, financial 
analysts and individual shareholders. Fess and Ziegler 
asked 'how carefully do you read the auditor's report' 





Carefully 69 28 27 
Hurriedly 31 70 57 
Note that it is there - 2 16 
100 100 100 
Therefore, according to this Fess and Ziegler study, 
bankers read the auditor's report most carefully of the 
three groups surveyed with financial analysts in second 
place. 
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This study by Fess and Ziegler confirmed the 
findings of the Brenner survey that bankers read the 
financial audit report of companies more carefully than 
either financial analysts or shareholders. Of course, 
the Fess and Ziegler study concentrated on individual 
shareholders and it could be argued that institutional 
shareholders might be more interested in the financial 
audit report than individual shareholders. A third two - 
part survey by Lee and Tweedie in Great Britain would 
support such an argument. For example, interviewing 
301 private shareholders in a very large public company, 
Lee and Tweedie8 asked respondents to state the 
attention which they paid to each section of annual 
reports; and interviewing 231 institutional shareholders 
(such as insurance companies, pension funds, investment 
trusts, unit trusts and also stockbroking firms) Lee and 
Tweedie9 asked respondents whether or not they read 
various sections of the annual report and if the answer 
was yes, the respondents were then asked whether they 
read that particular section thoroughly or read it 
briefly for interest. 
The results from these two separate studies for the 
auditor's report were as follows: 
Private Institutional 
shareholders10 shareholders 11 
Read thoroughly 16 38 
Read briefly for interest 36 38 
Not read at all 48 24 
100 100 
According to these two Lee and Tweedie studies, 
institutional shareholders read the auditor's report more 
thoroughly than private shareholders. Very tentatively, 
therefore, it can be suggested that these three empirical 
surveys imply that in terms of reading the financial 
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auditor's report carefully the order is: 
1. Bankers 
2. Institutional shareholders and 
financial analysts 
3. Private shareholders. 
It should be emphasised that the above research about 
careful reading of the financial audit report does not 
necessarily mean that this report is understood by users. 
After summarising the results of eighteen empirical 
surveys related to the understanding of the financial 
audit report, Estes has concluded: 
'The general view that bankers and security 
analysts understand the auditor's role and 
report better than do shareholders is 
confirmed.'12 
One example of bankers' understanding of the financial 
audit report has come from Libby13 in his experiment 
using different audit reports with 30 Chicago audit 
partners from five 'Big 8' C.P.A. firms and 28 commercial 
loan officers from five large banks in Chicago. Libby 
found no significant differences between the auditors and 
bankers and concluded: 
.1 This general finding of no large differences 
implies that fears of miscommunication of 
the messages intended by audit reports to 
more sophisticated users may not be 
justified.' 
14 
When considering the results of Libby's survey, the small 
sample and the top management level of the bankers 
involved must be remembered. Nevertheless, these various 
empirical studies show that bankers read the financial 
audit report more carefully than financial analysts, 
institutional shareholders and private shareholders; and 
also bankers understand the financial auditor's role and 
report better than shareholders. 
Of the four groups highlighted at the beginning of 
this chapter, the empirical studies cited have not 
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included creditors. Research is lacking in relation to 
creditors and accounting in general and auditing in 
particular. In my opinion it would be extremely worth- 
while to survey creditors not only about their use of the 
financial audit report but also about their opinions on 
the external management audit report. Obviously the 
management audit report is very different from the 
financial audit report with different objectives, 
differences in length and different content and, there- 
fore, the degree of interest shown by various user groups 
in the management audit report may be very different from 
the interest shown in the financial audit report. 
Consequently, the ranking of user groups by their care in 
reading the management audit report may be very different 
from the ranking for the financial audit report. User 
groups high on the list for surveying about external 
management auditing would include institutional investors 
and financial analysts (from the above empirical evidence) 
and credit managers. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence 
relating to the financial audit report suggests that 
bankers would be a reasonable user group to survey first 
in relation to external management auditing. 
Another reason for choosing to survey bankers about 
external management auditing is the fact that it is 
generally accepted that bankers themselves try to assess 
corporate managements. For example, Cohen, Gilmore and 
Singer15 have proposed the following model of how American 
bankers analyse business loan applications: 
'An overall credit rating, Sl, is derived 
from three subsidiary factors; (1) a 
rating of management competence, F1; 
(2) an outside credit rating, F2; (3) a 
rating based on the results of the bank's 
financial analysis, 
F3.,16 
Cohen, Gilmore and Singer have also suggested how bankers 
can rate the competence of management: 
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'The rating of management competence, F1, 
is provided as input to the model. It , 
depends on such considerations as: 
(i) the ability of the firm's management 
to recognize change and take appropriate 
action; (2) the extent of forward plann- 
ing in the firm, partially indicated by 
the existence of regular forecasts, 
budgets, and product analysis programs; 
(3) marketing trends in the industry, 
indicating whether the firm is holding 
its own, getting ahead or slipping behind 
its competition; (4) the relation of the 
firm's present product lines to products 
offered by other firms in the industry; 
(5) the extent to which the firm's 
management has succeeded in the past in 
getting improvements made within the 
organization and in meeting competition; 
(6) the management's overall stewardship 
of the firm.' 
17 
In their final credit rating Cohen, Gilmore and Singer 
input the management competence factor into their model 
as high, average or marginal. 
Egginton18 provides evidence that British bankers 
assess corporate managements when he discusses the well - 
known banking guideline known as 'the three C's' which 
states that bankers should ensure that a borrower 
satisfies the conditions of 'character, capability and 
capital'. Egginton emphasises that in the corporate 
lending field, bankers must assess the manage 'pent of a 
company: 
'Incompetent management is a potent recipe 
for financial disaster, and bankers 
understandably give a high priority to 
satisfying themselves that the management 
of a borrowing firm appears reasonably 
competent. This issue is, of course, 
related to "character and capability" 
which occupied two -thirds of the three 
C's.119 
To assess the competence of the management of a company 
Egginton suggests that a banker may consider 'the 
management's experience, qualifications, enthusiasm and 
apparent grasp of industrial and financial problems, with 
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the related question of continuity raising the opposing 
dangers of a "one -man band" or too frequent management 
changes'.20 My discussions with bankers confirmed that 
they are extremely interested in the competence of 
corporate managements. Therefore, because bankers try to 
assess the management of companies and because they read 
the financial audit report carefully, it seemed reasonable 
to choose bankers as the first user group to be surveyed 
about external management auditing. 
Being based in Edinburgh the most obvious bankers to 
choose for this survey were those in the three Scottish 
joint -stock banks namely the Bank of Scotland, the 
Clydesdale Bank and the Royal Bank of Scotland. At the 
time of this survey in 1983 the Trustee Savings Bank 
Scotland had only recently started to lend to companies 
and it was considered that it would not have the 
experienced staff of the three Scottish joint -stock banks 
and, therefore, the Trustee Savings Bank Scotland was 
excluded from this survey. The three Scottish joint -stock 
banks were approached and all agreed to participate in 
this research project. 
Hypotheses 
The primary objective of this survey was to determine 
whether or not branch managers and head office lending 
officials in the Scottish joint -stock banks would express 
any demand for external management audit reports on 
companies and, if so, what information they would like 
included in such reports. The two main research 
instruments considered were interviews and a postal 
questionnaire. Although the head office lending officials 
of the three Scottish joint -stock banks are based mainly 
in Edinburgh and Glasgow with a few in London, the branch 
managers are spread throughout the country. Therefore, in 
order to include a random sample of a reasonable number of 
branch managers and given the time and cost constraints, a 
postal questionnaire was the research instrument chosen. 
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Originally the questionnaire was restricted to 
questions on external management auditing but my pre - 
survey discussions with bankers and others suggested that 
questions about financial auditing were necessary. For 
example, one original hypothesis was: 
Bankers consider that the management 
audit report would be useful in 
relation to their lending decisions 
about limited liability companies. 
However, without a similar hypothesis about the financial 
audit report, the results for the management audit report 
would lack a benchmark. In effect a comparative approach 
between the financial audit report and the management 
audit report was adopted in this questionnaire. Further- 
more, in the early stages from discussions with some 
bankers it emerged that the distinction between small and 
large limited liability companies might be important. 
Some bankers thought that the answers could be different 
for small and large companies. My discussions with 
bankers suggested that the size of company was a more 
important factor for them than whether it was a public or 
private company. These developments are reflected in the 
following hypotheses to be tested. 
The first hypothesis is: 
1. Bankers claim to read the financial 
audit report of their customer 
companies. 
It was decided to begin with hypotheses about the 
financial audit report because the bankers would be 
familiar with such reports. This hypothesis is expressed 
in terms of 'bankers claim to read' because, with a 
postal questionnaire, we rely on the bankers' answers 
rather than on checks to determine whether or not bankers 
actually did read the financial audit report of their 
customer companies. This first hypothesis is also 
expressed in terms of 'bankers claim to read the financial 
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audit report' because bankers could read this report 
without actually acting on it. 
The second hypothesis considers the use of the 
financial audit report: 
2. Bankers consider the financial audit 
report to be useful in relation to 
their lending decisions about both 
small and large limited liability 
companies. 
In all nine hypotheses the term 'bankers' is used to cover 
both groups of branch managers and head office lending 
officials. This second hypothesis is a development from 
the first hypothesis. If bankers claim not to read the 
financial audit report of their customer companies, the 
assumption is that such reports are not useful. However, 
if bankers claim to read financial audit reports, are 
these reports useful to the bankers? This hypothesis is 
expressed in terms of 'their lending decisions' which would 
cover both bankers' loan and overdraft decisions. This 
hypothesis can be divided into two in relation to small 
companies and large companies. The criteria used to 
differentiate between small and large companies are 
derived from the 1981 Companies Act's21 criteria which in 
turn are derived from the European Economic Community's 
Fourth Directive. The 1981 Companies Act's criteria are 
turnover of £1,400,000, balance sheet total of £700,000 
and 50 employees. In this survey a large limited 
liability company was defined as one 'which equals or 
exceeds at least two of the following three criteria: 
1. Turnover £2 million 
2. Balance sheet total assets £1 million 
3. Average number of employees 50'. 
A small limited liability company was also defined in 
terms of not exceeding (or equalling) two of the above 
three criteria. 
These first two hypotheses relate to the financial 
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audit report and the following three hypotheses 
concentrate on bankers' assessment of management. The 
third hypothesis to be tested is: 
3. Bankers claim to assess management 
when making their lending decisions 
about both small and large limited 
liability companies. 
As with the first hypothesis, this third hypothesis is 
expressed in terms of 'bankers claim'. Furthermore, this 
hypothesis is in terms of assessing the management of 
companies rather than assessing individual managers. 
This hypothesis is important for external management 
auditing because if bankers claim not to assess the 
management of companies when making corporate lending 
decisions, then a primary objective of the external 
management audit report might be of little interest to 
bankers. 
The fourth hypothesis develops the area of how 
bankers assess corporate managements: 
4. Bankers claim to use a range of 
financial and non -financial 
information in assessing manage- 
ment for both small and large 
limited liability companies. 
From discussions with bankers and others, originally five 
specific items of information were included in this 
fourth hypothesis namely: 
(a) Annual financial statements 
(b) Financial audit report 
(c) Qualifications of management 
(d) Practical experience of management 
(e) Bankers' personal knowledge of 
management. 
Accountants would not think of assessing management from 
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the financial audit report but some bankers at least do 
just that. It was difficult to express succinctly the 
information which bankers obtain by meeting the management 
of a company and gaining an overall impression. After 
many attempts this was expressed as the 'bankers' personal 
knowledge of management'. However, it was decided to omit 
such detail from this fourth hypothesis and make it more 
general by referring to 'a range of financial and non- 
financial information'. 
The final hypothesis on bankers' assessment of 
corporate management takes an even more general approach 
than the fourth hypothesis: 
5. Bankers consider that they do not always 
have sufficient information to make 
an adequate assessment of management 
for both small and large limited 
liability companies. 
This fifth hypothesis assumes that the results support 
the third and at least part of the fourth hypothesis and 
concentrates on the sufficiency of the information which 
bankers have to make assessments of corporate managements. 
If the results do support this fifth hypothesis, this 
could imply that the external management audit report 
might be of interest to bankers. 
After these five hypotheses on the financial audit 
report and bankers' assessment of corporate management, 
the remaining four hypotheses relate specifically to 
external management auditing. The sixth hypothesis is: 
6. Bankers consider that the management 
audit report would be useful in 
relation to their lending decisions 
about small and large limited 
liability companies. 
When considering the management audit report we move away 
from what bankers actually do in practice and turn to 
their opinions about the management audit report. With 
70 
both the financial audit report and the management audit 
report, the qualifying adjective 'external' was originally 
included in these hypotheses but in the context of bankers 
this seemed an irrelevant addition. Furthermore, both the 
financial audit report and the management audit report 
would need to be defined in the actual questionnaire 
derived from these hypotheses. These definitions are 
discussed in detail later in this chapter. This sixth 
hypothesis can also be compared with the above second 
hypothesis on the financial audit report. This is an 
example of the comparative approach mentioned above 
between the financial and management audit reports. 
At present the corporate financial audit report is 
required by law, paid for by the company and conducted 
annually. Continuing this comparative approach between 
the financial and management audit reports, the seventh 
hypothesis is: 
7. Bankers consider that the management 
audit of both small and large 
limited liability companies should 
be: 
(a) Required by the banks 
(b) Paid for by the company 
(c) Conducted annually. 
This hypothesis is framed in terms of the management 
audit being required by the banks rather than by the law 
because this survey is directed specifically at bankers 
but, like the financial audit, the management audit would 
be paid for by the company and conducted annually. 
These sixth and seventh hypotheses are at a very 
general level but the eighth hypothesis concentrates on 
the possible content of the management audit report: 
8. Bankers consider that the management 
audit report for both small and large 
limited liability companies should 
include assessments both of the general 
management function and of the 
individual business functions. 
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This hypothesis divides the previous assessment of 
management into two separate aspects namely, firstly, 
assessment of the general management function (including 
such areas as company objectives, corporate structure and 
management information system) and, secondly, assessment 
of the individual business functions (including such 
functions as purchasing, production, marketing and 
personnel). This should give some indication of the type 
of information which bankers would like to see included 
in management audit reports. 
The ninth and final hypothesis returns to the 
comparative approach between the financial and management 
audit reports: 
9. Bankers consider that the management 
audit report would be more useful 
than the financial audit report in 
relation to their lending decisions 
about both small and large limited 
liability companies. 
This hypothesis hypotheses two and six and, 
because this survey concentrates on management auditing, 
is expressed in terms of the management audit report 
being more useful to bankers than the financial audit 
report. in relation to their corporate lending decisions. 
The postal questionnaire could now be designed on the 
basis of these nine hypotheses. 
Questionnaire 
After several drafts, which benefited from the comments of 
some senior bankers and from colleagues at the University 
of Edinburgh and elsewhere, a questionnaire was tested in 
a pilot study with six bankers. After taking into 
account the feedback from this pilot study, a final 
questionnaire was developed. For the convenience of the 
reader this questionnaire is included in a pocket on the 
cover of this thesis so that the following comments can be 
read together with the questionnaire. 
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(a) Covering letters 
With any postal questionnaire one major problem is the 
possibility of a very poor response rate. For this 
reason, instead of simply sending out questionnaires to 
bankers, it was decided to approach the three Scottish 
joint -stock banks to seek their cooperation. This 
research project was explained to all three banks and the 
Royal Bank of Scotland in particular made the point that 
each year they received many research requests which are 
mostly rejected but they considered this particular 
project to be of sufficient interest to allow their staff 
to participate. Therefore, in addition to giving me 
their comments on the draft questionnaire, each of the 
three banks agreed to include a covering letter with my 
questionnaire. The main reason for this was to assure 
recipients of the questionnaire that their head office had 
given me permission to send this questionnaire to their 
staff. 
The advantage of such a covering letter is that it 
may encourage recipients of the questionnaire to reply 
but the disadvantage is the possible bias that it may 
introduce if such recipients think that this is a 
directive from head office. The three covering letters 
included minor differences in their wording and were 
signed by the following officials: 
1. William Anderson, Staff Training Courses 
Manager, for the Bank of Scotland. 
2. Campbell Harvey, Deputy General Manager - 
Administration, for the Clydesdale Bank. 
3. Norman Lang, Assistant General Manager - 
Branch Department, for the Royal Bank 
of Scotland. 
To try to reduce any bias caused by these covering letters, 
the letter from each of the three banks emphasised that 
the individual bankers were under no obligation to 
complete this questionnaire and that the personal opinions 
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of the individual bankers were being sought rather than 
any perceived bank opinion. Copies of these letters from 
the three banks are included in Appendix A. 
Despite this helpful covering letter from the banks, 
it was important for the response rate that my first page 
letter caught the interest of the reader. Therefore, to 
attract the attention of the readers so that they would 
be sufficiently interested to complete and return the 
questionnaire, my covering letter contained several 
points. Firstly, the letter began by emphasising that 
bankers are major users of corporate financial audit 
reports so that bankers could relate to a type of 
corporate auditing with which they would be familiar. 
Secondly, reference was made to the Rhys tivilliams'22 
proposal in Parliament that a management audit would be 
appropriate for companies. This introduced the term 
'management audit' and also indicated that we were 
considering a proposal for an additional type of audit. 
Thirdly, a general definition of a management audit was 
given relating it to users outside the company (such as 
bankers) and defining it simply as 'a report on the 
performance of management'. A more detailed definition 
of a management audit was included within the question- 
naire. Fourthly, the basic reason for this questionnaire 
was given namely 'to evidence bankers' opinions about 
this proposal on management auditing'. This emphasised 
that the questionnaire was seeking the opinions of 
bankers. 
Fifthly, to encourage the readers of this covering 
letter to complete the questionnaire, five specific 
points were made: 
(a) This was a short questionnaire which 
could be answered mainly by ticking 
the appropriate box. 
(b) Their cooperation was crucial for 
the success of this project. 
(c) A stamped addressed envelope was 
enclosed. 
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(d) Respondents did not need to reveal 
their name and they could not be 
personally identified from the 
questionnaire. 
(e) A copy of the results of this survey 
would be sent to those respondents 
who asked for this. 
Finally, at the foot of this covering letter it was noted 
that The Institute of Cost and Management Accountants was 
sponsoring this research project. This might indicate to 
the bankers that this research project had possible, long- 
term, practical benefits. Similarly, although the 
University of Edinburgh address was given at the top of 
the letter it was signed as John Innes, Chartered 
Accountant because bankers would generally have had more 
contact with accountants than with academics. Each 
letter was addressed individually with the name of each 
recipient and each letter was also signed personally to 
avoid the impression of a circular letter. On the back 
of this covering letter were the definitions of the 
terms used in the questionnaire. 
(b) Definitions 
To ensure a reasonable response rate, one constraint on 
this questionnaire was to keep it as simple and as short 
as possible while at the same time meeting its objective 
of determining whether or not bankers would express any 
demand for external management audit reports on companies 
and, if so, what information they would like included in 
such reports. Therefore, it was decided to keep the 
formal definitions in the questionnaire to a minimum but 
from my discussions with bankers three definitions were 
considered necessary. Firstly, the distinction was made 
between a small and a large limited liability company. 
As mentioned in the above section on hypotheses, my 
discussions with certain bankers suggested that the size 
of the company being audited might affect certain of the 
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answers. In order to keep the definition reasonably 
simple, the criteria used in the 1981 Companies Act were 
rounded up to the nearest £million to give the following 
three criteria: 
1. Turnover £2 million 
2. Balance sheet total assets £l million 
3. Average number of employees 50. 
A small limited liability company was defined as one which 
does not exceed (or equal) two of these three criteria and 
a large limited liability company as one which equals or 
exceeds at least two of these criteria. 
After defining small and large limited liability 
companies, a definition of the financial audit report was 
given. Although bankers can be expected to be familiar 
with the financial audit report, this definition was 
necessary to distinguish the financial audit report from 
the proposed management audit report. The adjective 
'proposed' was used to qualify the management audit report 
to emphasise that this type of report was only at the 
proposal stage and bankers, therefore, would not have seen 
such a report. The definitions of the financial audit 
report and the proposed management audit report were 
structured to be comparative: 
Financial audit report 
'a report, containing an independent opinion on the annual 
financial statements of a limited liability company, 
prepared by a professional accounting firm and included 
at present with the financial statements of your limited 
liability customer companies'. 
Proposed management audit report 
'a report, containing an independent opinion on the 
performance of the management of a limited liability 
company, prepared by a professionally qualified team and 
included with the financial statements of your limited 
liability customer companies'. 
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Two similarities between these two definitions are that, 
firstly, both consist of 'a report containing an 
independent opinion' and, secondly, both reports would be 
'included with the financial statements of your limited 
liability customer companies'. Originally a definition 
of independence was included in terms of the auditor 
being independent of the management of the company but 
several bankers suggested that this was unnecessary given 
the fact that bankers are aware of the situation with the 
financial auditor and also that 'an independent opinion' 
appeared in both definitions. The reason for having these 
two similarities was so that the responding bankers could 
relate the proposed management audit report to something 
with which they were familiar. The disadvantage was that 
the management audit report would not necessarily be 
included with companies' financial statements, 
However, the above definitions highlighted two 
important differences: 
Financial audit report 
1. Opinion on the annual financial statements 
2. Prepared by a professional accounting firm 
Proposed management audit report 
1. Opinion on the performance of the management 
2. Prepared by a professionally qualified team. 
These two differences suggest the wider scope of the 
proposed management audit report compared to the narrower 
financial audit report with its concentration on the 
annual financial statements and with its accounting 
emphasis. In addition an extra sentence was added to the 
definition of the proposed management audit report to 
clarify to the bankers what was meant by a management 
audit report: 
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'This report would include detailed comments 
on whether the management have used the 
resources of the limited liability company 
efficiently and effectively.' 
The possibility of including a specimen management audit 
report was considered but rejected for two reasons. 
Firstly, this would have lengthened the questionnaire and 
complicated this section on definitions. Secondly, one 
objective of this questionnaire was to try to determine 
what information bankers would like included in the 
proposed management audit report. If a specimen manage - 
ment audit report had been given in the questionnaire 
this might have biased the bankers' answers to the 
question asking which areas they would like specifically 
reported upon in a management audit report. 
(c) Questions 
In designing the questions the advice of several authors 
was taken into account. For example, Belson has advised 
that the following should be avoided in question design: 
'(1) loading up the question with a lot 
of different or defining terms; 
(2) offering long alternatives (as possible 
answers to a question); 
(3) the use of words that are not the 
usual working tools of the respondent; 
(4) giving the respondent a difficult task 
to perform; 
(5) giving the respondent a task that calls 
for a major memory effort; 
(6) offering alternatives that could both 
be true.'24 
23 
The problem of the order of the questions was at least 
partially solved by including the questions on the 
financial audit report first before those on the manage- 
ment audit report. Two further problems in any question- 
naire are validity and reliability. Bailey has pointed 
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out that the problem of validity is to ensure that 'the 
measuring instrument is actually measuring the concept in 
question, and not some other concept'.25 This question- 
naire was scrutinised carefully not only by bankers and 
myself but also by other academics26 with experience in 
designing such questionnaires. 
The problem of reliability in a questionnaire is to 
try to ensure that the measuring instrument is reliable. 
Bailey has argued: 
'The difficulty in checking for reliability 
is that when the same question is repeated 
in a single questionnaire as a consistency 
check, with no time lag, the respondent 
tends to see it as a "trick" question.'27 
In designing this questionnaire, no question was included 
twice but question 16 was as follows: 
Do you consider that the management audit 
report would be more useful than the 
financial audit report in helping you to 
make your lending decisions about small/ 
large limited liability companies? 
This question 16 was deliberately linked with previous 
questions (in the form of statements to which respondents 
had five alternative answers) on the financial and 
management audit reports namely: 
3 In general you find the financial audit 
and report useful in helping you to make your 
4 lending decisions about small /large 
limited liability companies. 
and 
10 You would find a management audit report 
and useful in relation to your lending 
11 decisions about small /large limited 
liability companies. 
This combination of questions, therefore, could reveal 
a respondent with inconsistent answers - for example 
replying that the management audit report would be more 
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useful than the financial audit report while also 
answering that the financial audit report is useful but 
the management audit report is of no use. 
Comments from various bankers and colleagues together 
with feedback from the pilot questionnaire enabled me to 
correct certain problems such as questions which were 
ambiguous. However, the final questionnaire can be viewed 
in terms of the comment by Schuman and Presser: 
'When scrutinized, almost every survey 
question is subject to criticism.'28 
Hopefully, the above process has helped at least to reduce 
such criticism. 
In the final questionnaire the first eight questions 
concentrated on financial auditing and existing lending 
decisions while questions nine to seventeen concentrated 
on management auditing. However, the management auditing 
questions included more sections within each question. 
The following Table 1 illustrates the links between the 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The comparative approach between the financial audit 
report and the management audit report can be seen from 
the following similar questions: 
Financial audit report Management audit report 










The final page of the questionnaire asked for personal 
details about some background variable. 
(d) Background variables 
Some similar research studies involving bankers and the 
financial audit report (such as Winters29, Brenner30 and 
Estes and Reimer3l) did not ask respondents for any back- 
ground details but Libby32 in his bankers' survey did. 
Other research studies involving shareholders (such as 
Lee and Tweedie33 and Estes34) have also collected back- 
ground information from respondents. For this survey on 
external management auditing, it was considered important 
to request background details from respondents, firstly, 
to determine the characteristics of a 'typical' 
respondent and, secondly, to check whether any answers 
might be related to background variables such as the age 
of respondents. However, it was decided to restrict the 
number of background variables to eight because too long 
a list might have affected the response rate. 
In choosing the eight background variables for this 
survey, consideration was given to those collected by 






2. Years of experience 
3. % of customers 
4. Bank 
5. Highest degree earned 




3. Accounting experience 
4. Occupation 
Estes 
(Shareholders and professional investors) 
1. Years of business experience 
2. Credit hours in accounting courses 
3. Credit hours in finance and investment courses 
4. Years of college completed 
5. Market value of investments in corporate stock 
6. Market value of investments in corporate bonds 
7. Market value of other securities 
8. Number of stock transactions in the past two years 
9. Frequency of evaluating stocks or advising investors 
10. Sex 
11. Age 
12. Familiarity with Dow Jones Industrial Average 
13. Investment attitude. 
Obviously several of the above variables (such as 
occupation and market value of other securities) were 
irrelevant for this particular study. However, using the 
above lists as a starting point and based on my discussions 
with bankers together with feedback from the pilot 
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questionnaire, the following eight personal details were 
identified as being of possible importance: 
1. Age 
2. Sex 
3. Number of years employed by a bank 
4. Number of years using financial information 
5. Qualifications 
6. Types of banking experience 
7. Small limited liability companies as customers 
8. Large limited liability companies as customers. 
These questions on the personal details of respondents 
were included as the last page of the questionnaire. 
Selection of sample 
With the Royal Bank and the Bank of Scotland being the 
largest two banks in terms of assets and taking into 
account time and cost factors, it was decided to survey 
150 branch managers from those two banks and 100 from the 
Clydesdale Bank. The six branch managers in the pilot 
survey were excluded from the population of branch managers 
for the purpose of this sample. This survey sample as a 
percentage of the population of branch managers in the 
three banks is given in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
Population and sample of branch managers 
Bank of Clydesdale Royal Bank Total 
Scotland Bank of Scotland 
Population of 
branch managers 377 309 453 1,139 
Number of branch 
managers surveyed 150 100 150 400 
% of branch 
managers surveyed 40% 32% 33% 35% 
This gave a total sample of 400 branch managers from a 
population in the three banks of 1,139 branch managers 
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making a sample of 35%. The percentage of branch 
managers surveyed from the Bank of Scotland at 40% was 
higher than the other two banks and this has arisen 
because it was decided to sample the same number of branch 
managers from the Bank of Scotland and the Royal Bank of 
Scotland (both larger than the Clydesdale Bank) and to use 
round numbers in the sample (100, 150 and 400) rather than 
the same percentage for all three banks. The three banks 
supplied a full list of branch managers and a random 
sample was taken for each bank. Details of these samples 
are given in Appendix B. 
All three banks also agreed that all their head 
office lending officials would receive a questionnaire. 
The head office lending officials supervised the lending 
of a number of branch managers on a regional basis. It 
was decided to survey all the head office lending 
officials because of the relatively small number involved 
and because of their specialist experience in the 
corporate lending field. Table 3 summarises the number 
of bankers surveyed. 
TABLE 3 
Number of bankers surveyed 
Bank of Clydesdale Royal Bank Total 
Scotland Bank of Scotland 
Head office staff 21 15 30 66 
Branch managers 150 100 150 400 
Total number surveyed 171 115 180 466 
The questionnaire with my covering letter and with the 
letter from the bank was posted d.uring1983 to all 466 
participants in the survey. The questionnaires were 
designed (or marked) so that from the returned question- 
naires the bank and category (head office or branch 
manager) of each respondent could be identified. This 
chapter has outlined the development of the questionnaire 




RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 
Response rates 
In asking the three banks for their assistance with this 
research project, it was stated at the beginning that 
this could be a two -stage project namely a questionnaire 
followed by a simulated lending decision. The results of 
this first stage questionnaire would determine whether or 
not this second stage of a simulated lending decision 
would be conducted. Therefore, in my initial approach to 
the three banks it was stated that no follow -up letters 
would be sent in order to avoid bankers selected for this 
project receiving possibly four different letters. This 
decision to forego the follow -up letters was not taken 
lightly because it would almost certainly mean a lower 
overall response rate. Nevertheless, the more important 
point was to secure the co- operation of all three banks 
and this was achieved. 
Despite this lack of a follow -up letter the number 
of responses and the response rates for each bank were 
acceptable as shown in Table 4. 
TABLE 4 
Number of respondents and response rates 
Bank of Clydesdale Royal Bank Total 
Scotland Bank of Scotland 
Number of head 
office respondents 13 10 14 37 
Number of branch 
manager respondents 95* 71 92 258* 
Total number of 
respondents 108* 81 106 295* 
% response from 
head office staff 
% response from 
branch managers 













4 responses were blank with a covering letter 
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Babbie has expressed the following opinion about 
surveys' response rates: 
feel that a response rate of 50 percent 
is adequate for analysis and reporting. A 
response rate of at least 60 percent is good. 
And a response rate of 70 percent or more is 
very good .... these are only rough guides 
and they have no statistical basis.'1 
Given the response rates of recent postal surveys on 
auditing topics in Great Britain (such as Santocki2 with 
10 %), the nature of the topic being researched and the 
fact of no follow -up letter, an overall response rate of 
63% was in Babbie's terms 'good'. The overall response 
rate for each of the three banks varied from 59% for the 
Royal Bank of Scotland to 70% for the Clydesdale Bank but 
even 59% is in Babble's terms 'adequate'. One 
characteristic common to all three banks was the fact that 
the percentage response from head office staff was lower 
than that from branch managers. In particular the 47% 
response from the Royal Bank of Scotland head office staff 
was relatively low although it may be explained by the 
fact that at the time of the survey, a reorganisation of 
head office staff had recently taken place at the Royal 
Bank of Scotland. However, overall the response rate was 
reasonable. Furthermore, from the number of detailed 
comments on the returned questionnaires it was apparent 
that many respondents had spent a considerable amount of 
time on completing the questionnaire. One hundred and 
three respondents (35% of all respondents) also indicated 
a continuing interest in this project by requesting a 
copy of the results of the survey. A copy of the results 
of this survey sent to such respondents is given in 
Appendix C. 
Preparation for analysis 
When the completed questionnaires were received, the date 
of receipt was noted on them. These dates were later 
grouped into weeks to indicate the week of receipt. 48% 
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of the completed questionnaires were received in the 
first week, 33% in the second week, 12% in the third week 
and only 7% in the fourth week or later. The completed 
questionnaires were grouped by bank and within each bank 
were numbered in the date order of receipt as shown in 
Table 5. 
TABLE 5 
Numbering of questionnaires 
Number Bank 
001 - 104 Bank of Scotland 
105 - 185 Clydesdale Bank 
186- 291 Royal Bank of Scotland 
The four uncompleted questionnaires each with a covering 
letter explaining why the questionnaire could not be 
completed (for example because of illness) were excluded 
from any further analysis. 
A master questionnaire was coded for punching and 
the coded answers to the questions for the 291 usable 
questionnaires were key- punched and verified. In fact 90 
columns were required for the answers (with each 
individual answer contained in one column), 3 columns for 
the number of each questionnaire and 3 columns for the 
following: 
1. name of the bank; 
2. week in which completed questionnaire 
was received; 
3. head office or branch respondent. 
This gave a total of 96 columns on the print -out. A 
manual check between the completed questionnaires and the 
computer print -out also revealed errors which were 
corrected to give the final computer files on which a 
statistical analysis was carried out. The Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (S.P.S.S.) was used to 
analyse the data. Some respondents who had no large 
limited liability corporate customers did not answer the 
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questions relating to such companies. It was decided that 
the best form of presentation for the following analysis 
would be to exclude such missing answers (in other words 
the answers given would total 100%) and to show also the 
number of respondents for each question. Therefore, with 
291 respondents having returned usable questionnaires, the 
number of missing answers can be calculated from any of 
the following tables. For example, when 278 respondents 
are shown as having answered a particular question, this 
means that 13 respondents did not answer that question. 
Background variables 
As discussed in Chapter 5 one reason for asking respondents 
for background details was to determine the characteristics 
of a 'typical' respondent. The following sections 
summarise the results for each of the background variables 
in this survey. 
1. Age 
As can be seen from Table 6, 50% of respondents were in the 
40 to 49 age range. Indeed 67% of respondents were under 
50 years old and 33% were 50 and older. 
Under 30 
30 -39 
40 - 49 
50 - 59 
60 and over 
TABLE 6 
Age of respondents 






In all the Tables n indicates the number of 
respondents answering that particular question 
out of a possible maximum of 291 respondents. 
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2. Sex 
Of the 269 respondents answering this question all except 
one were male. This is not surprising in the context of 
Scottish branch managers and head office lending staff 
although the point had been made during my discussions 
with bankers that female branch managers do exist and 
this was the reason for including sex as a background 
variable. 
3. Number of years employed by a bank 
Table 7 shows that 90% of respondents had been employed 
by a bank for at least 20 years. The respondents were 
almost equally divided into those who had been employed by 
a bank for under 30 years (51% of respondents) and those 
employed by a bank for over 30 years (49% of respondents) . 
Indeed the age profile of respondents (Table 6 above) and 
the following Table 7 suggest that a number of respondents 
joined a bank straight from school and that particular 
bank has been their only employer during their working 
life. 
TABLE 7 
Number of years 
employed by a bank 
n = 277 
Under 5 - 
5 - 9 1 
10 - 19 9 
20 - 29 41 
30 and over 49 
100 
4. Number of years using financial information 
As we have seen from Table 7, 90% of respondents had been 
employed by a bank for at least 20 years but Table 8 shows 
that only 21% of respondents had been using financial 
information for at least 20 years. This suggests that 
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many respondents may have worked their way up through the 
banking structure from the bottom rather than joining the 
bank at a relatively senior level. 
TABLE 8 
Number of years using 
financial information 
n = 277 
Under 5 4 
5 - 9 24 
10 - 19 51 
20 - 29 17 
30 and over 4 
100 
5. Qualifications 
A large number of respondents (102) did not answer this 
particular question which may mean that such respondents 
had no paper qualifications. However, of those answering 
this question, 92% gave their only qualification as being 
as Associate of the Institute of Bankers (A.I.B.). 
TABLE 9 
Qualifications 
n = 189 % 
A.I.B. 92 
A.I.B. + other 
qualification 6 
Fellow of the 
Institute of Bankers 2 
100 
96 
6. Banking experience 
All respondents who answered this question had more than 
one type of banking experience. Table 10 shows the 
number of respondents who had experienced these various 











Assuming that those respondents who did not answer this 
question had no experience of these various types of 
banking (obviously an unrealistic assumption), this 
would still mean that 88% of the 291 respondents to this 
questionnaire had commercial banking experience and 65% 
had industrial banking experience. 
7 and 8. Customers 
A large limited liability company was defined in the 
questionnaire as one 'which equals or exceeds at least 
two of the following three criteria: 
1. Turnover £2 million 
2. Balance sheet total assets £1 million 
3. Average number of employees 50.' 
Almost all respondents (97% of the 276 bankers answering 
this question) had small limited liability companies as 
customers but only 60% of the bankers answering this 
question had large limited liability companies as 
customers. The important fact for this survey was that 
almost all respondents had experience of limited liability 
companies as customers and were therefore able to answer 
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this questionnaire with their background of practical 
experience. 
Summary of background variables 
In summary a 'typical' respondent to this questionnaire 
was over 40 years old, male, employed by a bank for at 
least 20 years, a user of financial information for at 
least 10 years, an Associate of the Institute of Bankers 
and experienced in the commercial and industrial banking 
fields with limited liability companies as customers. 
Non -response bias 
In almost every survey some members of the initial sample 
will not return their questionnaires and therefore non - 
response bias becomes a potential problem. One test for 
non -response bias is to compare the characteristics of the 
respondents with the characteristics of the population. 
In informal discussions with my top management contacts in 
the three banks, no surprise was expressed at the above 
'typical' respondent to this questionnaire. However, to 
be a reliable test, a statistical analysis of the back- 
grounds of all branch managers and all head office 
lending officials in the three banks would have been 
required and such an analysis was not available. 
A second test for non -response bias was therefore 
conducted by comparing the early and late respondents to 
this questionnaire. This is based on the summary of 
findings by Oppenheim3 that respondents who send in their 
questionnaires late are roughly similar to non -respondents. 
One problem with this test is to decide when is 
sufficiently late to assume that such respondents are 
similar to non -respondents. It was decided that the 
141 respondents whose completed questionnaires were 
received in the first week could be compared 
with the 
55 respondents whose questionnaires 
were received in the 
third week and later. When the early and late respondents 
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are compared in percentage terms in Table 11, it must be 
remember that the late respondents totalled only 55. 
With the relatively small number of late respondents and 
to enable a fair comparison to be made between the early 
and late respondents, the no answers are included in the 
percentages in Table 11. 
TABLE 11 







n = 141 % n = 55 % 
Bank of Scotland 30 24 
Clydesdale Bank 30 38 
Royal Bank of Scotland 40 38 
100 100 
Category of respondents 
Head office 16 11 




Under 30 1 
30 - 39 18 
9 
40 - 49 45 
54 
50 - 59 32 
35 
























Number of years employed 
by a bank 
Under 5 
5 - 9 1 - 
10 - 19 9 7 
20 - 29 38 40 
30 and over 49 51 
No answer 3 2 
l00 100 
Number of years using 
financial information 
Under 5 5 - 
5 - 9 20 23 
10 - 19 52 47 
20 -. 29 16 22 
30 and over 4 4 
No answer 3 4 
Qualifications 
100 100 
A.I.B. 62 60 
A.I.B. + other 
qualification 3 6 
F.I.B. 3 - 









n = 141 % n = 55 % 
Personal 94 98 
Commercial 88 93 
Agricultural 69 75 
Industrial 69 69 
Fishing 20 29 
Other 11 7 
Small limited liability 
companies as customers 
Yes 96 91 
No 2 2 
No answer 2 7 
100 100 
Large limited liability 
companies as customers 
Yes 62 57 
No 34 36 
No answer 4 7 
100 100 
Table 11 illustrates that the early (first week) and late 
(third week and later) respondents had very similar 
background in terms of age, sex, number of years employed 
by a bank, number of years using financial information, 
qualifications, banking experience and limited liability 
companies as customers. Two minor differences between 
the early and late respondents were: 
(1) 30% of the early respondents were 
from the Clydesdale Bank against 
38% of the late respondents. 
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(2) 20% of the early respondents had 
banking experience of the fishing 
industry against 29% of the late 
respondents. 
Neither difference has important implications for non - 
response bias. 
In addition to comparing the early and late 
respondents on the basis of background variables, an 
attempt was made to examine any differences in their 
replies to the questionnaire. Again the early respondents 
were defined as those whose questionnaires were received 
in the first week and the late respondents as those whose 
questionnaires were received in the third week and later. 
Excluding the background variables, 77 'questions' 
requiring a separate answer can be identified in the 
questionnaire when parts of various questions and the 
split between small and large companies are considered. 
Details of these 77 'questions' are given in Appendix D. 
The null hypothesis to be tested for each of these 77 
'questions' (which can be described as HoQl to HoQ77 for 
reference) are: 
H0Q1 Bankers' answers to question 1 
are not significantly related to 
early or late respondents. 
H0Q77 Bankers' answers to question 77 
are not significantly related to 
early or late respondents. 
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Using S.P.S.S. the 77 cross- tabulations were 
calculated. Schuman and Presser have suggested: 
'A probability of less than .10 is 
ordinarily regarded as borderline, 
p< .05 as significant and p< .01 as 
highly significant.'* 
This suggestion of Schuman and Presser will be adopted 
and the 5% significance level will be used generally as 
a cut -off point when describing the results of this 
survey. Furthermore, the following two rules of thumb 
suggested by Yeomans for the chi- square test will also be 
used when analysing the results of this survey: 
'As a working rule, the chi -square 
test should not be used if any 
expected frequency is less than one, 
or if more than 20 per cent of 
expected frequencies are less than 
five.'5 
As to be expected with such a large number of 
cross -tabulations, some chi- squares were significant at 
the 5% level. Details of these cross- tabulations 
significant at the 5% level and meeting the two rules 
of thumb of Yeomans5 are given in Table 12. 
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TABLE 12 
Cross- tabulations of 'row' by early 
and late respondents significant at 5% level 
Row 
1. Consider that financial audit 
report could contain more 
information for large 
companies 
2. Use qualifications of 
management in assessing 
management for small 
companies 
3. Would like assessment of 
performance of production 
function specifically 
reported in a management 
audit report for small 
companies 
n X2 df p 
168 6.73 2 .03 
196 7.21 2 .03 
187 7.76 2 .02 
(Note: n = number of respondents answering 
that particular question 
X2 = chi -square or corrected chi -square 
where necessary 
df = degrees of freedom 
p = significance) 
A-much higher percentage of the late respondents (69 %) 
than of the early respondents (46 %) considered that the 
financial audit report for large companies could contain 
more information, Regarding the second cross -tabulation 
above, the main difference was that 65% of early 
respondents against 44% of late respondents sometimes use 
the qualifications of management when assessing management. 
However, if we combine the 'sometimes' and 'always' answers, 
97% of early and 95% of late respondents either always or 
sometimes use the qualifications of management when assess- 
ing management. By combining these two answers, the 
difference between early and late respondents becomes less 
important. The third cross- tabulation above is significant 
mainly because 7% of early against 21% of late respondents 
did not wish the assessment of the performance of the 
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production function specifically reported upon in a 
management audit report for small companies. Nevertheless, 
we have no reason to reject almost all the null hypotheses 
HoQ1 to HoQ77. In summary, the differences between the 
answers of the early and late respondents do not suggest 
any important non -response bias. Therefore, considering 
also the above informal comparison of the characteristics 
of the sample with the characteristics of the population, 
and taking into account the results of the comparison of 
the characteristics of the early and late respondents, we 
have no evidence to suggest that the respondents were not 
reasonably representative of the total sample. 
Detailed results of survey 
The reliability of the answers is a problem in any 
questionnaire. As discussed in Chapter 5 questions 3, 10 
and 16(a) were logically linked for small companies and 
questions 4, 11 and 16(a) for large companies. 
Questions 3, 4, 10 and 11 each had six possible answers 
(including no answer) and questions 16(a) and 16(b) each 
had five possible answers (including no answer). With 
291 respondents and questions on both small and large 
companies, this gave a total population for this 
reliability check of 582 but 147 of these 582 were 
excluded.6 Of the remaining 435, 65 inconsistencies 
could be identified with 17 respondents having 
inconsistencies about both small and large companies 
which meant that 48 respondents had at least one 
inconsistency in their answers to these questions. 
However, these 65 inconsistencies would be classified as 
follows: 
49 minor inconsistencies on ranking scale? 
16 major inconsistencies on ranking scale8 
65 
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Therefore, 16 major inconsistencies could be identified 
and 10 of these 16 came from five respondents which 
implied that 11 respondents out of 291 accounted for all 
16 major inconsistencies. Therefore, the conclusion of 
this one check is that the answers of the responding 
bankers appear to be generally reliable. 
Before considering the overall results of this 
questionnaire survey, various subsets of the respondents 
will be considered to attempt to identify any significant 
differences. 
(a) Results by bank 
The detailed results of this survey by bank by question 
are given in Appendix F. To determine whether the 
answers of the bankers of any one of the three banks were 
statistically significantly different, the null hypothesis 
to be tested for each of the 77 questions listed in 
Appendix D (which can be described as HoBQ1 to HoBQ77 
for reference) are: 
HoBQl Bankers' answers to question 1 
are not significantly related to 
a particular bank. 
HoBQ77 Bankers' answers to question 77 
are not significantly related to 
a particular bank. 
The 77 cross -tabulations were calculated and the 
three chi- squares significant at the 5% level and meeting 
the two chi- square rules of thumb of Yeomans5 are given 
in Table 13. 
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TABLE 13 
Cross -tabulations of 'row' by 
bank significant at 5% level 
Row 
1. Consider that financial 
audit report could contain 
more information for large 
companies 
n X 2 df p 
241 10.41 4 .03 
2. Use financial audit report 
in assessing management 
for small companies 288 22.16 4 .00 
3. Use any other information 
in assessing management of 
large companies 72 11.01 4 .03 
Table 13 omits three significant cross- tabulations.9 
Regarding the above significant cross -tabulations, firstly, 
a larger percentage of the Clydesdale Bank's respondents 
(41 %) compared to the respondents of the other two banks 
(22% for both the Bank of Scotland and the Royal Bank of 
Scotland) did not consider that the financial audit report 
could contain more information for large companies. 
Secondly, 51% of the Bank of Scotland's respondents 
compared to 26% of the Clydesdale Bank's respondents and 
31% of the Royal Bank of Scotland's respondents sometimes 
use thé financial audit report in assessing the management 
for small companies. The third cross -tabulation can be 
ignored with only 72 out of 291 respondents answering this 
particular question. Although there are differences, 
which are statistically significant at the 5% level 
between a few answers of the bankers from the three banks, 
we have no reason to reject almost all the null hypotheses 
HoBQ1 to HoBQ77. The overall conclusion is that the 
bankers' answers in this survey are not generally 
significantly related to a particular bank. 
(b) Results by head office officials 
and branch managers 
We have the problem of small numbers with only 37 head 
office respondents in total from the three banks. 
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Accepting this problem, would the answers of head office 
respondents be statistically significantly different from 
those of the branch managers? The null hypothesis to be 
tested for each of the 77 questions listed in Appendix D 
(which can be described as HoSQ1 to HoSQ77 for reference) 
are: 
HoSQ1 Bankers' answers to question 1 
are not significantly related to 
head office or branch manager 
respondents. 
HoSQ77 Bankers' answers to question 77 
are not significantly related to 
head office or branch manager 
respondents. 
Again the cross -tabulations were calculated for all 
77 questions and the only two cross -tabulations which 
were significant at the 5% level and met the two chi - 
square rules of thumb of Yeomans5 are given in Table 14. 
TABLE 14 
Cross -tabulations of 'row' by head office 
and branch respondents significant at 5% level 
1. Used financial audit report 
as part of data on which 
based lending decisions to 
large companies 
2. Use your own personal 
knowledge of management in 
assessing management for 
large companies 
n XZ df p 
236 4.29 1 0.04 
216 6.43 2 0.04 
Perhaps as to be expected a larger percentage of the 
branch manager respondents (29%) compared to head office 
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staff respondents (11 %) have not used the financial audit 
report as part of the data on which they have based their 
lending decisions to large companies. Regarding the 
above second cross -tabulation, 42% of head office staff 
respondents compared to 58% of branch manager respondents 
always use their own personal knowledge of management in 
assessing the management of large companies. However, if 
we combine the always and sometimes answers we find that 
90% of head office staff respondents compared to 98% of 
branch manager respondents always or sometimes use their 
own personal knowledge of management in assessing the 
management of large companies. By combining these two 
answers the difference between the head office and 
branch manager respondents becomes less important. In 
the answers to these three questions differences which 
are significant at the 5% level did exist between the 
head office and branch respondents but we have no reason 
to reject almost all the null hypotheses HoSQ1 to HoSQ77. 
No major overall differences can be identified between 
head office and branch respondents. 
(c) Results by small and large companies 
The questionnaire was designed so that all questions 
(except question 1) required two separate answers for 
small and large limited liability companies. In other 
words the 77 questions in Appendix D become 38 
comparative questions in relation to small and large 
companies. This distinction between small and large 
companies had been made because in my early discussions 
with bankers, they suggested that the answers to some 
questions could be different for small and large 
companies. Therefore, would the answers for small 
companies be statistically significantly different from 
the answers for large companies? The null hypothesis to 
be tested for each of the 38 questions listed in 
Appendix D (which can be described as HoCQ1 to HoCQ38 






Bankers' answers to question 1 
for small companies are not 
significantly related to the 
answers to the same question 
for large companies. 
Bankers' answers to question 38 
for small companies are not 
significantly related to the 
answers to the same question 
for large companies. 
The cross -tabulations were calculated for the 38 
questions and, although many suffered from the problem of 
small numbers when calculating the chi- square, all were 
significant at the 5% level and most were significant at 
the 1% level. A selection of these cross- tabulations are 
given in Table 15 for illustration: 
TABLE 15 
Selection of cross -tabulations of 
'row' for small companies by 'row' for 
large companies significant at 1% level 
Row 
1. Used financial audit report 
as part of the data on which 
based lending decisions 
2. Consider that financial 
audit report could contain 
more information 
3. Assess management when 
making lending decisions 
4. Like assessment of 
organisational structure 
specifically reported in 
a management audit report 
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n X2 df p 
236 92.48 1 .00 
240 243.81 4 .00 
236 53.30 2 .00 
220 221.55 4 .00 
Row 
5. Like assessment of 
performance of management 
of computing function 
specifically reported in 
a management audit report 
n X2 df p 
216 223.80 4 .00 
The general conclusion is that we have to reject the 
null hypothesis that bankers' answers to the questions 
for small companies are not significantly related to the 
answers for large companies. The results of this 
questionnaire show that the distinction between small and 
large companies is very much less important than that 
suggested by my early discussions with bankers and by the 
pilot questionnaire. This conclusion is consistent with 
the recent finding of an American survey by Stanga and 
Tiller: 
'The conclusion of the study is that the 
informational needs of bank loan officers 
do not differ substantially between large 
public companies and small private 
companies.s10 
Unfortunately this study by Stanga and Tiller was not 
available at the time when my questionnaire survey was 
being developed. 
(d) Results by background variables 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, in addition to determining the 
characteristics of a 'typical' respondent, background 
information was collected from respondents in order to 
check whether any answers might be related to background 
variables such as the age of respondents. The questions 
on the personal details of respondents covered age, sex 
(which can be ignored with only one female respondent), 
number of years employed by a bank, number of years using 
financial information, qualifications, banking experience, 
small and large limited liability companies as customers. 
The null hypotheses to be tested for each of the 77 
questions listed in Appendix D (which can be described 
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as HoVQ1(a) to HoVQ77(9,)) are: 
HoVQl ( a) 
to 
HoVQ1(R, ) 
Bankers' answers to question 1 are 
not significantly related to: 
(a) Age (under 50 years old or 50 years and over). 
(b) Number of years employed by a bank (under 
30 years or 30 years and more). 
(c) Number of years using financial information 
(under 10 years or 10 years and more). 
(d) Qualifications (stating a paper qualification 
or not) . 
(e) Agricultural banking experience (with or 
without). 
(f) Commercial banking experience (with or 
without). 
(g) Fishing banking experience (with or without). 
(h) Industrial banking experience (with or 
without). 
(i) Personal banking experience (with or without). 
(j) Other banking experience (with or without) 
(k) Having small limited liability companies as 
customers (or not) 
(Q) Having large limited liability companies as 
customers (or not). 
HoVQ77(Q) Bankers' answers to question 77 are not 
significantly related to having large limited 
liability companies as customers (or not). 
This gave a total of 924 null hypotheses to be 
tested. The cross -tabulations were calculated for all 
924 and the 34 chi- squares significant at the 5% level 
112 
and meeting the two chi- square rules of thumb of 
Yeomans5 are given in Appendix E together with some 
comments. However, the conclusions about the background 
variables can be summarised in four main points. 
Firstly, three of the above twelve background variables 
(namely personal banking experience, other banking 
experience and having small limited liability companies 
as customers) produced no cross -tabulations significant 
at the 5% level. This was partly because of the small 
number of respondents who did not have personal banking 
experience, who did have other banking experience and 
who did not have small companies as customers. 
Secondly, using the background variable of 
qualifications, 13 out of 77 cross -tabulations were 
significant at the 5% level with six of these 13 cross - 
tabulations being significant at the 1% level. Further- 
more eight of these 13 cross- tabulations were in relation 
to the same four questions for both small and large 
companies. Therefore, we have evidence to reject 13 null 
hypotheses that bankers' answers to those 13 questions are 
not significantly related to qualifications. In 
particular a larger percentage of respondents with paper 
qualifications (compared to respondents without 
qualifications) would like the following specifically 
reported in a management audit report: 
1. assessment of company objectives for both 
small and large companies; 
2. assessment of organisational structure for 
both small and large companies; 
3. assessment of the performance of the 
management of the following functions: 
(a) purchasing for large companies 
(b) production for large companies 
(c) accounting (small difference see 
Appendix E for details) for small 
companies 
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(d) computing for small companies 
(e) research and development for small 
and large companies. 
Thirdly, after qualifications the second most 
important background variable (in terms of null 
hypotheses rejected at the 5% level of significance) was 
industrial banking experience with ten null hypotheses 
rejected. Of these ten null hypotheses rejected, five 
were significant at the 1% level. In particular a larger 
percentage of respondents with industrial banking 
experience (compared to respondents without such 
experience) have used the financial audit report as part 
of the data on which they have based their lending 
decisions to small and large companies and also consider 
that the financial audit report could contain more 
information for both small and large companies. Further- 
more, a larger percentage of respondents with industrial 
banking experience (compared to respondents without such 
experience) assess management when making their lending 
decisions about large companies. 
Fourthly, the only other background variable with 
five or more null hypotheses rejected at the 5% level of 
significance was that of age. With the background 
variable of age three of the five significant cross - 
tabulations arose when a greater percentage of 
respondents under 50 years old (compared to respondents 
50 years old and over) expressed a desire for assessments 
of the performance of the management of the accounting, 
computing and research and development functions to be 
specifically reported in a management audit report for 
small companies. In summary, we have no evidence to 
reject the vast majority of the 924 null hypotheses 
HoVQ1(a) to HoVQ77(k). The background variables of sex, 
number of years employed by a bank, number of years using 
financial information, agricultural banking experience, 
commercial banking experience, fishing banking experience, 
personal banking experience, other banking experience, 
having small and large limited liability companies as 
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customers can be regarded as relatively unimportant for 
this survey. The two most important background variables 
for this survey in terms of the number of null hypotheses 
rejected are qualifications and industrial banking 
experience. 
Overall results for all three banks 
The detailed results of this questionnaire survey by 
bank by question are given in Appendix F but the 
following sections summarise the results of this survey 
in relation to the nine hypotheses developed in Chapter 5. 
The questionnaire was divided into two parts namely 
existing lending decisions and management auditing and 
the results of the survey will be discussed under these 
two general headings. 
1. Existing lending decisions 
(a) Financial audit report 
The hypotheses to be tested are given in the previous 
chapter and the first was: 
H1 Bankers claim to read the financial 
audit report of their customer 
companies. 
Only one out of 291 respondents replied that he never 
read the financial audit report of his customer companies 
with 93% of respondents always and 7% sometimes reading 
it. Hypothesis H1 is clearly supported by this evidence. 
This result is consistent with the Fess and Ziegler 
study (discussed in the previous chapter) where all the 
bankers claimed to read the financial audit report. Also, 
in the Brenner12 study only 7% of bankers claimed not to 
read the financial audit report. The results of these 
two American studies taken together with the results of 
this British survey suggest that bankers are at least one 
user group which claim to read the financial audit report. 
However, did the bankers in this survey find the audit 
report useful? 
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The second hypothesis was: 
H2 Bankers consider the financial audit 
report to be useful in relation to 
their lending decisions about both 
small and large limited liability 
companies. 
In fact 85% (of 290 respondents) stated that they had used 
the financial audit report as part of the data on which 
they had based their lending decisions to small limited 
liability companies. For large limited liability 
companies the figure was 74% of 236 respondents. The 
respondents to questions on large companies were generally 
fewer than the respondents to questions on small companies 
because 110 respondents did not have any large companies 
as customers and some of these 110 respondents did not 
answer the questions on large companies.13 However, 76 of 
these 110 respondents did answer this particular question 
and if these 76 answers are excluded, 81% (of 160 
respondents) stated that they had used the financial audit 
report as part of the data on which they had based their 
lending decisions to large companies. 
The questionnaire requested details of the typical 
occasions on which respondents had used the financial 
audit report. The comments were extensive and two typical 
examples were: 
'Qualification had led to enquiries which 
have led to a request for bank support 
being declined.' 
'A qualified report has led to a more 
comprehensive appraisal and in some 
cases to withdrawal of credit lines.' 
Specific circumstances given by respondents included 
liquidity problems, stock valuation, long -term work-in - 
progress valuation and research and development. Indeed 
the most usual could be classified as follows: 
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(1) 49 respondents stated that the 
financial audit report played a part 
in any lending proposal whether it 
was a new one or a renewal. 
(2) 59 respondents mentioned specifically 
that a qualified audit report could 
be used for further action (such as 
explanation from Directors). 
These answers and comments provide evidence about how 
often bankers use the financial audit report as part of 
the data on which they base their lending decisions. 
Questions 3 and 4 were also related to H2 and the 
answers are summarised in Table 16. 
TABLE 16 
Financial audit report useful in helping 
to make lending decisions about: 
SMALL companies LARGE companies 
n = 291 % n = 238 % 
Strongly 15 20 
Agree 66 57 
Uncertain 11 14 
Disagree 8 9 
Stróngly disagree 
100 100 
Table 16 reveals that 81% and 77% of respondents found the 
financial audit report useful in helping them to make 
their lending decisions about small and large companies 
respectively. With any postal questionnaire the results 
must be interpreted with care. It would be interesting to 
compare, for example, the results in Table 16 with the 
results of an interview survey of bankers asking the same 
question. Nevertheless, together with the number of 
examples given by respondents of occasions when they had 
used the financial audit report, Table 16 provides 
evidence that bankers have found the financial audit 
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report useful in helping them to make lending decisions 
about companies. 
Despite this high percentage of respondents who 
found the financial audit report useful, 59% of 286 
respondents still considered that it could contain more 
information for small companies and 51% of 211 respondents 
considered the same for large companies. In the open - 
ended comments section to this question 15 respondents 
requested an opinion on the 'quality' of stocks and 
debtors and details of preferential creditors (a 
disclosure point) . This desire for more information in 
the financial audit report would help to ensure that it 
was perceived to be more useful. However, the above 
answers undoubtedly support H2 that 'bankers consider the 
financial audit report to be useful in relation to their 
lending decisions about both small and large limited 
liability companies'. 
(b) Assessment of management 
The third hypothesis was: 
H3 Bankers claim to assess management 
when making their lending decisions 
about both small and large limited 
liability companies 





Assess management when making 
lending decisions about: 
SMALL companies LARGE companies 








Again the evidence supports H3 although it is interesting 
that bankers appear to assess the management of large 
companies less often than the management of small 
companies. This result remains the same even if the 76 
respondents who answered this question but do not have 
large companies as customers are excluded. When these 
76 respondents are excluded, the percentages for large 
companies remain almost the same with 69% of the 160, 
respondents answering always, 29% answering sometimes and 
2% answering never. Indeed the exclusion of these 76 
respondents makes little difference to almost all the 
following percentage results and these respondents (who 
have answered a question about large companies without 
having such companies as customers) will be specifically 
mentioned in the rest of this chapter only if their 
exclusion makes a material difference of plus or minus 
five per cent to any result. 
This result that bankers claim to assessmanagement 
when making their lending decisions about companies is an 
important finding in relation to external management 
auditing. This confirms that bankers try to assess the 
management of companies which is, of course, a major 
objective of the external management audit. What 
information, therefore, do bankers use in trying to assess 
corporate managements? 
The fourth hypothesis was: 
H4 Bankers claim to use a range of 
financial and non- financial 
information in assessing 
management for both small and 
large limited liability companies. 
The information which bankers claim to use in assessing 
corporate management can be seen from Table 18. 
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TABLE 18 
























management 289 75 24 1 
Personal knowledge 
of management 287 76 23 1 
Any other 
information 101 37 46 17 
LARGE companies 
n Always Sometimes Never 
Annual financial 
statements 219 77 19 4 
Financial audit 
report 218 62 32 6 
Qualifications of 
management 219 30 62 8 
Practical 
experience of 
management 218 59 37 4 
Personal knowledge 
of management 216 56 41 3 
Any other 
information 72. 35 42 23 
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Adding together the percentages in the always use 
and sometimes use columns to rank the answers in Table 18, 
the annual financial statements, the practical experience 
of management and the bankers' personal knowledge of 
management were the three main sources of information 
used by bankers in assessing the managements of both 
small and large companies. The financial audit report 
came a close fourth in this ranking. Indeed using the 
percentages in the always use column to rank the answers 
in Table 18, the ranking would not change for small 
companies but for large companies the financial audit 
report would jump from fourth to second place. The use 
by bankers of audit qualifications may have influenced 
respondents and those who replied 'always' may mean that 
when assessing management they always look at the audit 
report to check that no audit qualification appears. 
Only 38% and 30% of respondents always use the 
qualifications of management in assessing the management 
of small and large companies respectively. However, it 
would appear that the use of the qualifications of 
management may depend on the particular circumstances of 
companies because, for both small and large companies, 
the qualifications of management are ranked first in the 
sometimes use column in Table 18. In Table 18, 23 of the 
72 respondents to the question on large companies did not 
have such companies as customers and if these 23 
respondents are excluded the results become 33% always, 
49% sometimes and 18% never use any other information in 
assessing the management of large companies instead of 
35 %, 42% and 23% as in Table 18. 
In this Table the range of other information used in 
assessing management was very wide. More than ten 
respondents used the following types of information when 
assessing corporate managements: 
1. Provision of management accounts 
and budgets; 
2. Past track record of management; 
3. Results of competitors. 
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Other types of information used included comments from 
the financial press, the reputation of the company, the 
integrity of the directors, company visits and the views 
of customers. The results of this survey suggest that 
bankers do use a range of financial and non -financial 
information in assessing corporate managements. H4 is 
generally supported by the evidence. 
The fifth hypothesis was: 
H5 Bankers consider that they do not 
always have sufficient information 
to make an adequate assessment of 
management for both small and 
large limited liability companies. 
The evidence from this survey suggests that bankers are 
by no means satisfied that sufficient information is 
always available to them at present to make an adequate 
assessment of management as shown by Table 19. 
TABLE 19 
Sufficient information to assess management of: 
SMALL companies LARGE companies 
n = 291 ja n=233 % 
Always 9 5 
Sometimes 79 81 
Never 12 14 
100 100 
Less than 10% of respondents consider that they always 
have sufficient information to assess the management of 
small and large companies although approximately 80% do 
consider that they sometimes have sufficient information 
available for both small and large companies. The 
evidence therefore support H5. This implies that the 
external management audit report might be of interest to 
bankers by giving them more information on which to make 
assessments of corporate managements. This completed the 
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first section of the questionnaire on the financial audit 
report. 
2. Management auditing 
The second section of the questionnaire concentrated on 
management auditing. 
(a) Usefulness 
The sixth hypothesis was: 
H6 Bankers consider that the management 
audit report would be useful in 
relation to their lending decisions 
about both small and large limited 
liability companies. 
Table 20 shows that over 60% of respondents would always 
use the management audit report as part of the 
information on which they would assess the management of 
both small and large companies and a further 36% would 
sometimes use such a report. 
TABLE 20 
Use management audit report as part of 
the information on which you would assess 
the management of: 
SMALL companies LARGE companies 
n = 289 % n = 251 
Always 63 62 
Sometimes 36 37 
Never 1 1 
100 100 
With the same question being asked about the 
financial audit report in the first section of the 
questionnaire, a comparison between questions 7b and 9 is 
made in Table 21. 
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TABLE 21 
(a) Use in assessing management of SMALL companies 
Financial audit Management audit 
report report 
n = 288 jo n = 289 
Always 61 63 
Sometimes 34 36. 
Never 5 1 
100 100 
(b) Use in assessing management of LARGE companies 
Financial audit Management audit 
report report 
n = 218 f n = 251 f 
Always 62 62 
Sometimes 32 37 
Never 6 1 
100 100 
The results are very similar. Indeed the cross - 
tabulations of the individual bankers' answers in Table 21 
for the financial audit report by their answers for the 
management audit report are significant at the 1% level 
for small companies and at the 10% level for large 
companies. It appears that both the financial and 
management audit reports would be used as part of the 
information on which bankers would assess the management 
of small and large limited liability companies. 
Questions 10 and 11 also related to H6 and the 
replies are summarised in Table 22. 
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TABLE 22 
Management audit report useful in 



















H6 is certainly supported by the evidence in Table 22 
with 88% and 86% agreeing that they would find a manage- 
ment audit report useful in relation to their lending 
decisions about small and large companies respectively. 
A similar question was asked in the first section 
of the questionnaire regarding the financial audit report 
and the answers are compared in Table 23. 
TABLE 23 
(a) Report useful in relation to lending 
decision about SMALL companies 
Financial audit Management audit 
n = 291 % n = 289 












(b) Report useful in relation to lending 
decision about LARGE companies 
Financial audit Management audit 
n = 238 % n = 254 
Strongly agree 20 20 
Agree 57 66 
Uncertain 14 13 
Disagree 9 1 
Strongly disagree - - 
100 100 
Firstly, these results are very similar. Both the 
financial and management audit reports are viewed by 
respondents as being equally useful in their lending 
decisions about both small and large companies. Indeed 
the cross -tabulations of the individual bankers' answers 
in Table 23 for the financial audit report by their 
answers for the management audit report are significant 
at the 1% level for both small and large companies. 
Secondly, a slightly larger percentage (approximately 
10% more) agree that the management audit report will be 
useful in relation to their lending decisions about both 
small and large companies compared to the percentage 
supporting the financial audit report. Thirdly, almost 
10% of respondents disagree that the financial audit 
report is useful in relation to lending decisions about 
both small and large companies compared to only 1% with 
respect to the management audit report. 
(b) Requirement, payment and frequency 
The seventh hypothesis was: 
H7 Bankers consider that the management 
audit of both small and large limited 
liability should be: 
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(a) Required by the banks 
(b) Paid for by the company 
(c) Conducted annually. 
Table 24 summarises the replies. 
TABLE 24 
Consider that a management audit should be: 
SMALL companies 
n Yes No Don't know 
Voluntary 235 54 38 8 
Required by professional 
accounting bodies 216 53 33 14 
Required by law 241 42 47 11 
Required by the banks 226 64 30 6 
LARGE companies 
n Yes No Don't know 
Voluntary 189 39 54 7 
Required by professional 
accounting bodies 188 61 26 13 
Required by law 222 59 30 11 
Required by the banks 189 69 24 7 
Many respondents chose more than one of the 
alternatives and therefore the results are inconclusive 
although the largest percentage of respondents support the 
management audit for both small and large companies being 
required by the banks. Six respondents commented that 
when companies enjoy the privilege of limited liability, 
they should make as much information as possible available 
to creditors. Another comment made by seven respondents 
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was that a voluntary management audit scheme would only be 
carried out by good companies. 
However, if this requirement question gave 
inconclusive results, the question of who should pay for 
the management audit was clear -cut (despite some duplicate 
answers), namely the company, as can be seen from 
Table 25. 
TABLE 25 
Management audit should be: 
SMALL companies 
n Yes No Don't know 
Paid for by the company 233 87 9 4 
Paid for by the government 195 12 84 4 
Paid for by the users 
(eg. bankers) 200 6 89 5 
LARGE companies 
n Yes No Don't know 
Paid for by the company 236 91 5 4 
Paid for by the government 165 12 82 6 
Paid for by the users 
(eg. bankers) 169 8 86 6 
Approximately 90% of respondents consider that the manage- 
ment audit should be paid for by the company. In the open - 
ended comments section twenty -five respondents suggested 
that the companies should pay because they will benefit 
from the management audits. Typical of such comments was 
the following: 
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'I consider that a management audit 
would be of immense value not only to 
third parties such as bankers etc. 
but probably more importantly to the 
management of the companies concerned.' 
Another research study would be to ask shareholders and 
company managements about management auditing and in 
particular about the benefits for the company and also 
who should pay for the management audit. 
Table 26 shows the answers to the question on the 




Not at all 
should a management 
conducted 
SMALL companies LARGE companies 
n = 286 % 
2 
n = 259 
2 
Annually 45 56 
Every 2 years 29 23 
Ad hoc 15 9 
Other 7 5 
Don't know 2 5 
100 100 
Although approximately half of the respondents favour an 
annual management audit, another quarter prefer every two 
years. In the comments section, eight respondents gave 
cost savings as their reason for choosing every two years. 
In summary, the evidence supports H7 although the problem 
of multiple answers to the requirement question in 
particular must be kept in mind. 
(c) Content of reports 
The eighth hypothesis was: 
H8 Bankers consider that the management 
audit report for both small and 
large limited liability companies 
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should include assessments both 
of the general management function 
and of the individual business 
functions. 
Table 27 shows strong support for assessments of various 
aspects of the general management function. 
TABLE 27 
Areas which you would like specifically 






Company objectives 264 84 10 6 
Efficiency and effectiveness 
of management in achievement 
of company objectives 278 90 5 5 
Organisational structure 257 60 24 16 
Budgetary control system 281 88 8 4 
Management information system 266 68 18 14 





n - Yes No 
Don't 
Know - 
Company objectives 230 86 8 6 
Efficiency and effectiveness 
of management in achievement 
of company objectives 235 94 1 5 
Organisational structure 226 71 13 16 
Budgetary control system 239 89 5 6 
Management information system 230 77 11 12 
Other 43 33 21 46 
Over 80% of respondents wish the following assessments 
reported in a management audit report for both small and 
large companies: 
1. Efficiency and effectiveness of 
management in achievement of 
company objectives 
2. Budgetary control system 
3. Company objectives. 
It is interesting that a larger percentage of respondents 
would like an assessment of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of management in achieving company 
objectives rather than an actual assessment of company 
objectives reported in a management audit report. 
Table 27 also shows that 60% or more of respondents would 
also like an assessment both of organisational structure 
and of the management information system for small and 
large companies. The other category included three 
respondents requesting an assessment of the company's 
forward plans and three suggesting a comparison with 
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competitors. Other areas mentioned by individual 
respondents included the effects of changing legislation 
on the company, productivity and the extent of the 
involvement of non -executive directors. In summary, 
bankers consider that the management audit report should 
include assessments of the general management function. 
Table 28 also shows strong support for assessment of 
the performance of some of the individual business 
functions. 
TABLE 28 
Areas to be specifically reported 
upon in a management audit report 
SMALL companies 




Finance function 283 95 3 2 
Purchasing function 260 66 20 14 
Production function 270 81 11 8 
Marketing function 272 86 8 6 
Personnel function 257 40 45 15 
Training function 257 34 49 17 
Accounting function 273 86 10 4 
Computing function 253 36 38 26 
Research and 
Development function 260 56 26 18 


















Yes No Don't Know 
240 95 2 3 . 
222 72 14 14 
231 84 7 9 
233 87 6 7 
225 49 36 15 
225 44 39 17 
233 88 7 5 
219 52 28 20 
230 73 11 16 
26 19 31 50 
Over 80% of respondents would like a management audit 
report to include an assessment of the performance of the 
management of the finance, accounting, marketing and 
production functions for both small and large companies. 
Only 70% of respondents asked for an assessment of the 
performance of the management of the purchasing function 
for both small and large companies. Furthermore, under 
50% of respondents wish a management audit report to 
include an assessment of the performance of the management 
of the personnel and training functions for all companies 
and of the computing function for small companies. These 
answers give an insight into how bankers view the 
importance of the various management functions within 
companies,with the finance function at the top of the 
bankers' list and the training function at the bottom. 
Under the other category four respondents mentioned 
assessments of industrial relations and three suggested 
stock control. Some respondents also commented on the 
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cost (seven respondents) and the practicability (three 
respondents) of assessing such a large number of corporate 
functions but, eight respondents did suggest that to be 
effective a management audit would need to cover all 
aspects of management. In summary, bankers consider that 
the management audit report should include assessments of 
the performance of the management of at least some 
individual business functions. H8 is supported by the 
evidence. 
(d) Management audit v financial audit 
The final hypothesis was: 
H9 Bankers consider that the management 
audit report would be more useful 
than the financial audit report in 
relation to their lending decisions 
about both small and large limited 
liability companies. 
Table 29 shows that this hypothesis is not supported by 
the evidence which suggests instead that the management 
audit report would be as useful as (rather than more 
useful than) the financial audit report in helping 
bankers to make their lending decisions. This finding is 
consistent with the above comparison of answers to 
questions 3/4 and 10/11 about the usefulness of the two 
audit reports in relation to bankers' lending decisions. 
TABLE 29 
Management audit report more useful 
than financial audit report in helping 
bankers to make lending decisions about 
SMALL companies LARGE companies 
n = 287 n = 252 
Yes 24 23 
Less useful 24 24 
Equally useful 48 47 
Don't know 4 6 
100 100 
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The results for both small and large companies could 
scarcely be more similar. Indeed examining the 
individual replies, and excluding the don't know and no 
answers, only 25 respondents gave a different answer for 
small and large companies. Table 29 shows that 
approximately 50% of respondents consider the two reports 
to be equally useful and the remaining 50% are divided 
evenly in favour of either the financial audit report or 
the management audit report. 
The open -ended comments section for this question 
attracted a very large number of responses. With this 
variety of comments, in addition to classifying them below, 
a selection of actual quotations is given in Appendix G. 
(a) Management audit report MORE useful 
than financial audit report 
Thirteen respondents suggested that the management 
audit report would be more useful than the 
financial audit report in helping bankers to 
assess the future prospects of a company. Six 
respondents emphasised the importance of the 
assessment of management and four respondents 
commented that the management audit report would 
be more useful simply because of the lack of 
information in the financial audit report. 
(b) Management audit report LESS useful 
than financial audit report 
Ten respondents suggested that good or bad 
management will be reflected in the financial 
results and therefore the financial audit report is 
more important than the management audit report. 
Three respondents commented that with small 
companies bankers themselves can assess the 
management. 
135 
(c) Management audit report EQUALLY useful 
as financial audit report 
Twenty respondents commented that the management 
audit and financial audit reports would be 
complementary. 
The final question was open -ended and asked for any 
additional comments which the respondents wished to make 
on management auditing. Many respondents took this 
opportunity to comment and a selection of indivudual 
quotations is given in Appendix H. Categorising the 
comments, eleven respondents emphasised the importance of 
the quality and selection of professionally qualified 
staff. Six respondents questioned the cost of the manage- 
ment audit report and four mentioned the problems of 
determining meaningful yardsticks for the management 
audit. Judging by the number of comments given, 
respondents were interested in this questionnaire on 
external management auditing. 
Summary and conclusions 
This questionnaire survey produced a 63% response rate 
with 291 usable replies. The typical respondent was an 
experienced banker who had been employed by a bank for at 
least 20 years and had used financial information for at 
least 10 years. Furthermore, no evidence could be found 
to suggest that the respondents were not reasonably 
representative of the total sample. Generally, the 
respondents' answers were not significantly related either 
to a particular bank or to the type of respondent (head 
office or branch manager). In contrast the respondents' 
answers to the same question for small and large companies 
were significantly related. The distinction made in the 
questionnaire between small and large companies proved to 
be relatively unimportant. Similarly, most of the back- 
ground variables (except for qualifications and industrial 
banking experience) could be ignored. 
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The main findings of this questionnaire survey can 
be summarised as follows. Firstly, bankers claim to read 
and use the financial audit report. For example, 93% of 
respondents claim to always read the financial audit 
report; and approximately 80% replied that they have used 
the financial audit report as part of the data on which 
they have based their lending decisions to both small and 
large limited liability companies; and 80% have also 
found the audit report useful in helping them to make 
their lending decisions about companies. 
Secondly, bankers try to assess the managements of 
both small and large companies. For example, 89% of 
respondents always assess management when making lending 
decisions about small companies but only 69% do this for 
large companies. Thirdly, bankers use a range of 
financial and non -financial information in assessing 
corporate managements. For instance, over 50% of 
respondents always use the annual financial statements, 
practical experience of management, personal knowledge of 
management and financial audit report when assessing 
corporate managements. Fourthly, despite such information, 
bankers consider that they do not always have sufficient 
information to make an adequate assessment of corporate 
managements. For example, less than 10% of respondents 
consider that they always have sufficient information to 
assess corporate managements. 
These four findings about bankers' use of the 
financial audit report and bankers' assessment of corporate 
management suggest that bankers might be interested in 
external management audit reports. The fifth finding of 
the questionnaire survey confirms this suggestion because 
bankers consider that the management audit report would be 
useful in their corporate lending decisions as part of the 
information on which to assess corporate management. For 
instance, over 85% of respondents agree that they would 
find a management audit report useful in their corporate 
lending decisions. Furthermore, over 95% of respondents 
would always or sometimes use the management audit report 
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as part of the information on which to assess corporate 
management. 
The results of this survey were unclear on whether or 
not a management audit should be required by the banks and 
on how often such an audit should be conducted. However, 
a sixth finding was that bankers consider that the 
company should pay for the management audit. Seventhly, 
bankers consider that the management audit report should 
include assessments both of the general management and of 
the individual business functions. For example, over 80% 
of respondents wish assessments of the following reported 
in a management audit report: 
(1) Efficiency and effectiveness of 
management in achievement of 
company objectives; 
(2) Budgetary control systems; 
(3) Company objectives; 
(4) Performance of the management 
of the finance, accounting, 
marketing and production functions. 
The eighth, and final, finding is that bankers 
consider that the management and financial audit reports 
would be equally useful in helping them to make their 
lending decisions about companies. The results of this 
questionnaire survey indicate support for both the 
financial and management audit reports from the responding 
bankers. The answers indicate that it is certainly not a 
question of replacing the financial audit with a manage- 
ment audit. However, despite the fact that bankers have 
experience of using financial audit reports but not 
management audit reports, as much support exists for the 
management audit as for the financial audit. The results 
of this survey provide evidence that one user group, 
namely bankers, would be interested in external management 
audit reports on limited liability companies. 
Bankers have expressed a demand for such management 
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audit reports. The findings of this questionnaire survey 
therefore suggested that it would be worthwhile to 
continue with the second stage of this project which was 
a simulated lending decision to try to determine whether 
or not the addition of a management audit report would 
have a significant effect on bankers' lending decisions. 
The management audit report in this simulated lending 
decision would be based at least partly on the findings 
of this questionnaire survey. The development of this 




DEVELOPMENT OF SIMULATED LENDING DECISION 
The results of this questionnaire survey show support from 
the responding bankers for the proposed external manage- 
ment audit reports. This is strong evidence in favour of 
the external management audit but it could be suggested 
that if you asked bankers if they would like additional 
information about companies, the answer would generally be 
in the affirmative. For example, in response to the 
questionnaire survey, several bankers commented that they 
would like more information on which to base their 
corporate lending decisions. Therefore, although the 
results of the questionnaire survey support the idea of 
external management auditing, would bankers actually use 
an external management audit report when making their 
corporate lending decisions? To try to answer this 
question, a simulated lending decision was developed. 
The objective of this simulation exercise was to attempt 
to determine whether or not the addition of an external 
management audit report would have a significant effect on 
the corporate overdraft decisions of bankers. Before 
considering the detailed development of this simulated 
lending decision, similar research involving the external 
financial audit report will be examined. 
Effects of financial audit reports 
In 1973 the American Accounting Association's Committee on 
Basic Auditing Concepts suggested in relation to the 
financial audit report: 
'In most cases today, the intended effect 
of the auditor's report is not clear and 
the effects it does produce are not well 
known. More consideration needs to be 
given to this area and greater research 
needs to be performed. Communication is 
not neutral. It does have an impact and 
can change behavior.'1 
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Several research studies have tried to examine the 
effects of different external financial audit reports on 
various user groups. These research studies can be 
divided into two broad categories namely share price 
based analyses and simulation exercises. Share price 
based studies attempt to investigate the reactions of 
share prices to different types of audit opinion. For 
example, Alderman2 examined the changes in the share 
prices of 20 American companies with an uncertainty audit 
qualification (in other words a subject to qualification) 
between 1968 to 1971 and compared the changes in these 20 
shares with the changes in the share prices of 20 other 
companies which had received clean audit opinions during 
this period. Alderman concluded: 
'Uncertainty qualifications had little 
impact on market -assessed risk.'3 
In an Australian study Ball, Walker and Whittred4 
selected a final sample of 117 audit qualifications 
relating to the financial statements of 101 companies 
during the period 1961 to 1972. Most of these audit 
qualifications were 'subject to' opinions where the 
financial statements gave a true and fair view subject to 
a specific qualification. Ball, Walker and Whittred 
found: - 
'For the sample as a whole the average 
difference between the returns on 
qualified shares and the market is 
small. The net abnormal return in 
the effective announcement period is 
positive and statistically 
insignificant. However, once the 
total sample is broken down into 
somewhat more homogeneous sub -groups 
different price responses are 
observable .... Certain types of 
audit qualifications are associated 
with changes in shareholders' 
assessment of the value of 
securities.'5 
In a British study Firth had similar findings to 
those of Ball, Walker and Whittred on 'subject to' audit 
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qualifications. From the 1,500 largest stock exchange 
companies Firth found that, of their 3,000 financial 
statements issued in 1974 and 1975, 247 contained an audit 
qualification. Firth concluded: 
'The research has found that certain types 
of qualified audit reports contain 
significant "information" which investors 
use in their portfolio decision making. 
It also emphasizes that investors react 




has questioned the validity of such share 
price based studies. For example, in relation to two of 
studies mentioned above Bailey has argued: 
'Neither Alderman nor Firth excluded 
the systematic financial statement 
differences between the experimental 
and "control" groups; so any inference 
about the information content of audit 
reports is unwarranted.19 
Bailey has suggested that information sets with identical 
financial statements are required and that share price 
based studies cannot meet this requirement. Furthermore, 
share price based studies are restricted to one user 
group namely investors. The second category of research 
study on the effects of financial audit reports on the 
decisions of users, namely simulation exercises, can meet 
this requirement of identical financial statements and 
can also examine the effects of such reports on various 
user groups. 
When developing this simulated lending decision for 
bankers using external management audit reports, the 
results were available from three simulation exercises 
involving bankers and external financial audit reports 
namely Estes and Reimer10, Firth11 and Libby12. After 
completing my simulation exercise, the results of another 
study by Houghton13 became available. Firstly, in 1977 
Estes and Reimer10 attempted to determine whether 
commercial bank loan and credit officers would be 
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influenced by an 'except for' audit opinion when deciding 
maximum loan limits for a hypothetical company. Estes 
and Reimer posted financial statements, footnotes and 
descriptive information about this hypothetical company 
to 1,000 bankers with 500 also receiving an unqualified 
audit report and 500 receiving a qualified audit report. 
From the group of bankers receiving the unqualified 
report 120 replies (24% response rate) were received and 
from the other group 102 replies (20% response rate). 
Estes and Reimer concluded: 
'The present study suggests that bank loan 
officers are not separately affected to a 
statistically significant degree by an 
'except for' opinion on financial 
statements, when the basis for the 
exception is otherwise fully disclosed in 
a footnote.' 14 
Secondly, in 1979 Firth11 tried to examine what 
effect, if any, qualified audit reports had on bankers' 
lending decisions by sending a set of financial 
statements for a hypothetical company to a sample of 
British bankers. These financial statements contained a 
profit and loss account, balance sheet and funds 
statement for three years. A summary of the notes to the 
financial statements was also given for the final year. 
Firth sent these financial statements containing four 
different types of audit report to 700 bankers. Firth 
himself admits that these bankers, who were sent four 
different audit reports, may give biased results. There- 
fore, Firth divided the 800 remaining bankers in the 
sample of 1,500 bankers into four groups of 200 each with 
each group receiving a different - but only one - audit 
report. The bankers were asked to state the maximum 
amount of money which they would lend to this company. 
Firth received 293 replies from the group of 700 bankers 
(42% response rate) and 351 replies (44% response rate) 
from the group of 800 bankers. Firth concluded: 
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'The results showed the bankers attached 
considerable importance to going concern 
and asset valuation qualifications and 
companies suffering these types of audit 
reports would find their credit ranking 
considerably impaired. It was also shown 
that SSAP qualified audit reports, where 
companies have not followed recommended 
accounting practice, have little impact 
on bank lending decisions.'15 
Thirdly, 36 bank loan officers from four large 
American commercial banks participated in an experiment 
conducted by Libby.12 A senior officer at each bank 
arranged for their staff to participate with the four 
banks providing two, ten, ten and fourteen participants 
respectively. Libby was trying to test the effects of 
'subject to' qualifications in the audit report by 
combining three pieces of information: 
1. Two different sets of two -year 
comparative financial statements. 
2. Two management evaluations. 
3. Five uncertainty disclosures. 
The two management evaluations presented a favourable and 
an unfavourable report. These evaluations included 
information on the background and qualifications of the 
company's management and on the accounting and marketing 
systems. The uncertainty disclosures were as follows: 
1. No disclosure and qualified audit 
report. 
2. Footnote disclosure and unqualified 
audit report. 
3. Footnote disclosure and 'subject to' 
audit qualification. 
The two disclosures containing loss contingencies (legal 
cases) were then combined with the above second and third 
uncertainty disclosures to give a total of five 
uncertainty disclosures. 
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The two sets of financial statements, the two 
management evaluations and these five uncertainty 
disclosures gave a total of 20 loan cases. The bankers 
were asked whether or not they would grant the loan and, 
if they would grant the loan, the interest rate premium 
to be charged on the loan. If they would not grant the 
loan, the bankers were asked to estimate the interest rate 
premium which would be required by another bank. Libby 
used ANOVA (analysis of variance) to analyse the results 
and found no statistically significant difference between 
the loan decisions based on qualified and unqualified 
audit reports provided that the uncertainty was disclosed 
in a footnote. Libby's conclusion is consistent with the 
findings of Estes and Reimer. 
Fourthly, in 1983 Houghton13 attempted to examine the 
impact of an unqualified audit opinion compared to a 
'subject to' qualified audit opinion on both the lending 
decision process and decision outcome of Australian bank 
staff. The participants in this simulation exercise came 
from six Western Australian banks with three banks 
allowing all their lending staff to participate and three 
banks choosing a sample of their staff to give a total 
sample of 247 bankers. One -third of the participants (82) 
received an unqualified audit report, one -third (82 
participants) received a qualified audit report and the 
remaining one -third (83 participants) received no audit 
report. The bankers were asked to grant the loan or not 
rather than (as in the Estes and Reimer10 and Firth 
studies) to state the maximum loan which they would grant. 
Houghton attempted also to examine the bankers' 
decision process by asking respondents to state the steps 
involved in arriving at their decision and to give the 
reasons for their loan decision. However, it is doubtful 
whether two such questions in a postal survey examine the 
real decision process of bankers. Initially 156 replies 
(63% response rate) were received and, after the follow -up 
procedures, the replies totalled 173 (70% response rate). 
Houghton concluded: 
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'This study has found that the existence 
of a qualified audit report does not 
necessarily have a sufficient impact 
upon a bank loan decision to alter 
significantly the decision outcome .... 
Further, it was found that whilst not 
necessarily having a significant impact 
on the decision outcome the presence of 
an audit report did play a part in the 
loan decision process of bankers.'16 
Therefore, of these four studies discussed above, only 
Firth 
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found that an audit qualification (such as going 
concern or asset qualifications) made a statistically 
significant difference to bankers' lending decision 
outcomes. 
Simulated overdraft decision 
The Estes and Reimer10, Firth11 and Libby12 studies 
formed a basis on which to develop a simulated lending 
decision with external management audit reports instead of 
external financial audit reports. These three studies 
used a specific loan decision for a particular project. 
However, when approaching the three Scottish banks, I 
raised the possibility of a simulated overdraft decision 
to finance working capital instead of a simulated term 
loan decision. The senior bank officials in the three 
Scottish banks agreed that most of their lending officials 
at both head office and branch manager level would have 
more experience of corporate overdraft decisions for 
working capital purposes than of corporate term loan 
decisions. The main advantage of the corporate overdraft 
is that the company pays interest only on the amount of 
the overdraft used and not on the total overdraft limit; 
whereas a company pays interest on the full amount of any 
term loan. A disadvantage of the corporate overdraft is 
that the bank can recall the overdraft at any time; 
whereas the term loan is available for a given period of 
time. 
The senior bank officials confirmed that the financial 
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statements, external financial audit report and assess- 
ment of the company's management would generally play as 
important a part (if not a more important part) in the 
corporate overdraft decision as in the corporate loan 
decision. Indeed, although in theory the bank can recall 
the corporate overdraft on demand, in practice almost all 
such overdrafts are a form of continuing finance. With 
the potentially long -term nature of many corporate over- 
drafts, bankers take the initial decision to grant an 
overdraft facility very seriously. Therefore, a 
simulated overdraft decision was devised and, for the 
convenience of the reader, this simulation exercise is 
included in a pocket on the cover of this thesis so that 
the following comments can be read together with the 
final version of this simulation exercise. 
Based on the Estes and Reimer10 and Firth studies, 
my first proposal was to divide the bankers into two 
groups. One group would receive the following financial 
information for an individual company: 
(a) Profit and loss account 
(b) Balance sheet 
(c) Funds statement 
(d) Financial audit report 
and woúld be asked to state the maximum overdraft 
facilities which they would grant to this particular 
company. The second group of bankers would receive 
exactly the same information together with an external 
management audit report and would be asked the same 
question. It could then be determined whether or not a 
statistically significant difference existed between the 
answers of the two groups. 
However, from discussions with various bankers in the 
Bank of Scotland, the Clydesdale Bank and the Royal Bank 
of Scotland, it became apparent that this proposal would 
be unrealistic for the bankers for two main reasons. 
Firstly, and most importantly, bankers are not accustomed 
to stating the maximum overdraft facility which they 
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would grant. This is too open- ended. Bankers expect 
their customer to request a specific overdraft limit. By 
definition a simulated lending decision can never be 
totally realistic but it was considered important to make 
this exercise as realistic as possible. Therefore, 
instead of being an open -ended decision on the overdraft 
limit, a specific limit was requested by the company and 
the decision to grant this overdraft facility would be 
yes, no or don't know. It is interesting that the recent 
Australian study by Houghton13 also asked bankers whether 
or not they would grant the loan rather than the maximum 
loan which they would grant. Nevertheless this change, 
from an open -ended decision on the corporate overdraft 
limit to either granting the overdraft or not, made it 
more difficult to distinguish differences between the two 
groups of bankers. The possibility of using several 
different companies was considered but rejected because, 
give the second point below, this simulation exercise 
would have become too lengthy. 
Secondly, again to make this simulated overdraft 
decision more realistic, the bankers suggested that they 
would require answers to the following questions: 
(a) Is this a new or an existing customer? 
(b) What are the backgrounds of the 
directors of the company? 
(c) Will any security be offered for 
this overdraft? 
(d) What is the cash flow forecast for 
the next year? 
Answers to these questions were therefore incorporated 
into this simulated overdraft decision. Points (a), (b) 
and (c) above were covered in at least one of the four 
studies discussed above by Estes and Reimer10, Firth11, 
Libby12 and Houghton13. However, none of these four 
studies included a cash flow forecast. Nevertheless, the 
senior management officials in the three Scottish banks 
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had no doubt that bankers would always request a cash 
flow forecast for a minimum period of one year when 
making such an overdraft decision. Therefore, this 
simulation exercise included a cash flow forecast for the 
following year. 
With the decision alternatives for the bankers of 
yes, no or don't know, it was decided to use as an 
example a company to which bankers would generally grant 
overdraft facilities although they would consider this 
company to be reasonably close to the borderline of being 
refused overdraft facilities. With such a company it 
would be possible to isolate the effects of the manage- 
ment audit report. The senior management officials in 
the three banks gave me assistance in designing a 
simulation exercise with such a company. For example, my 
first proposal was considered to be too strong a company. 
Taking account of the comments from these senior bankers 
and from colleagues at the University of Edinburgh and 
elsewhere several changes were made to this simulation 
exercise. After these changes the bankers involved in 
the development of this simulated lending decision agreed 
that the data given for AB Limited would make it a good 
(but not too good) proposition if it was requesting 
overdraft facilities of £350,000 for working capital 
purposes. 
(a) Objective 
Given the revised yes, no or don't know alternatives for 
the bankers' decisions, it was decided that, instead of 
having only the following: 
1. Information with the financial 
audit report only; 
2. Information with the financial audit 
report and a management audit report 
it might help to detect any differences caused by the 
addition of a management audit report by having both a 
'favourable' management audit report (ie. favourable 
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comments on the management of the company) and an 
'adverse' management audit report (ie.adverse comments on 
the management of the company). As discussed above, each 
package of information included the same profit and loss 
account, balance sheet, funds statement, cash flow 
forecast and financial audit report. This would be the 
first package of information. The second package of 
information would also include (in addition to the 
financial audit report) a favourable management audit 
report. The third package of information would include 
(in addition to the financial audit report) an adverse 
management audit report. For ease of description, the 
three packages of information sent to the bankers will be 
described from this point as: 
1. Financial audit report only 
2. Favourable management audit report 
3. Adverse management audit report. 
The group of bankers receiving the favourable 
management audit report could be used to monitor the 
effect of an additional piece of information (namely a 
favourable management audit report) on the bankers' 
overdraft decisions. For this group, if a similar 
percentage of bankers granted overdraft facilities 
compared to the group receiving the information with only 
the financial audit report, it could be argued that the 
addition of a management audit report Lx itself did not 
change the bankers' decisions. However, if a smaller 
percentage of the group receiving the adverse management 
audit report granted overdraft facilities compared to the 
other two groups, then it could be concluded that the 
adverse management audit report had changed some bankers' 
decisions. The objective of this exercise, therefore, 
was to attempt to determine whether or not the addition of 
an adverse management audit report would have a 
significant effect on bankers' lending decisions. The 
null hypotheses to be tested are discussed and the results 
are analysed in Chapter 8. 
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It should be emphasised that this simulation 
exercise is very much a first tentative step in testing 
the effects of external management audit reports on 
bankers' lending decisions. For example, different 
versions of the adverse management audit report could be 
tested. Furthermore, the reverse could also be tested 
to determine whether or not a favourable management audit 
report might change bankers' lending decisions in the 
case of a company where bankers would generally not 
grant overdraft facilities. This was the background to 
the development of this simulated overdraft decision and 
the final version, which is included in a pocket on the 
cover of this thesis, will now be considered in more 
detail. 
(b) Sample 
A random sample was not taken for this simulated lending 
decision. With this being the second stage of the 
project the population of bank managers was divided into 
those who had received the first stage questionnaire and 
those who had not (see Table 30). 
TABLE 30 
Branch managers for simulated lending decision 
Branch managers 
Total number of 
Received Did not receive 
branch managers 











1,139 400 739 
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The six branch managers in the pilot survey for the 
first stage questionnaire have been excluded from the 
population of branch managers in Table 30 for the purpose 
of this sample. The reason for dividing the population 
of branch managers into those who received the first 
stage questionnaire and those who did not was in case the 
branch managers who had received the first stage 
questionnaire on external management auditing might be 
biased in their replies to this second stage simulatèd 
lending decision. For example, it could be suggested 
that those branch managers who did receive this first 
stage questionnaire on external management auditing 
might place more importance on the management audit 
report in this simulation exercise than those branch 
managers who did not receive the first stage questionnaire. 
This distinction between branch managers, of having 
received the first stage questionnaire or not, divided the 
total population of 1,139 branch managers into 400 (who 
had received the first stage questionnaire) and 739 
branch managers (who had not received the first stage 
questionnaire). It would have been possible to take two 
random samples from these two groups of branch managers 
but this was not done because the first stage 
questionnaire had shown that a few branch managers 
(approximately 3% of respondents) had no corporate 
customers and others (approximately 40% of respondents) 
had no large limited liability companies as customers. 
One objective of this simulated lending decision was to 
make this exercise as realistic as possible and it was 
considered important that the branch managers selected 
should have experience of this type of lending decision. 
Therefore, instead of taking two random samples from 
these two groups of 400 and 739 branch managers, a senior 
management official in each of the three banks selected 
an equal number of branch managers (from their two groups 
of branch managers who did receive the first stage 
questionnaire and those who did not) who would have 
experience of this type of lending decision. The sample 
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selected, therefore, was very much a judgment sample - 
using the judgment of senior management officials of the 
three banks - and not a random sample. 
In addition to the branch managers being divided 
into two groups of those who received the first stage 
questionnaire and those who did not, the total number of 
branch managers selected from each bank could be divided 
by three because the branch managers would be divided 
into three groups for the three different types of 
information (financial audit report only, favourable and 
adverse management audit reports). The Clydesdale Bank 
suggested that the total number of branch managers with 
the appropriate lending experience out of the 100 branch 
managers receiving the first stage questionnaire would be 
only 24. This seemed a low number but after discussion 
with a senior Clydesdale Bank official, the number of 
Clydesdale Bank branch managers selected with the 
appropriate lending experience totalled 48 (being 24 
branch managers from those who received the first stage 
questionnaire and 24 branch managers from those who did 
not receive this first stage questionnaire). These two 
groups of 24 branch managers would be each divided into 
three to receive the three different types of information 
so that in total we have six groups of eight Clydesdale 
Bank branch managers. 
As with the first stage questionnaire, it was 
decided to sample the same number of branch managers from 
both the Bank of Scotland and the Royal Bank of Scotland. 
A senior management official in the Bank of Scotland 
considered that 60 branch managers from the 150 branch 
managers who received the first stage questionnaire 
would have the appropriate lending experience. Therefore, 
in total 120 Bank of Scotland branch managers were 
selected with 60 also being chosen by that senior Bank of 
Scotland official form those 227 branch managers who did 
not receive the first stage questionnaire. Similarly, a 
senior management official in the Royal Bank of Scotland 
selected 60 branch managers from the group of 150 who did 
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receive the first stage questionnaire and 60 from the 
303 branch managers who did not receive the first stage 
questionnaire. The branches selected for this second 
stage simulated overdraft decision are given in 
Appendix I. 
As with the first stage questionnaire, all the head 
office lending officials from the three banks were 
included in this second stage simulated lending decision 
because, generally, these head office officials had the 
greatest experience in making this type of corporate 
overdraft decision. By chance, the number of head office 
lending officials for each of the three banks could be 
divided by three so that an equal number of head office 
lending officials could receive the three different types 
of information (financial audit report only, favourable 
and adverse management audit reports). However, as with 
the branch managers who had received the first stage 
questionnaire, it was possible that these head office 
officials might be biased in their replies to this second 
stage simulation exercise. This possibility will be 
examined when the results are analysed in Chapter 8. 
Table 31 summarises the number of bankers selected 
for this second stage simulated overdraft decision. 
TABLE 31 
Number of bankers surveyed 
Bank of Clydesdale Royal Bank Total Scotland Bank of Scotland 
Head office staff 21 15 30 66 
Branch managers 120 48 120 288 
Total number 
surveyed 141 63 150 354 
In summary, all the above 66 head office staff surveyed 
would have received both the first stage questionnaire and 
the second stage simulated overdraft decision; and 144 
branch managers (60 from the Bank of Scotland, 24 from the 
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Clydesdale Bank and 60 from the Royal Bank of Scotland) 
would be in a similar position. The remaining 144 branch 
managers would not have received the first stage 
questionnaire but would receive only the second stage 
simulated overdraft decision. 
(c) Covering letter 
With some bankers in this simulated lending decision 
having received the first stage questionnaire and others 
not, it was necessary to have two different covering 
letters (see the simulated overdraft decision in the 
pocket on the cover of this thesis) . However, the core 
of these two letters was the same namely: 
I have therefore devised a simulated 
overdraft decision which I should like 
you to make. This should not involve a 
great deal of your time and, in order 
to make this decision, the following 
are attached to this letter: 
1. A page of assumptions; 
2. A cash flow forecast for 1983 
prepared by AB Limited; 
. A profit and loss account, balance 
sheet and source and application of 
funds for AB Limited for 1982; 
4. Audit reports. 
I APPRECIATE THAT THIS INFORMATION IS LIMITED BUT 
PLEASE DO NOT MAKE ANY ASSUMPTIONS OTHER THAN 
THOSE GIVEN AND PLEASE READ THE ATTACHED SET OF 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND THE AUDIT REPORTS BEFORE 
ENTERING ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE WHETHER OR NOT YOU 
WOULD GRANT AN OVERDRAFT TO THIS COMPANY. 
Point 4 above refers to those bankers who received both 
financial and management audit reports. One third of the 
bankers only received a financial audit report and 
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point 4 was amended accordingly for this group. 
For those branch managers who had not received the 
first stage questionnaire, each of the three banks agreed 
to include a covering letter with this simulated lending 
decision similar to that included with the first stage 
questionnaire. Again the main reason for this letter 
from head office was to inform those who received the 
simulated lending decision that their head office had 
approved the distribution of this exercise. As discussed 
in Chapter 5, the advantage of such a covering letter is 
that it may encourage recipients of this simulation 
exercise to return it but the disadvantage is the 
potential bias if recipients perceive this simulation 
exercise as a directive from head office. As with the 
covering letter for the first stage questionnaire, 
therefore, the covering letter for the second stage 
simulated overdraft decision included two main points: 
(1) The bank had given me permission to 
send out this simulated lending 
decision to their staff. 
(2) The individual bankers were under 
no obligation to complete this 
exercise. 
An example of the covering letter from the Royal Bank of 
Scotland is given in Appendix J. 
(d) Decision sheet 
The decision sheet was kept as simple as possible with 
the question: 
WOULD YOU GRANT AN OVERDRAFT 
OF £350,000 TO AB LIMITED? 
YES NO 




This left respondents with three -quarters of a page for 
any reasons which they wished to give. 
With only two pages (this decision sheet and a 
personal details sheet) being returned, it was necessary 
to mark this decision sheet in various ways to ensure 
that the returned sheets could be identified. With the 
number of permutations possible, this decision sheet was 
marked in two ways. Firstly, the following were written 
on the decision sheet: 
H.O. = Head office staff 
R = Royal Bank of Scotland 
1 = Received data with only a 
financial audit report 
2 = Received data with both a financial 
audit report and a 'favourable' 
management audit report 
3 = Received data with both a financial 
audit report and an 'advers' 
management audit report. 
Furthermore, the Bank of Scotland decision sheets were in 
a large typeface to distinguish these from the Clydesdale 
decision sheets which were in a small typeface. There- 
fore, for instance, H.O.R3 would indicate a respondent 
from the head office of the Royal Bank of Scotland who had 
received data with both a financial audit report and an 
'adverse' management audit report. 
Secondly, it was necessary to distinguish from the 
returned decision sheets whether or not such respondents 
had received the first stage questionnaire. Therefore, on 
the decision sheet the following distinction was made: 
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PLEASE GIVE REASONS FOR YOUR DECISION: 
indicated that this individual had 
received the first stage questionnaire; 
whereas 
PLEASE GIVE REASONS FOR YOUR DECISION: 
(ie. no underlining) meant that this 
respondent had not received the first 
stage questionnaire. 
(e) Background variables 
At the foot of the decision sheet respondents were asked 
to complete also the following page of background 
details before returning the two pages to me in the 
enclosed stamped addressed envelope. The personal 
details requested were exactly the same as those for the 
first stage questionnaire namely: 
Age 
Sex 
Number of years employed by a bank 
Number of years using financial information 
Qualifications 
Types of banking experience 
Small and large limited liability companies 
as customers. 
To use this last background factor of customers 
would have required the inclusion of a definition of 
small and large limited liability companies. This had 
been important for the first stage questionnaire with the 
random sample but was less appropriate for this second 
stage with the judgment sample. Furthermore, to include 
a definition of small and large limited liability 
companies would have been a distraction from the lending 
decision. Therefore, no such definitions were included. 
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This question on small and large limited companies as 
customers was included so that those who had received the 
first stage questionnaire would be asked for exactly the 
same personal details again. However, as a background 
factor it was of little relevance for this simulated 
lending decision because all the respondents had already 
been selected as having experience of this type of 
lending decision. Similarly, on the basis of the results 
of the first stage questionnaire, the background 
variable of sex could have been omitted but was in fact 
included because it was decided to retain exactly the 
same background variables for this second stage simulation 
exercise as for the first stage questionnaire so that 
recipients of the first stage questionnaire would be asked 
for exactly the same background variables again. 
(f) Assumptions 
The first page of the actual lending decision was a page 
of assumptions. The first four assumptions were to 
ensure that all the respondents were making their 
decision on the same basis: 
(a) Your bank has money to lend; 
(b) Your bank's current base rate is 8% p.a; 
(c) You have no upper lending limit; 
(d) You are taking this decision on 
26 January 1983. 
Regarding (d), the cash flow forecast was for 1983 and the 
financial statements were for the year ended 31 December 
1982. 
Five further assumptions related specifically to 
AB Limited and provided information which the bankers in 
the pilot study had requested. My discussions with senior 
management officials in the three banks confirmed that the 
inclusion of the following five assumptions would make 
this simulated overdraft decision more realistic: 
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(1) This is an existing customer requesting 
overdraft facilities for the first time. 
AB Limited is requesting overdraft 
facilities for £350,000 for working 
capital purposes because of the planned 
growth in its business. 
(2) The three directors, who are in their 
late 40s, have been managing AB Limited 
for 15 years and hold 90% of the 
ordinary shares of AB Limited. Their 
backgrounds are respectively sales, 
production and finance. 
(3) The directors are not prepared to charge 
any personal assets, but they are 
willing to grant security for the bank 
overdraft over the heritable land and 
buildings of AB Limited. It is 
estimated that the heritable land and 
buildings could be sold for approximately 
£400,000 at 31 December 1982. 
(4) AB Limited is a private company which 
specialises in the manufacture of top 
quality knitwear. 
(5) Any overdraft granted Lo AB Limited will 
be at a cost of 2% over your bank's base 
rate. 
The criterion used to select these assumptions was to make 
this simulated lending decision as realistic as possible. 
(g) Financial information 
It was difficult to decide on the best size of company for 
this exercise but, after discussions with senior manage- 
ment officials in the three banks, a reasonable proposal 
seemed to be a private company with a turnover of about 
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£5 million. As discussed above, a cash flow forecast was 
included in the financial information given for AB 
Limited. The 1983 cash flow forecast began from the 
closing bank figure in the balance sheet at 31 December 
1982 and the rest of the forecast was based on the 1982 
figures adjusted for the projected growth in AB Limited 
According to this cash flow forecast AB Limited would 
require a bank overdraft from April 1983 with a maximum 
projected overdraft of £304,000 in July falling to 
£54,000 by December 1983. 
The profit and loss account and balance sheet of 
AB Limited were originally based on a particular company 
but changes were made in finalising the financial 
statements used in the simulation exercise included in the 
pocket on the cover of this thesis. The turnover of 
AB Limited increased by approximately 18% between 1981 and 
1982 and this increase in turnover was chosen deliberately 
for this simulation exercise because AB Limited was an 
expanding company and was planning for further growth in 
1983. In both 1981 and 1982 the gross profit percentage 
of AB Limited remained the same at approximately 37% and 
similarly in both 1981 and 1982 the net profit before tax 
was approximately 27% of net assets employed. Again both 
these ratios were chosen deliberately to show that, 
although AB Limited was increasing its sales, it was 
maintaining its profitability. The tax charge changed 
marginally from £129,000 in 1981 to £121,000 in 1982 and 
the total dividends remained the same in both years at 
£168,000. After tax and dividends, the annual retained 
profit was only £4,000 in 1981 and £32,000 in 1982. 
The current ratio of AB Limited was slightly under 
1.5:1 for both 1981 and 1982 and the quick ratio was 
0.8:1 for both years. Two important features of the 
current assets for this simulation exercise were, firstly, 
that debtors had increased from £806,000 at 31st December 
1981 to £929,000 at 31st December 1982 (mainly because of 
the increase in sales rather than because of poor credit 
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control) and, secondly, the cash and bank total had 
fallen from £124,000 at 31st December 1981 to £34,000 at 
31st December 1982. These two points about the increase 
in debtors and the decrease in the bank were important 
for this simulated lending decision because the overdraft 
was required by AB Limited during 1983 to finance an 
increase in the working capital because of the planned 
growth in the business of AB Limited. 
The funds statements for 1981 and 1982 emphasised 
this increase in working capital in both years and the 
reduction in cash and bank (£127,000 in 1981 and £90,000 
during 1982). Furthermore, AB Limited has been under- 
taking a capital investment programme without any 
borrowing and has spent £151,000 on capital expenditure 
in 1981, £111,000 in 1982 and has projected capital 
expenditure of £100,000 in 1983. The final details of 
the financial information for AB Limited benefited from 
the comments of academic colleagues both at the University 
of Edinburgh and elsewhere, senior management officials 
in the three banks and bankers in the pilot study. 
(h) Audit reports 
The financial audit report was of the standard form 
recommended in the British Auditing Standards and 
Guidelines17. This audit report was signed by XY, 
Chartered Accountants, on 24 January 1983. This date was 
chosen because the bankers were taking their decision on 
26 January 1983 and they required the financial audit 
report for the purposes of this simulated overdraft 
decision. Twenty -four days after the year -end is a short, 
but not unreasonably short, period in which to complete 
the audit work for 1982. 
The drafting of the favourable and adverse management 
audit reports proved to be more difficult than the 
drafting of the financial audit report. In drafting the 
management audit reports, the two criteria of conciseness 
and realism were chosen for the following reasons. 
Firstly, the management audit reports were to be kept 
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reasonably short. The bankers might pay attention to 
the management audit reports simply because they had not 
seen such reports before, but it would have defeated the 
purpose of this exercise if the management audit reports 
had been so long that they appeared to be out of place 
in relation to the rest of the material. No other single 
item in this simulation exercise exceeded one page and, 
therefore, the management audit reports were restricted 
to one page. Secondly, the management audit reports were 
to be as realistic as possible. The management audit 
reports included only examples in which I had been 
involved personally. This obviously restricted the 
choice of items to be included in the management audit 
reports but this restriction meant that these reports 
could be regarded as being relatively realistic. The 
examples were drawn from my two years' experience as an 
internal operational auditor although, to preserve 
confidentiality, the examples selected had in fact been 
included in different audit reports and the figures 
included in the management audit reports were scaled 
appropriately to the size of AB Limited. 
The management audit report was headed: 
AB Limited 
MANAGEMENT AUDITORS' REPORT 
for the year ended 31 December 1982 
and was signed by MN, management auditors, to show that 
they were different from the financial auditors, XY. 
However, both the management and financial audit reports 
were dated 24 January 1983. 
The favourable management audit report began: 
'The following summarised report indicates 
that a generally satisfactory situation 
existed within AB Limited.' 
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In contrast the adverse management audit report began: 
'A number of areas were found where 
potential cost savings and improvements 
in operational and financial controls 
could be implemented as summarised 
below.' 
In both reports, following the findings of the first, 
stage questionnaire, comments were included on the 
corporate objectives, organisational structure, management 
information system and on the performance of the finance, 
purchasing, production and selling functions. By its very 
nature the adverse management audit report was longer 
than the favourable management audit report but both 
reports were restricted to one page. Both the favourable 
and adverse management audit reports together with the 
rest of this simulated overdraft decision are included in 
the pocket on the cover of this thesis. The results of 




RESULTS OF SIMULATED OVERDRAFT DECISION 
Response rates 
The simulated overdraft decision was posted during 1983 
to the 354 participants in the survey with 118 
participants receiving each of the three different types 
of information namely the financial audit report only, 
the favourable management audit report and the adverse 
management audit report. As discussed in Chapter 6 on 
the first stage questionnaire survey, in my initial 
approach to the three banks it had been agreed that no 
follow -up letters would be sent. Again, therefore, no 
follow -up letters were sent for this second stage 
simulation exercise. The number of responses and the 
response rates for each bank for this simulated overdraft 
decision are given in Table 32. 
TABLE 32 








Number of head 
office respondents 11 7 12 30 
Number of branch 
manager respondents 72* 35 69 176* 
Total number of 
respondents 83* 42 81 206* 
% response from 
head office staff 52% 47% 40% 45% 
% response from 
branch managers 60% 73% 58% 61% 
% total response 59% 67% 54% 58% 
1 decision sheet was blank with a covering letter 
Although it is slightly lower than the response rate 
of 63% for the first stage questionnaire survey, the 
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overall response rate of 58% (205 respondents from 354 
surveyed) for this second stage simulated overdraft 
decision is reasonable relative to the response rates of 
the surveys discussed in Chapter 7 (which involved a 
decision by respondents) such as Estes and Reimer1 with 
a 22% response rate, Firth2 with a 43% response rate and 
Houghton3 with a 63% response rate before follow -up and 
70% after follow -up. The overall response rate for each 
of the three banks in Table 32 varied from 54% for the 
Royal Bank of Scotland to 67% for the Clydesdale Bank. 
As with the first stage questionnaire, the percentage 
response from head office staff was lower than that from 
branch managers for all three banks, although when 
examining the percentage in Table 32 the relatively small 
absolute number of head office staff must be remembered. 
Of the 210 bankers surveyed who had received the 
first stage questionnaire, 110 replied to this simulated 
overdraft decision giving a response rate of 52 %; 
whereas of the 144 bankers surveyed who did not receive 
the first stage questionnaire, 95 replied to this 
simulated overdraft decision giving a response rate of 
66 %. Confining this comparison to branch managers only, 
the response rate from those who had received the first 
stage questionnaire was 56% against the above 66% 
response rate. Therefore, as expected, the overall 
response rate of 58% for this simulated overdraft 
decision appears to have been affected by the fact that 
it was the second stage in this research project. 
However, 125 respondents (61% of all respondents) 
demonstrated an interest in this second stage simulated 
overdraft decision by requesting a copy of the results 
(see Appendix K for a copy of the results of this 
simulation exercise sent to such respondents). This 
compared with 103 respondents (35% of all respondents) 
requesting a copy of the results for the first stage 
questionnaire. Therefore, if the number of requests for 
a copy of the results can be used as a measure of 
interest, greater interest was shown by respondents in 
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this simulated overdraft decision than in the question- 
naire survey. Furthermore, every respondent in this 
lending decision exercise gave some reasons for their 
decision. Indeed, many respondents gave very detailed 
reasons (including some calculations) for their final 
decision. 
In Table 32, of the 205 usable replies, 30 (15 %) 
were from head office staff and 175 (85%) from branch 
managers. Table 33 shows how these 205 respondents from 
the 354 bankers surveyed were divided between the various 
groups receiving the three different types of information. 
For each bank the same number of branch managers received 
the three different types of information - for example, 
of the 120 Bank of Scotland branch managers surveyed: 
40 received the financial audit report only 
40 received the favourable management audit report 
40 received the adverse management audit report. 
Similarly, for each bank the same number of head office 
staff received the three different types of information - 
for example of the 21 Bank of Scotland head office staff 
surveyed: 
7 received the financial audit report only 
7 received the favourable management audit report 
7 received the adverse management audit report. 
This emphasises the relatively small sample sizes 
involved and in Table 33, therefore, the number of 
respondents (not percentages) by bank and by type of 
information are given. 
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TABLE 33 
Number of respondents by type of information 
Total Number of respondents 
number Total Branch H.O. 
surveyed returns returns 
Bank of Scotland(l) 
1. Financial audit 
report only 47 
2. Favourable management 
audit report 47 
3. Adverse management 
audit report 47 
141 
Clydesdale Bank(2) 
1. Financial audit 
report only 21 
2. Favourable management 
audit report 21 
3. Adverse management 
audit report 21 
63 
Royal Bank of Scotland(3) 
1. Financial audit 
report only 50 
2. Favourable management 
audit report 50 
3. Adverse management 
audit report 50 
150 
All 3 Banks(4) 
1. Financial audit 
report only 118 
2. Favourable management 
audit report 118 
3. Adverse management 
audit report 118 
354 
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25 22 3 
27 23 4 
30 26 4 
82 71 11 
15 13 2 
14 10 4 
13 12 1 
42 35 7 
23 19 4 
31 26 5 
27 24 3 
81 69 12 
63 54 9 
72 59 13 
70 62 8 
205 175 30 
Notes: 
(1) 40 branch managers and 7 head office 
staff surveyed for each type of information. 
(2) 16 branch managers and 5 head office 
staff surveyed. 
(3) 40 branch managers and 10 head office 
staff surveyed. 
(4) 96 branch managers and 22 head office 
staff surveyed. 
The overall response rates for the three types of 
information are similar with 53% (63 respondents from 
118 surveyed) for the financial audit report only, 61% 
(72 respondents from 118 surveyed) for the favourable 
management audit report and 59% (70 respondents from 
118 surveyed) for the adverse management audit report. 
If the individual banks are considered the differences are 
greater with the lowest percentage response rate being 
46% (23 respondents out of 50 surveyed) for the Royal Bank 
of Scotland for the financial audit report only and the 
highest percentage response rate being 71% (15 respondents 
out of 21 surveyed) for the Clydesdale Bank for the 
financial audit report only. Again the relatively small 
absolute numbers involved must be remembered when 
considering these percentages. Table 33 was given in 
absolute numbers and not in percentages to show that, for 
each of the three banks, the number of respondents can be 
regarded as being reasonly similar for the three types of 
information with: 
25, 27 and 30 respondents for the Bank of Scotland; 
15, 14 and 13 respondents for the Clydesdale Bank; 
and 23, 31 and 27 respondents for the Royal Bank of Scotland. 
As the decision sheets were received, the date of 
receipt was noted on them. Later these dates were grouped 
into weeks to indicate the week of receipt. 47% of the 
replies were received in week 1, 25% in week 2, 13% in 
week 3, 8% in week 4 and only 7% in week 5 or later. The 
169 
decision sheets were grouped by bank and by the type of 
information received to give nine groups and, within each 
of these groups, the decision sheets were arranged by 
date of receipt and on this basis the questionnaire were 




of decision sheets 
Bank Type of information 
001 - 025 Bank - financial audit report only 
026 - 052 of - favourable management audit report 
053 - 082 Scotland - adverse management audit report 
083 - 097 - financial audit report only 
098 - 111 
Clydesdale favourable management audit report 
112 - 124 
Bank - adverse management audit report 
125 - 147 Royal Bank - financial audit report only 
148 - 178 of - favourable management audit report 
179 - 205 Scotland - adverse management audit report 
The decision sheets were then key- punched and checked. A 
manual check was also made between the decision sheets 
and the computer print -out to ensure that the final 
computer file was as accurate as possible for the 
statistical analysis to be carred out on it. As with the 
first stage questionnaire, S.P.S.S. was used to analyse 
the data. The following analysis excludes missing 
answers (in other words the answers given total 100%) and 
shows the number of respondents for each question. 
Therefore, with 205 respondents having returned usable 
decision sheets, the number of 'missing answers' can be 
calculated from any of the following tables. 
Background variables 
As discussed above, one reason for asking respondents for 
background details was to determine the characteristics 
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of a 'typical' respondent. The following sections 
summarise the results for each of the background 
variables in this second stage simulation exercise. 
1. Age 
As can be seen from Table 35, 45% of respondents were in 
the 40 to 49 age range with 63% under 50 and 37% 50 and 
older. 
TABLE 35 
Age of respondents 
n* = 205 
Under 30 1 
30 - 39 17 
40 - 49 45 
50 - 59 37 
100 
In all the Tables n indicates the number of 
respondents answering that particular question 
out of a possible maximum of 205 respondents. 
2. Sex 
Of the 202 respondents answering this question all were 
male. 
3. Number of years employed by a bank 
Table 36 shows that 87% of respondents had been employed 
by a bank for at least 20 years with 44% being employed 




Number of years 
employed by a bank 
n = 204 
Under 5 - 
5 - 9 1 
10 - 19 12 
20 - 29 31 
30 and over 56 
100 
4. Number of years using financial information 
Although 87% of respondents had been employed by a bank 
for at least 20 years, Table 37 shows that only 30% of 
respondents had been using financial information for at 
least 20 years. However, 80% of respondents had been 
using financial information for at least 10 years. 
TABLE 37 
Number of years using 
financial information 
n = 205 
Under 5 4 
5 - 9 16 
10 - 19 50 
20 - 29 24 




This question was not answered by 42 respondents which 
could mean, of course, that they had no paper 
qualifications. However, of those answering, 92% gave 
their only qualification as being an Associate of the 
Institute of Bankers. 
TABLE 38 
Qualifications 
n = 163 % 
A.I.B. 92 
A.I.B. + other 
qualification 5 
Fellow of the 
Institute of Bankers 3 
100 
6. Banking experience 
Table 39 gives the number of respondents answering this 










7 and 8. Customers 
All respondents had limited liability companies as 
customers. As mentioned previously, the distinction 
between small and large companies was not made specifically 
in this second stage simulated overdraft decision. 
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Summary of background variables 
In summary, a 'typical' respondent to this simulated 
lending decision was over 40 years old, male, employed by 
a bank for at least 20 years, a user of financial 
information for at least 10 years, an Associate of the 
Institute of Bankers and experienced in the commercial 
and industrial banking fields with limited liability 
companies as customers. This 'typical' respondent is the 
same as that for the first stage questionnaire. However, 
comparing in detail the background variable of the 
respondents to both stages of this research, certain very 
minor differences can be seen. For example, 33% of 
questionnaire respondents against 37% of overdraft 
decision respondents were at least 50 years old. 
Similarly, only 49% of questionnaire respondents but 56% 
of overdraft decision respondents had been employed by a 
bank for at least 30 years; and 72% of questionnaire 
respondents against 80% of overdraft decision respondents 
had been using financial information for at least 10 years. 
These three minor differences reflect the fact that on 
average the overdraft decision respondents were slightly 
older and more experienced than the questionnaire 
respondents. This was to be expected with the judgment 
sampling for this second stage simulated overdraft 
decision based on the criterion of having experience of 
this type of decision compared with the random sampling 
of the branch managers for the first stage questionnaire. 
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Non -response bias 
The similarity of the background variables for both the 
questionnaire and the overdraft decision respondents 
confirms the previous comments that the characteristics 
of the 'typical' respondent were to be expected given the 
population of head office staff and branch managers in 
the three banks. As with the first stage questionnaire, 
a second test for non -response bias was conducted by 
comparing the early and late respondents to this 
simulation exercise on the assumption that late 
respondents are similar to non -respondents. The 97 
respondents whose decision sheets were received in the 
first week were compared with the 57 respondents whose 
decision sheets were received in the third week and 
later. The results are given in Table 40. 
TABLE 40 






n = 97 % n = 57 % 
Information received 
Financial audit 
report only 35 25 
Favourable management 
audit report 36 40 
Adverse management 





first week third week 
and later 
n = 97 % n = 57 % 
Bank 
Bank of Scotland 40 32 
Clydesdale Bank 16 26 
Royal Bank of Scotland 44 42 
100 100 
Category of respondents 
Head office 16 19 
Branch 84 81 
100 100 








Anwer to overdraft decision 
Yes 71 60 
No 22 30 




Under 30 1 2 
30 - 39 17 17 
40 - 49 46 42 
50 - 59 36 37 










n = 97 % 
99 
n = 57 % 
96 
No answer 1 4 
100 100 
Number of years employed 
by a bank 
Under 5 
5 - 9 1 2 
10 - 19 12 14 
20 - 29 27 33 
30 and over 60 49 
No answer - 2 
100 100 
Number of years using 
financial information 
Under 5 3 3 
5 - 9 14 18 
10 - 19 51 47 
20 -'29 26 23 
30 and over 6 9 
100 100 
Qualifications 
A.I.B. 74 72 
A.I.B. + other 
qualification 4 5 
F.I.B. 3 4 





first week third week 
and later 
n = 97 % n = 57 % 
Banking experience 
Personal l00 98 
Commercial 99 95 
Industrial 83 81 
Agricultural 78 68 
Fishing 27 35 
Other 12 14 






Table 40 illustrates that the early (first week) and late 
(third week and later) respondents have very similar 
backgrounds in terms of age, sex, number of years 
employed by a bank, number of years using financial 
information, qualifications and limited liability 
companies as customers. The implication is that non - 
respondents would have similar backgrounds to respondents. 
The evidence implies that the respondents are reasonably 
representative of this total judgment sample in terms of 
background variables. 
However, some differences are apparent in the non - 
background variables of the early and late respondents. 
Of the early respondents 35% received the financial audit 
report only as compared with 25% of the late respondents. 
In other words, respondents who received the financial 
audit report only were more likely to be early 
respondents; whereas, respondents who received one of the 
two management audit reports were more likely to be late 
respondents. Given the fact that bankers would not have 
seen such management audit reports before, this 
difference is not unexpected. 
178 
A second difference between early and late 
respondents was that only 16% of the early respondents 
were from the Clydesdale Bank against 26% of the late 
respondents; and in contrast 40% of the early 
respondents were from the Bank of Scotland against 32% of 
the late respondents. A third difference was that only 
50% of the early respondents had received the first stage 
questionnaire against 67% of the late respondents. In 
other words respondents who had received the first stage 
questionnaire tended to be late respondents to this 
simulated overdraft decision compared to those who had 
not received this first stage questionnaire. This 
difference was expected in that those who received the 
first stage questionnaire would not have expected this 
second stage simulation exercise and their first reaction 
might have been not to make this simulated overdraft 
decision but, after reconsidering, they might have become 
late respondents. The final difference was that 71% of 
early respondents replied yes to this overdraft decision 
against 60% of late respondents. However, this is 
meaningless without considering the type of information 
received. 
In addition to comparing the early and late 
respondents on the basis of background variables, there - 
fore, an attempt was made to examine any differences in 
their overdraft decisions. The three null hypotheses to 
be tested relate to the three types of information and 
for conciseness they will be described as HolOa, HolOb 
and H 
o 
l Oc : 
H 
o 
10 Bankers' overdraft decisions 
(a) on the basis of the financial 
audit report only 
(b) on the basis of the favourable 
management audit report 
(c) on the basis of the adverse 
management audit report 
are not significantly related to early or late 
respondents. 
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In the above hypothesis (and in later hypotheses) 
'decisions' refer to the decision outcomes in other words 
to the yes, no and don't know answers of bankers, rather 
than to the actual decision process to reach the final 
decision outcome. 
Using S.P.S.S. the cross -tabulations were calculated 
for the overdraft decisions by week (first week and third 
weeks and later) by information (the three different 
types of audit report) with the no and don't know answers 
being combined for two reasons. Firstly, the main reason 
is that the decision is to grant the overdraft (yes 
answers) or not (no and don't know answers). Secondly, 
we have the relatively small numbers involved. The rules 
of thumb for the chi- square test recommended by Yeomans4, 
and used also in the analysis of the results of the first 
stage questionnaire, are that: 
(1) The expected frequency for any cell 
should not be below one; 
(2) No more than 20% of all cells should 
have an expected frequency below five. 
The results are shown in Table 41. 
TABLE 41 
Cross -tabulations of overdraft decisions" by early 
and late respondents controlling for information 
n X2 df p 
Financial audit 
report only 48 0.08 1 0.77 
Favourable management 
audit report 58 0.00 1 1.00 
Adverse management 
audit report 48 1.66 1 0.20 
a 
No and don't know decision are combined 
(Note: n = number of respondents for that 
particular cross -tabulation 
X2 = chi- square or corrected chi- square 
where necessary 
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df = degrees of freedom 
p = significance) 
As in the analysis of the results of the question- 
naire survey in Chapter 6, the guidelines of Schuman and 
Pressers will be used in the analysis of this simulation 
exercise with a probability of less than .10 being 
regarded as 'borderline' in terms of statistical 
significance and a probability of less than .05 being 
regarded as 'significant'. Table 41 shoes that none of 
the chi- squares were significant at the 5% level. We 
have no reasons therefore to reject HolOa , HolOb and 
Ho10c at the 5% level of significance. In this 
simulation exercise, bankers' overdraft decisions do not 
appear to be significantly related to early or late 
respondents. 
Detailed results of simulated overdraft decision 
In the first stage questionnaire survey, bankers answered 
that they would use management audit reports on limited 
liability companies. Would the addition of the manage- 
ment audit reports make any significant difference to 
their overdraft decisions in this simulation exercise? 
Before analysing the overall results to try to answer 
this question, various subsets of the respondents will 
be considered to attempt to identify any significant 
differences. The results from this simulation exercise 
will be analysed by: 
(a) Bank to determine whether or not the 
bankers' overdraft decisions are 
significantly related to a particular 
bank; 
(b) By head office staff and branch managers 
to determine whether or not the bankers' 
overdraft decisions are significantly 
related to head office or branch 
manager respondents; 
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(c) Recipients and non -recipients of the first 
stage questionnaire to determine whether 
or not the bankers' overdraft decisions 
are significantly related to recipients 
or non -recipients of the first stage 
questionnaire; 
(d) Various background variables to determine 
whether or not the bankers' overdraft 
decisions are significantly related to 
such background variables as age, number 
of years employed by a bank, number of 
years using financial information and 
qualifications. 
(a) Results by bank 
If we examine the results by bank, the Clydesdale Bank 
appears to be slightly different from the Bank of 
Scotland and the Royal Bank of Scotland but this may be 
because of the relatively small number of Clydesdale 
Bank respondents namely 42. The results by bank are 
given in Table in percentages for ease of comparison. 
TABLE 42 
Overdraft decisions by bank 
n Yes No Don't know 
Clydesdale Bank 
Financial audit 
report only 15 53 27 
Favourable management 
audit report 14 86 14 
Adverse management 





n Yes No Don't know 
Bank of Scotland 
Financial audit 
report only 25 76 8 16 
Favourable management 
audit report 27 63 26 11 
Adverse management 
audit report 30 47 47 6 
82 
Royal Bank of Scotland 
Financial audit 
report only 23 74 22 
Favourable management 
audit report 31 74 26 
Adverse management 




As can be seen from Table 42 only 53% of the 
Clydesdale Bank respondents would lend on the basis of 
the financial audit report only (although a further 20% 
answered don't know) against 76% and 74% for the Bank of 
Scotland and the Royal Bank of Scotland respectively. 
Furthermore, 77% of the Clydesdale Bank respondents would 
lend on the basis of the adverse management audit report 
against 47% for the Bank of Scotland and 52% for the 
Royal Bank of Scotland. However, are these apparent 
differences statistically significant? The three null 






11 Bankers' overdraft decisions 
(a) on the basis of the financial 
audit report only 
(b) on the basis of the favourable 
management audit report 
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(c) on the basis of the adverse 
management audit report 
are not significantly related to a particular 
bank. 
The cross- tabulations were calculated for the over- 
draft decisions by bank (using the actual number of 
replies and not the percentages shown in Table 42) for 
the three sets of information and, for the reasons given 
in relation to Ho10 above, the no and don't know answers 
were combined. The resulting chi- squares are shown in 
Table 43. 
TABLE 43 
Cross -tabulations of overdraft decisions" by 
all three banks controlling for information 
p 
Financial audit 
n X2 df 
report only 63 2.57 2 0.28 
Favourable management 
audit report 72 2.48 2 0.29 
Adverse management 
audit report 70 3.45 2 0.18 
205 
(No and don't know decisions are combined) 
The chi -squares in Table 43 are not significant at the 5% 
level. Given this possibility of the Clydesdale Bank 
being different from the Bank of Scotland and the Royal 
Bank of Scotland, further analysis was carried out and 
the details.are included in Appendix L. However, the 
conclusion of this further analysis is that at the 5% 
significance level, or indeed even at the 10% significance 
level, there is no reason to reject the null hypotheses 
Holla, Hollb and Hollc. The overdraft decisions of the 
Clydesdale bankers are not statistically significantly 
different from those of the Bank of Scotland and of the 
Royal Bank of Scotland. 
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(b) Results by head office staff and branch managers 
Again we have the problem of small numbers with only 30 
head office respondents. If we examine the results in 
Table 44 (in percentages for comparison) we have no 
apparent major differences between head office and 
branch manager respondents. 
TABLE 44 
Overdraft decisions by head 
office staff and branch managers 
n Yes No Don't know 
Head office respondents 
Financial audit 
report only 9 78 22 
Favourable management 
audit report 13 85 15 
Adverse management 
audit report 8 63 25 
30 
Branch manager respondents 
12 
Financial audit 
report only 54 68 17 15 
Favourable management 
audit report 59 70 25 5 
Adverse management 
audit report 62 53 39 8 
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The three null hypotheses to be tested are Ho12a, Hol2b 
and H 
o 
12c as follows: 
H 
o 
12 Bankers' overdraft decisions 
(a) on the basis of the financial 
audit report only 
(b) on the basis of the favourable 
management audit report 
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(c) on the basis of the adverse 
management audit report 
are not significantly related to head office 
or branch manager respondents. 
The cross- tabulations for the overdraft decisions by 
head office staff and branch managers by information are 
given in Table 45. 
TABLE 45 
Cross -tabulations of overdraft decisions" 
by head office staff and branch managers 
controlling for information 
X2 df 
Financial audit 
report only 63 0.03 1 0.87 
Favourable management 
audit report 72 0.58 1 0.45 
Adverse management 
audit report 70 0.01 1 0.91 
205 
(No and don't know decisions are combined) 
Even with the grouping of the no and don't know overdraft 
decisions together, the cross -tabulations in Table 45 
suffer from the problem of one of the four valid cells 
having an expected cell frequency less than five. 
However, accepting this problem, there is no reason to 
reject the null hypotheses Holla, Ho12b and Ho12c at the 
5% level of significance (or even at the 10% significance 
level). 
(c) Results by recipients and 
non- recipients of questionnaire 
Of the 205 respondents to this simulated overdraft 
decision, 110 (including 30 head office respondents) had 
also received the first stage questionnaire. Would the 
fact that some respondents had received this questionnaire 
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affect their overdraft decision? Table 46 shows the 
results. 
TABLE 46 
Overdraft decisions by recipients 
and non -recipients of questionnaire 
n Yes No 
Don't 
Know 
Respondents (head office 
staff and branch managers) 
who had received questionnaire 
Financial audit report only 29 72 14 14 
Favourable management 
audit report 42 71 24 5 
Adverse management 
audit report 39 64 26 10 
Respondents (ie. branch 
managers only) who had not 
received questionnaire 





Respondents (ie. branch 
managers only) who had 
received questionnaire 
110 
34 68 20 12 
30 74 23 3 
31 42 52 6 
95 
Financial audit report only 20 70 10 20 
Favourable management 
audit report 29 65 28 7 
Adverse management 
audit report 31 64 26 10 
80 
(Difference between 110 and 80 respondents 
is the 30 head office staff) 
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These results from Table 46 show that 64% of 
respondents who had received the first stage questionnaire 
(both including and excluding head office respondents) 
were willing to lend given the adverse management audit 
report against 42% for respondents who had not received 
this questionnaire. It can be suggested that respondents 
who had received the questionnaire were aware of the 
emphasis on management auditing in this research and 
therefore when they received this simulated overdraft 
decision including an adverse management audit report, 
they may have tended to counteract the influence of such 
a management audit report. 
However, is this difference between recipients and 
non -recipients of the questionnaire statistically 
significant? The null hypotheses to be tested are as 
follows Hó 3a, Ho13b and Ho13c: 
H 
0 
13 Bankers/ overdraft decisions 
(a) on the basis of the financial 
audit report only 
(b) on the basis of the favourable 
management audit report 
(c) on the basis of the adverse 
management audit report 
are not significantly related to recipients or 
non -recipients of the first stage questionnaire. 
The cross- tabulations of overdraft decisions by recipients 
and non -recipients of the questionnaire by information 
were calculated with the no and don't know overdraft 
decisions combined. The resulting chi -squares are shown 
in Table 47. 
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TABLE 47 
Cross -tabulations of overdraft decisions" by 
recipients and non -recipients of questionnaire 
controlling for information 
n 
Financial audit 
X2 df p 
report only 63 0.02 1 0.89 
Favourable management 
audit report 72 0.00 1 1.00 
Adverse management 
audit report 70 2.58 1 0.11 
205 
(No and don't know decisions are combined) 
We have no reason to reject Hol3a and Hol3b at the 
5% level of significance. The cross -tabulations of 
overdraft decisions by recipients and non -recipients of 
the questionnaire by information were calculated for the 
branch managers only (ie. excluding the head office 
staff) with the no and don't know overdraft decisions 
combined. The resulting chi-squares are shown in 
Table 48. 
TABLE 48 
Cross- tabulations for branch managers only of overdraft 
ti 
decisions by recipients and non -recipients of 
questionnaire controlling for information 
n X2 df p 
Financial audit 
report only 54 0.00 1 1.00 
Favourable management 
audit report 59 0.14 1 0.71 
Adverse management 
audit report 62 2.33 1 0.13 
175 
(No and don't know decisions are combined) 
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Again we have no reason to reject Hol3a, Hol3b and Hol3c 
at the 5% significance level. In conclusion, even at the 
10% significance level there is no reason to reject the null 
hypotheses Ho13a, Ho13b and Hol3c. 
(d) Results by background variables 
Three of the background variables could be ignored: 
(1) Sex because all respondents were male. 
(2) Experience because the sample had been 
selected by the top management of the 
three banks on the basis of staff 
having the relevant experience for 
this type of overdraft decision. 
(3) Limited liability companies as 
customers because all respondents had 
such customers. 
As discussed in Chapter 7, the above three background 
variables were included in this second stage simulation 
exercise so that recipients of the first stage question- 
naire would be asked for exactly the same background 
variables as for the first stage questionnaire. On the 
basis of the analysis of background variables at the 
beginning of this chapter, age, number of years employed 
by a bank, number of years using financial information 
and qualifications were tested with regard to the 
following twelve null hypotheses which are described 
for convenience as Hol4 [ie. Hol4a(1), Hol4a(2), Ho14a(3), 
Hol4a(4), Hol4b(1) Ho14c(4)] : 
Hol4 Bankers' overdraft decisions 
(a) on the basis of the financial 
audit report only 
(b) on the basis of the favourable 
management audit report 
(c) on the basis of the adverse 
management audit report 
are not significantly related to 
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(1) age (under 50 years old or 50 years 
and over) 
(2) number of years employed by a bank 
(under 30 years or 30 years and more) 
number of years using financial 
information (under 10 years or 10 years 
and more) 
(3) 
(4) qualifications (stating a paper 
qualification or not). 
In relation to Ho14 the cross- tabulations were 
calculated for the overdraft decisions (with the no and 
don't know answers combined) by: 
(1) age 
(2) number of years employed by a bank 
(3) number of years using financial information 
(4) qualifications 
controlling for information in each case. The resulting 
chi- squares are given in Table 49. 
TABLE 49 
Cross- tabulations of overdraft decisions by 
background variables controlling for information 
n X2 df p 
Age (<50 or >50 years) 
Financial audit 
report only 63 0.06 1 0.80 
Favourable management 
audit report 72 1.42 1 0.23 
Adverse management 
audit report 70 0.03 1 0.87 
205 
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Years employed by bank 







Years using financial 
information 















n v2 A df p 
63 0.29 1 0.59 
72 0.88 1 0.35 
69 0.06 1 ' 0.81 
204 
63 0.28 1 0.59 
72 0.02 1 0.89 
70 0.00 1 0.95 
205 
63 0.35 1 0.55 
72 0.00 1 1.00 
70 0.90 1 0.34 
205 
("No and don't know decisions are combined) 
Even with the grouping of the no and don't know overdraft 
decisions together, some of the cross -tabulations in 
Table 49 suffer from the problem of one of the four valid 
cells having an expected cell frequency less than five. 
However, accepting this problem, Table 49 shows that all 
twelve chi -squares calculated were not significant at the 
5% level (or even at the 10% level) and therefore we have 
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no reason to reject any of the twelve hypotheses in H014. 
Overall results for all three banks 
The results of this simulated overdraft decision have now 
been examined by various subsets of the respondents 
namely by: 
(a) The three banks 
(b) Head office staff and branch managers 
(c) Recipients and non -recipients of the 
first stage questionnaire 
(d) Background variables. 
At the 10% level of significance not one of the null 
hypotheses relating to the above would be rejected. It 
is therefore reasonable to examine the overall results of 
this simulated overdraft decision which are given in 
Table 50. 
TABLE 50 
Overdraft decisions by type of information 
n Yes No Don't know 
Financial audit 
% % 
report only 63 70 17 13 
Favourable management 
audit report 72 72 24 4 
Adverse management 
audit report 70 54 37 9 
205 
Although given exactly the same information, 
bankers did make different overdraft decisions. For 
example, on the basis of the financial audit report only, 
70% granted the overdraft and 30% did not. Table 42 
above also showed that, even within the same bank, bankers 
did make different overdraft decisions although given 
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exactly the same information. The reasons for such 
differences would be an interesting area of research but 
the objective of this particular exercise was to examine 
whether or not different audit reports would have a 
significant effect on bankers' corporate overdraft 
decisions. Little difference exists between the over- 
draft decisions with the financial audit report only and 
the addition of the favourable management audit report. 
On the basis of the financial audit report only, 30% of 
respondents answered no or don't know to this overdraft 
decision compared to 28% on the basis of the favourable 
management audit report. These two results imply that 
an additional piece of information by itself (ie. a 
favourable management audit report) has not greatly 
affected the responding bankers' overdraft decisions. 
However, the main conclusion from Table 50 is that 
the adverse management audit report has affected the 
bankers' decisions. Instead of at least 70% of the 
responding bankers lending to this company given the 
financial audit report only or the favourable management 
audit report, only 54% of responding bankers would lend 
to this same company given the adverse management audit 
report. The adverse management audit report appears to 
make a difference to the overdraft decision of the 
bankers in this simulation exercise. 
The next question is how statistically significant 
are these results. The null hypothesis to be tested for 
the overall results was: 
Ho15 There are no significant differences 
between bankers' overdraft decisions 
on the basis of 
(a) the financial audit report only 
(b) the favourable management audit 
report 
(c) the adverse management audit 
report. 
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Without combining the no and don't know overdraft 
decisions, the cross- tabulation of the overdraft 
decisions by information gives a chi -square of 10.18 with 
four degrees of freedom and with a significance of 0.04. 
The null hypothesis H015 must therefore be rejected at 
the 5% level of significance. The computer package of 
MINITAB can be used to examine the composition of this 
chi- square of 10.18 and the results are given in 
Table 51. 
TABLE 51 
Composition of chi- square of overdraft 













No Don't know Total 
1.89 1.47 3.55 
0.20 1.48 2.20 
3.10 0.02 4.43 
10.18 
Table 51 shows that 3.10 of the chi- square of 10.18 can 
be attributed to the cell of the adverse management audit 
report with the decision to refuse the overdraft for 
AB Limited where the expected frequency was 18 and the 
actual number of answers was 26. 
If the no and don't know overdraft decisions are 
combined, the cross -tabulation of the overdraft decisions 
by information gives a chi -square of 5.85 with two 
degrees of freedom and with a significance of 0.05. 
MINITAB can again be used to examine the composition of 




Composition of chi -square of 
overdraft decisions by information 
with no and don't know decisions combined 
Information 
Overdraft decision 
Yes No and Don't Know Total 
Financial audit 
report only 0.19 
Favourable management 
audit report 0.52 
Adverse management 








Table 52 shows that 2.48 of the chi- square of 5.85 can be 
attributed to the cell of the adverse management audit 
report with no and don't know decisions where the expected 
frequency was 24 and the actual number of answers was 32. 
This overall result implies that there is evidence that 
the overdraft decisions of bankers are related to the 
three different types of information and we can now 
examine this overall result in more detail. 
From the frequencies in Table 50 it appears that the 
addition of the favourable management audit report by 
itself has not greatly affected the bankers' decisions. 
The null hypothesis to be tested is: 
Ho16 There are no significant differences 
between bankers' overdraft decisions 
on the basis of 
(a) the financial audit report only 
(b) the favourable management audit 
report. 
Similarly, from Table 50 it appears that the addition of 
the adverse management audit report has affected the 
bankers' overdraft decisions. The null hypothesis to be 
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tested is: 
Ho17 There are no significant differences 
between bankers' overdraft decisions 
on the basis of 
(a) the financial audit report only 
(b) the adverse management audit report. 
Without combining the no and don't know overdraft 
decisions, the cross -tabulations of: 
(1) The financial audit report only by 
the favourable management audit 
report 
and (2) The financial audit report only by 
the adverse management audit report 
are given in Table 53. 
TABLE 53 
Cross -tabulations of overdraft 
decisions by information 
Financial audit report 
only by favourable 
n X2 df p 
management audit report 135 3.64 2 0.16 
Financial audit report 
only by adverse 
management audit report 133 6.46 2 0.04 
At the 5% level of significance (and indeed also at the 
10% level of significance), therefore, we have no reason 
to reject H016 but we would reject H017. The adverse 
management audit report appears to have 'changed' the 
corporate overdraft decision of a statistically 
significant number of bankers. 
The same cross- tabulations of: 
(1) The financial audit report only by 
the favourable management audit 
report 
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and (2) The financial audit report only by 
the adverse management audit report 
are shown in Table 54 with the no and don't know 
decisions combined. 
TABLE 54 
Cross -tabulations of overdraft 
decisions by information with the 
no and don't know decisions combined 
Financial audit report 
only by favourable 
n X2 df p 
management audit report 135 0.01 1 0.91 
Financial audit report 
only by adverse 
management audit report 133 2.77 1 0.10 
At the 5% level of significance therefore, we would 
reject both H0l6 and H017 but at the 10% level of 
significance we have no reason to reject H016 but we 
would reject H017. Considering both Tables 53 and 54, at 
the 10% level of significance we have no reason to reject 
Ho16 but we would reject Ho17. The overall conclusion of 
Tables 50 to 54 is that the overdraft decisions of 
bankers are not significantly related in this simulation 
exercise to the addition of a favourable management 
audit report but are related to the addition of an 
adverse management audit report (see also Appendix M ). 
Reasons for overdraft decisions 
In addition to asking the bankers to make this overdraft 
decision, the decision sheet also asked the bankers for 
the reasons for their decision. All 205 respondents gave 
at least one reason for their particular lending decision 
and most gave several reasons. An attempt has been made 
to classify such reasons into general categories although 
a degree of interpretation is involved. A number of 
actual quotations from the reasons given which relate to 
198 
the management audit reports are given in Appendix N. 
Table 55 summarises the reasons given by respondents for 
each of the three decisions on the basis of the financial 
audit report only. Some respondents gave several reasons 
for their decision. 
TABLE 55 
Reasons for overdraft decisions 
with financial audit report only 
Total Bank of 
Scotland 






(n =19) (n =8) (n =17) (n =44) 
Adequate shareholders' 
interest relative to 
overdraft 13 5 5 23 
Reasonable profitability 6 2 9 17 
Experienced directors 4 5 6 15 
Adequate security 8 4 3 15 
Satisfactory liquidity 4 2 - 6 
No 
(n =2) (n =4) (n =5) (n =11) 
Dividends too high 2 3 3 8 
Inadequate security 2 1 3 6 
Margins under pressure - 1 3 4 
Don't know (n =4) (n 
=3) (n =1) (n =8) 
Dividends too high 3 2 1 6 
Inadequate security 3 2 1 6 
The reasons listed in Table 55 give an indication of 
how bankers in this survey assessed AB Limited when given 
the information with the financial audit report only. The 
most frequently cited reason for granting the overdraft 
was the adequate shareholders' interest relative to the 
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overdraft. The bankers giving this reason apparently 
considered it important that the owners of the company 
had a reasonable investment in the company relative to 
the size of overdraft requested. In other words the 
bankers wished to avoid the situation where the share- 
holders themselves accept little risk and finance the 
company with a bank overdraft with the result that the 
shareholders benefit if the company prospers but the 
bank - rather than the shareholders - suffers if the 
company goes into liquidation. In addition to examining 
the adequacy of the shareholders' interest in AB Limited 
relative to the overdraft requested, 15 or more bankers 
out of the 44 granting the overdraft also considered the 
level of profitability, the experience of the directors 
and the adequacy of the security offered. 
Despite the reasons given in Table 55 for granting 
the overdraft facility on the basis of the information 
with the financial audit report only, two reservations 
were also expressed by several respondents although these 
reservations did not change their decision to reply yes. 
Firstly, 22 respondents (from the 44 replying yes) would 
like a floating charge as security because of the 
problem of selling industrial buildings in the event of 
a liquidation. Secondly, 18 of these 44 respondents 
commented on the high dividends paid (mainly to the 
directors themselves) and suggested that future dividends 
should be reduced. These two reservations of inadequate 
security and dividends being too high were also the two 
main reasons given by bankers refusing to grant overdraft 
facilities or answering don't know on the basis of the 
information with the financial audit report only. Table 
55 highlights the fact that in the overdraft decision we 
are concerned with bankers' judgments and individual 
bankers will view items differently such as the adequacy 
of the security for the overdraft. 
The second type of information included the 
favourable management audit report and Table 56 shows the 
reasons given for each of the three decisions. 
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TABLE 56 
Reasons for overdraft decisions with 










(n =17) (n =12) (n =23) (n =52) 
Adequate shareholders' 
interest relative to 
overdraft 7 7 19 33 
Experienced directors 6 6 4 16 
Reasonable profitability 4 3 3 10 
Adequate security 8 - 2 10 
No (n=7) (n=2) (n=8) (n=17) 
Management audit report 
weaknesses are not 
minor 4 1 8 13 
Dividends too high 2 1 7 10 
Inadequate security 4 1 2 7 
Margins under pressure 1 1 1 3 
Don't know (n =3) (n =0) (n =0) (n =3) 
Inadequate security 
Dividends too high 
3 - - 3 
2 - 2 
As with the financial audit report only, the four 
main reasons given for granting the overdraft facility on 
the basis of the favourable management audit report are 
adequate shareholders' interest relative to the overdraft 
requested, experienced directors, reasonable profitability 
and adequate security. Similarly, of the 52 respondents 
who would grant overdraft facilities on the basis of the 
information with the favourable management audit report, 
a number expressed the two reservations of the need for 
a floating charge (19 respondents) and the question of 
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the high dividends (15 respondents). Furthermore, of 
these 52 respondents replying yes, 37 emphasised the need 
to correct the weaknesses mentioned in the management 
audit report. 
It is interesting that some bankers have interpreted 
'a minor weakness' in the favourable management audit 
report as being more than minor. Indeed it is the most 
common reason expressed (by 13 out of 17 respondents) for 
refusing the overdraft facility. This finding has 
important implications for the drafting of management 
audit reports. My perception of minor weaknesses was 
obviously different from that of some bankers and the 
clarification of communication between sender and 
receiver would have to be investigated further. After 
the management audit report weaknesses, the two other 
main reasons for refusing to grant the overdraft facility 
on the basis of the favourable management audit report 
are again dividends being too high and inadequate 
security. 
The third type of information included the adverse 
audit report and Table 57 summarises the 
reasons given for each of the three answers. 
TABLE 57 
Reasons for overdraft decisions with 
adverse management audit report 
Number of respondents 
Bank of Clydesdale Royal Bank 




=14) (n =10) (n =14) (n =38) 
Adequate shareholders' 
interest relative to 
overdraft 3 5 9 17 
Adequate security 4 4 5 13 
Reasonable profitability 3 5 3 11 











(n =14) (n =2) (n =10) (n =26) 
Management audit report 
weaknesses 14 2 10 26 
Dividends too high 4 2 4 10 
Inadequate security 5 1 1 7 
Margins under pressure 1 1 3 5 
Don't know (n =2) (n =1) (n =3) (n =6) 
Management audit report 
weaknesses 2 1 3 6 
Dividends too high - 1 2 3 
Inadequate security 2 - 1 3 
Table 57 shows that, as with the financial audit 
report only and also with the favourable management audit 
report, the most frequently cited reason for granting the 
overdraft on the basis of the information with the adverse 
management audit report was the 'gearing effect' - in 
other words adequate shareholders' interest in the company 
relative to the size of overdraft requested. Taking the 
three types of information together (financial audit 
report only, favourable and adverse management audit 
reports) 73 respondents out of the 134 respondents 
granting the overdraft gave this reason of adequate 
shareholders' interest relative to the size of overdraft 
compared with 38 respondents citing reasonable profit- 
ability, 38 respondents citing adequate security and 
35 respondents citing the experience of the directors. 
Concentrating on Table 57, of the 38 respondents 
who would grant overdraft facilities on the basis of the 
information with the adverse management audit report, 
19 respondents desired a floating charge and 11 
respondents mentioned the high level of dividends. 
However, all 38 respondents stated that, although they 
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would grant this overdraft facility, the weaknesses 
outlined in the management audit report would be 
investigated. To be more specific, 14 of the 38 
respondents who would grant overdraft facilities to 
AB Limited made it a condition of their lending that the 
weaknesses mentioned in the management audit report 
should be corrected. Furthermore, all of the remaining 
24 respondents granting overdraft facilities stated that 
the contents of this management audit report would'be 
discussed with the directors of AB Limited. 
Of those 26 bankers refusing to grant overdraft 
facilities, all 26 mentioned the weaknesses outlined in 
the management audit report as being one reason for their 
decision. Similarly, all 6 of the bankers answering 
don't know also gave these weaknesses as being one of the 
reasons for their decision. In summary the adverse 
management audit report appears to have had an effect not 
only in influencing the decision outcome of those bankers 
refusing the overdraft facility but also in causing those 
bankers who would still grant this overdraft facility to 
take an extra precaution such as adding a condition to 
the overdraft or discussing the management audit report 
with the directors of the company. 
Conclusion on adverse management audit report 
When examining the results of this simulation exercise 
it should be remembered that only one6 of the four7 
studies cited in Chapter 7 found that an external 
financial audit qualification made a statistically 
significant difference to bankers' lending decisions. 
The main conclusion from this simulated overdraft decision 
is that there are statistically significant differences 
between bankers' overdraft decisions on the basis of the 
financial audit report only and decisions with the 
addition of the adverse management audit report. However, 
when considering this conclusion it should be remembered 
that even with this relatively strong adverse management 
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audit report, 54% of respondents would still grant the 
overdraft on the basis of the information with the 
adverse management audit report. 
Nevertheless, the effects of the adverse management 
audit report can also be seen in the reasons given by 
bankers for their overdraft decisions. For example, all 
32 bankers who did not grant the overdraft on the basis 
of the adverse management audit report gave the weak- 
nesses outlined in this report as being one reason for 
their decision. Furthermore, all 38 respondents who 
did grant the overdraft on the basis of the adverse 
management audit report replied that the weaknesses 
outlined in this report would be investigated further. 
The responding bankers stated in the first stage 
questionnaire that they would use external management 
audit reports and they have shown in this simulation 
exercise that the addition of an external management 




SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
(a) Definition, roots and reasons 
An external management audit was defined as an independent 
examination of an organisation resulting in a statement 
to external users on the performance of the management 
function. However, this thesis has concentrated on one 
particular type of organisation namely the limited 
liability company and three separate roots of external 
management auditing were identified namely external 
financial auditing, internal operational auditing and 
management consultancy. Nevertheless, although external 
management auditing has links with these three activities, 
it is also different from each of these three activities. 
For example, external financial auditors concentrate 
on the honesty of management's stewardship and ignore the 
efficiency of that stewardship in which external manage- 
ment auditors are interested. The internal operational 
auditors are internal auditors who conduct the audit FOR 
the company's management and audit certain parts of the 
company at the request of top management; whereas the 
external management auditors conduct an audit OF top 
management, report to external user groups and decide for 
themselves the parts of the company on which to 
concentrate. Similarly, the management consultants, 
although external to the company, report their findings 
internally to the management and again very often 
concentrate on a particular problem identified by the 
management of the company. External management auditing 
has links with, but also important differences from 
external financial auditing, internal operational auditing 
and management consultancy. 
The reasons for conducting external management audits 
were considered particularly in relation to the idea of 
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the accountability of corporate management in society and 
the interests of various potential user groups. This 
growing emphasis on the accountability of corporate 
managements, not only to shareholders but also to society 
as a whole, could be an important source of pressure for 
corporate external management auditing. Furthermore, 
many user groups (such as bankers, creditors, financial 
analysts, trade unions and governmental agencies) may be 
interested in the economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
of the managerial performance of companies. For example, 
empirical surveys have shown that financial analysts and 
investors rank the quality of corporate management very 
highly in any list of important factors affecting their 
decisions. In particular the increase in the percentage 
of shares held by institutional investors could be 
another possible source of pressure for corporate 
external management auditing. 
(b) Examples and empirical evidence 
Many proposals have been made for external management 
audits both in the Great Britain and North America and, 
although these proposals begin generally from the view- 
point of shareholders, they illustrate the variety of 
possible forms of external management auditing. These 
proposals range from the audit of corporate and 
financial factors to public relations to product develop- 
ment to asset management to the total management 
information system. However, external management auditing 
is not merely a proposal but also a reality. Actual 
examples of external management audits can be found 
particularly in North America and especially in the public 
sector. One common theme in this variety of proposed and 
actual examples of external management audits both in the 
public and private sectors is the assessment of the 
efficiency and effectiveness of management. One of the 
most interesting actual examples of statutory external 
management auditing in the private sector is the Indian 
cost audit. 
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In the fields of both internal operational auditing 
and external management auditing there is a lack of 
British empirical evidence. Nevertheless, it seems that 
probably, even in Great Britain, operational auditing is 
now approximately 50% of all internal auditing. Corporate 
managements appear to find internal operational audits 
useful. In the American surveys on external management 
auditing the general conclusion is that users perceive 
a greater need for external management audits than do 
accountants. Given this lack of British empirical 
evidence in the field of external management auditing, it 
was decided to survey one potential user group. 
(c) Questionnaire survey 
Bankers were chosen as this user group because empirical 
surveys have shown that bankers claim to read the 
external financial audit report more carefully than 
financial analysts, institutional shareholders and 
private shareholders. Furthermore, bankers also try to 
assess corporate managements. The primary objective of 
this questionnaire survey was to attempt to determine 
whether or not bankers in the Bank of Scotland, the 
Clydesdale Bank and the Royal Bank of Scotland would 
express any demand for external management audit reports 
on companies. The proposed external management audit 
report was defined for bankers, in comparison with the 
external financial audit report, as 'a report containing 
an independent opinion on the performance of the 
management of a limited liability company, prepared by a 
professionally qualified team and included with the 
financial statements of your limited liability customer 
companies'. 
This questionnaire was sent to a sample of 466 
bankers in the three Scottish joint -stock banks out of a 
population of 1,205 with a resulting 63% response rate 
without any follow -up letters. A typical respondent was 
over 40 years old, male, employed by a bank for at least 
20 years, a user of financial information for at least 
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10 years, an Associate of the Institute of Bankers and 
experienced in the commercial and industrial banking 
fields with limited liability companies as customers. No 
evidence was found to suggest that the respondents were 
not reasonably representative of the total sample. 
In this survey the bankers' answers were not 
generally significantly related to: 
(a) a particular bank; 
(b) head office or branch respondents; 
(c) the background variables of sex, number 
of years employed by a bank, number of 
years using financial information, 
agricultural banking experience, 
commercial banking experience, fishing 
banking experience, personal banking 
experience, other banking experience 
and having small and large limited 
liability companies as customers. 
The two most important background variables for this 
survey in terms of the number of null hypotheses rejected 
at the 5% level of significance were qualifications 
(having paper qualifications or not) and industrial 
banking experience (having such experience or not). 
Furthermore, in this survey bankers' answers to the 
questions for small companies were significantly related 
to the answers for large companies. The distinction made 
in the questionnaire between small and large companies 
can generally be ignored. 
The main findings of this questionnaire survey can 
be summarised as follows: 
(1) Bankers claim to read and use the 
external financial audit report. For 
example, 80% of respondents found the 
external financial audit report useful 
in helping them to make their lending 
decisions about companies. 
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(2) Bankers do try to assess corporate 
managements. 
(3) When assessing corporate managements, 
bankers use a range of financial and 
non- financial information such as 
annual financial statements, practical 
experience of management, personal 
knowledge of management and external 
financial audit reports. 
(.4) Less than 10ó of respondents consider that 
they always have sufficient information to 
assess corporate managements. 
(5) Over 85% of respondents agree that they 
would find the external management audit 
report useful in their corporate lending 
decisions. 
(6) Over 90% of respondents would always or 
sometimes use the external management 
audit report as part of the information 
on which to assess corporate management. 
(7) Bankers consider that the company should 
pay for the cost of the external management 
audit. 
(8) Bankers consider that the external 
management audit report should include 
assessments both of the general management 
function and of the individual business 
functions. For example, over 80% of 
respondents wish assessments of the 
following reported in an external 
management audit report: 
(a) efficiency and effectiveness 
of management in the achievement 
of company objectives; 
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(b) budgetary control system; 
(c) company objectives; 
(d) performance of the management 
of the finance, accounting, 
marketing and production 
functions. 
(9) Bankers consider that the external 
financial and external management 
audit reports would be equally useful 
in helping them to make their corporate 
lending decisions. 
The results of this questionnaire survey indicate 
support for both the external financial and external 
management audit reports from the responding bankers. 
Despite the fact that bankers have had experience of 
using external financial audit reports but not external 
management audit reports, as much support existed for 
the external management audit as for the external 
financial audit. The results of this questionnaire 
survey provide evidence that bankers would be interested 
in external management audit reports on limited liability 
companies. Bankers did express a demand for external 
management audit reports. 
(d) Simulated overdraft decision 
The findings of this questionnaire survey implied that it 
would be worthwhile to continue with the second stage of 
this project which was a simulation exercise. The 
objective of this simulation exercise was to determine 
whether or not the addition of an external management 
audit report would have a statistically significant effect 
on the corporate overdraft decision outcomes of bankers. 
The general conclusion from research into external 
financial auditing is that audit qualifications have not 
made a statistically significant difference to bankers1 
lending decision outcomes. Would the same apply to 
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external management audit reports? 
A simulated overdraft decision was devised with the 
assistance of several bankers who agreed that the data 
given for the company would make it a good (but not too 
good) proposition if it was requesting an overdraft of 
£350,000 for working capital purposes. To make this 
simulation exercise as realistic as possible, all the 
bankers received the following information about 
AB Limited: 
(a) nine assumptions; 
(b) cash flow forecast for one year; 
(c) profit and loss accounts for two years; 
(d) balance sheets for two years; 
(e) funds statements for two years; 
(f) external financial audit report. 
A sample of 354 bankers, with experience of this 
type of corporate overdraft decision, were selected to 
receive this simulation exercise and were divided into 
three groups of 118 each with one group receiving only 
the above information for the company. A second group 
received the above information plus a 'favourable' 
management audit report (with favourable comments on the 
management of the company) and a third group received 
the above information plus an 'adverse' management audit 
report (with adverse comments on the management of the 
company). The bankers receiving the favourable manage- 
ment audit report could act as a control group. For this 
group of bankers, if a similar percentage of bankers 
granted overdraft facilities compared to the group 
receiving the data with only the financial audit report, 
it could be argued that the addition of a management 
audit report by itself did not affect the bankers' 
decisions. However, if a smaller percentage of the group 
receiving the adverse management audit report granted 
overdraft facilities compared to the other two groups, 
then it could be concluded that the adverse management 
audit report had affected the bankers' decisions. 
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The response rate for this simulated overdraft 
decision was 58% and the typical respondent was very 
similar to the typical respondent in the first stage 
questionnaire survey. With a response rate of less than 
100 %, the potential problem of non -response bias always 
exists but no evidence was found to suggest that the 
respondents were not reasonably representative of the 
total sample. In this simulation exercise bankers', 
overdraft decisions were not significantly related to: 
(a) a particular bank; 
(b) head office or branch respondents; 
(c) recipients or non -recipients of the 
first stage questionnaire; 
(d) background variables of age, number 
of years employed by a bank, number 
of years using financial information 
and qualifications. 
The overall results of this simulated overdraft 
decision were as follows: 




Financial audit report only 70 17 13 
Favourable management audit report 72 24 4 
Adverse management audit report 54 37 9 
Even when given exactly the same information, bankers 
did make different overdraft decisions. For example, on 
the basis of the information with the financial audit 
report only, 70% of respondents granted the overdraft and 
30% did not. However, little difference existed between 
the overdraft decisions with the financial audit report 
only and the overdraft decisions with the addition of the 
favourable external management audit report. On the 
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basis of the financial audit report only, 30% of 
respondents answered no or don't know to this overdraft 
decision compared to 28% on the basis of the favourable 
external management audit report. Indeed at the 10% 
level of significance there were no significant 
differences between bankers' overdraft decisions on the 
basis of the information with the financial audit report 
only and the information with the addition of the 
favourable external management audit report. It appears 
that an additional piece of information, namely the 
favourable external management audit report, has not by 
itself greatly affected the responding bankers' 
decisions outcomes. 
In contrast, the main conclusion is that, at the 10% 
level of significance, the addition of an adverse 
external management audit report did have a statistically 
significant effect on bankers' corporate overdraft 
decision outcomes. Instead of at least 70% of the 
responding bankers lending to this company given the 
information with the financial audit report only or with 
the addition of the favourable external management audit 
report, only 54% of responding bankers would lend to 
this same company given the adverse external management 
audit report. Furthermore, all the bankers who granted 
the overdraft on the basis of the information with the 
adverse external management audit report stated 
specifically that the weaknesses outlined in the external 
management audit report would be investigated further 
with the management of the company. All the bankers who 
did not grant the overdraft on the basis of the 
information with the adverse external management audit 
report specifically mentioned the weaknesses summarised 
in the external management audit report as being one 
reason for their decision not to grant the overdraft. 
The results of both the questionnaire survey and the 
simulated overdraft decision imply that bankers would be 
interested in receiving, and would use, external 
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management audit reports on their customer companies. 
Limitations of research and further research 
Although the conclusion of this research project is that 
bankers would be interested in and would use external 
management audit reports, the limitations of this 
research project must be remembered. Firstly, this 
research project has concentrated on only one user .group 
namely bankers and indeed on only one subset of bankers 
namely those employed by the three Scottish joint -stock 
banks. Secondly, with response rates of under 100% the 
possibility always exists of non -response bias. In 
relation to the second stage simulation exercise the 
following limitations also apply. Thirdly, this 
simulation exercise concentrated on one particular type 
of decision namely the granting of bank overdraft 
facilities to a company. Fourthly, this simulation 
exercise used a specific example of a favourable and an 
adverse external management audit report on a company to 
which bankers would generally grant overdraft facilities. 
Fifthly, this simulation exercise used relatively small 
sample sizes. 
Sixthly, despite the aim of making this simulation 
exercise as realistic as possible, it could never be 
totally realistic. For example, items such as the 
interest rate and the security were given in this 
simulation exercise, whereas in reality these two items 
would be a matter of negotiation. Similarly, the 
responding bankers obviously could not interview the 
directors of the company requesting the overdraft. 
Seventhly, respondents may make a different decision in 
a simulation exercise from their decision in a real -life 
situation. 
Some of the limitations of this research project and 
some of its results suggest further interesting areas of 
research. For example, the questionnaire survey and the 
simulation exercise (both suitably adapted) could be 
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replicated with other user groups such as creditors 
(probably the most similar user group to bankers), 
financial analysts and shareholders. It would also be 
important to discover how managers view such external 
management audits. It will also be necessary to 
replicate the simulation exercise with bankers using 
different examples of external management audit reports 
both favourable and adverse. For example, using a 
company to which bankers would generally refuse over- 
draft facilities, would a favourable external management 
audit report have a significant effect on bankers' 
decisions to grant an overdraft? 
The results of this simulated overdraft decision 
showed that even when given exactly the same information, 
a reasonable number of bankers would make different 
decisions. The decision process and the various factors 
influencing bankers' overdraft decisions would be 
interesting areas for further research. The reactions of 
some respondents to the 'favourable' external management 
audit report revealed that bankers may perceive'minor 
weaknesses' to be major rather than minor. The class- 
ification of such weaknesses requires further research. 
The problems suggested by some respondents of actually 
conducting external management audits could be another 
fruitful area of research. These problems would include 
the scope of external management audits, the qualifications 
and experience required to become an external management 
auditor, the development of performance indicators and 
standards used by external management auditors and the 
question of whether or not external management audits 
would stifle the initiative of corporate managements. 
Like much accounting and auditing research, this research 
project has raised as many questions as it has answered. 
Conclusions 
In recent years the role of external financial auditing 
has been emphasised in relation to society as a whole. 
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For example, in 1980 Pound and Courtis argued: 
'If the audit profession wishes to 
maintain a role in society, the quality 
of its output must be improved. To 
improve the readership of the audit 
opinion it must contain more of what 
the users of financial statements want. 
This is an area requiring further 
research.'1 
The results of this research project suggest that bankers 
want not only an improved external financial audit report 
but also the proposed external management audit report. 
Also on this theme of auditing in society Flint has 
suggested: 
'Society has to resolve this issue of 
how to stimulate evolution and dynamism 
in this important social process of 
auditing, the practice of which is 
certainly in danger of becoming, if it 
has not already become, excessively 
introverted when its true social role 
and function require quite the 
opposite.'2 
External management auditing has part of its roots in 
external financial auditing and external financial 
auditors could be one group supporting the development 
and evolution of external management auditing. Indeed, 
in an 1984 issue of the journal of the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, Accountancy, 
Glynn3 has proposed that value for money audits (a form 
of external management audit) should be conducted in 
the private sector. 
However, external management auditing is still in 
the relatively early stages of its development but, even 
at this stage, its inter -disciplinary nature is clear 
and accountants and auditors cannot develop external 
management auditing on their own. Furthermore, support 
from external financial auditors (or from other potential 
producers of external management audit reports such as 
management accountants and management consultants) can be 
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compared to 'supply push'. This is why it is important 
to collect evidence about any 'demand pull' which exists. 
In my opinion, priority in the area of external manage- 
ment auditing research should be given to projects to 
discover what various user groups think about external 
management audit reports. This research project with 
bankers is only one small part of the jigsaw which will 
take several years to complete. 
Nevertheless, this part of the jigsaw reveals 
support for external management audit reports from 
bankers. At present bankers use a range of financial and 
non -financial information in trying to assess corporate 
managements but bankers wish more information and they 
consider that external management audit reports would be 
used, together with the existing available information, 
in making their corporate lending decisions. The 
detailed content of external management audit reports 
requires further research. However, as a starting point, 
bankers wish external management audit reports to include 
assessments both of the general management function (for 
example the efficiency and effectiveness of management 
in achieving the company's objectives) and of the 
individual business functions (for example finance, 
accounting, marketing and production). External manage- 
ment audit reports will certainly be longer than the 
existing, standardised external financial audit report. 
The results of this research project suggest that it is 
not a question of replacing the external financial audit 
with the external management audit but, instead, of 
having both an external financial audit and an external 
management audit. The results of the questionnaire 
survey show that bankers would use both the existing 
external financial audit report and the proposed external 
management audit report. 
Therefore, the main conclusions of this research 
project are twofold. Firstly, bankers in the question- 
naire survey expressed a demand for external management 
audit reports. Secondly, the simulation exercise showed 
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that bankers would use the external management audit 
report as part of the information on which they would 
base their corporate overdraft decisions. If other 
potential user groups express the same interest as 
bankers in external management audit reports, the case 
for some form of external management audit in the private 
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APPENDIX A 
Covering letters from the three banks 
for first -stage questionnaire 
The following covering letters from the Bank of Scotland, 
the Clydesdale Bank and the Royal Bank of Scotland are 
discussed in Chapter 5 including the disadvantage of the 
possible bias arising from such letters. The actual 
letters did not meet the margin requirements of this 
thesis and, therefore, the letters have been retyped. 
The original letters were, of course, on the headed 
paper of each bank and were signed by the appropriate 
official. 
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BANK OF SCOTLAND 
Dear Sir 
Staff Training Centre 
58 St Albans Road 
EDINBURGH EH9 2LS 
21st January 1983 
We have been asked by the Department of Accounting and 
Business Method at Edinburgh University to co- operate 
with research being undertaken into the question of 
whether or not a management audit would be worthwhile 
from the viewpoint of users of accounts. 
The Bank is keen to be of assistance and has agreed to 
the distribution of a brief questionnaire to a number 
of Branch Managers and Head Office Lending Officials. 
The letter which accompanies the questionnaire is self 
explanatory and while we would wish to stress that you 
are under no obligation to participate if you do not 
wish to do so, we hope that you will feel able to be 
of assistance. 
Any views expressed should reflect your personal 
opinion rather than what you may see as the likely 
Bank view, and you may be assured that your confidence 
will be respected. 





CLYDESDALE BANK PLC 
P 0 Box 
30 St Vincent Place 
GLASGOW Gl 2HL 
9th February 1983 
Dear Sir 
We have been asked by Mr John Innes, a lecturer in the 
Department of Accounting and Business Method at Edinburgh 
University if we would be willing to assist him in 
connection with a project he is undertaking on the 
auditing of Management performance in Companies from the 
viewpoint of those who use such accounts, e.g. Bankers, 
Accountants etc. 
We feel there would be value to the Bank in taking part 
in this project and a few of our Managers and Lending 
Officials have already been involved in a pilot exercise. 
We have now received the material and while you are 
under no obligation to participate we hope you will be 
willing to assist. 
I would emphasise that you are being asked to give a 
personal view and not a tBankt view and you will see 
from the accompanying letter that you will not be 
identified in any way unless you wish a copy of the 
survey. 
With thanks in anticipation of your co-operation. 
Yours sincerely 
W.C. Harvey 




P 0 Box 31 
42 St Andrew Square 
Edinburgh EH2 2YE 
12 April 1983 
THE ROYAL BANK 
OF SCOTLAND LIMITED 
Dear Sir 
We have been approached by Mr John Innes, a Lecturer in 
the Department of Accounting and Business Method at 
Edinburgh University to assist him in connection with a 
project he is undertaking on the auditing of Management 
performance in Companies from the viewpoint of those 
people who use Companies' Audited Accounts. 
We have studied Mr Innes's project and feel there is 
genuine merit in what he is doing . ^e , therefore, are 
happy for our Managers and other lending Officials to 
become involved and while you are under no obligation 
to participate, we hope you will be willing to assist. 
You will observe that you are being asked for a personal 
view and also that you will not be identified in any way 
unless you wish a copy of the final report. 
Thank you in anticipation of your co- operation. 
Yours sincerely 
Norman J Lang 




Random sample of branch managers 
The three different random samples of branch managers were 
taken manually using Table 21.7.1 on page 267 of the book 
by T.W. McRae, 'Statistical Sampling for Audit and Control' 
published by Wiley in 1974. Each bank provided a complete 
list of branches (together with the addresses and managers) 
and these branches were numbered to give the population 
for each bank. 
1. Bank of Scotland 
A random sample of 150 (without duplicates) was taken from 
a population of 377. The sample started in column 9, 
line 756 using the last three digits and moving vertically 
down a column. The branches selected were as follows: 
001 Bridge of Don, Aberdeen 
04 George Street, Aberdeen 
05 Kittybrewster, Aberdeen 
06 Market Street, Aberdeen 
07 Mile End, Aberdeen 
09 Queen's Cross, Aberdeen 
11 Tullos, Aberdeen 
16 West End, Aberdeen 
17 Aberfeldy 
18 Aberlour 
20 Stirling Street, Airdrie 
34 High Street, Ayr 
35 Killoch Place, Ayr 
38 Ballater 
40 Bathgate 
41 Kessington, Bearsden 





57 Bridge of Allan 















96 Queensberry Square, Dumfries 
97 Dunbar 
101 Murraygate, Dundee 
103 Panmure Street, Dundee 
107 82 High Street, Dunfermline 
109 Dunoon 
110 Duns 
115 Barnton, Edinburgh 
117 Brunswick Place, Edinburgh 
120 Comely Bank, Edinburgh 
123 Head Office, Edinburgh 
125 Drumsheugh, Edinburgh 
126 Fairmilehead, Edinburgh 
127 Frederick Street, Edinburgh 
130 George Street, Edinburgh 
138 Lothian Road, Edinburgh 
141 Morningside, Edinburgh 
144 New Town, Edinburgh 
145 North Morningside, Edinburgh 
148 Polwarth, Edinburgh 
149 Portobello, Edinburgh 
152 St. Andrew Square, Edinburgh 
158 Tollcross, Edinburgh 
160 Waterloo Place, Edinburgh 
161 West End, Edinburgh 
168 Vicar Street, Falkirk 
170 Forfar 





184 Glasgow Chief Office 
185 Anniesland, Glasgow 
188 Bothwell Street, Glasgow 
191 Byres Road, Glasgow 
193 Cathcart, Glasgow 
196 Drumchapel, Glasgow 
205 Hyndland, Glasgow 
207 Jordanhill, Glasgow 
210 Kinning Park, Glasgow 
212 Laurieston, Glasgow 
213 Linthouse, Glasgow 
214 Merrylee, Glasgow 
223 Queen Street, Glasgow 
224 Johnstone 
226 Sandyford, Glasgow 
229 Shawlands, Glasgow 
231 Stockwell, Glasgow 
232 Strathbungo, Glasgow 
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Bank of Scotland (continued) 
234 Victoria Road, Glasgow 
236 West George Street, Glasgow 
239 Gorebridge 
241 Grangemouth 







258 Union Street, Inverness 
259 Inverurie 
261 Jedburgh 
262 Glasgow Cross 
264 Kelso 
267 Bank Street, Kilmarnock 














299 London Chief Office 
301 Oxford Street, London 







319 Newton Mearns 
320 Newtonmore 
321 Newton Stewart 
327 St. Mirren, Paisley 
328 South, Paisley 
329 Wellmeadow Street, Paisley 
332 George Street, Perth 
333 High Street, Perth 
336 Peterhead 
337 Pitlochry 





Bank of Scotland (continued) 
350 Selkirk 
353 Stewarton 
354 2 King Street, Stirling 





372 West Linton 
373 Wick 
376 Wooler 
2. Clydesdale Bank 
A random sample of 100 (without duplicates) was taken from 
a population of 309. The sample started in column 1, 
line 751 using the last three digits and moving vertically 
down a column. The branches selected were as follows: 




















87 Buccleuch Street 
91 Downfield 




100 Princes Street 
103 Charlotte Square 
104 Corstorphine 
111 Newington 
113 Princes Street 
114 Tollcross 
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124 Fort William 
131 Glasgow, Head Office 
132 Aikenhead Road 
133 Anderston 
134 Anniesland 
135 Bothwell Street 
136 Calton and Bridgeton 
137 Cambridge Street 
138 Cardonald 
140 Cathcart 
141 Dalmarnock Road 
144 Gibson Street 
150 India Street 
151 Ingram Street 
153 Maryhill Road 
155 Moore Place 
157 Parkhead 
158 Partick 
162 St Enoch Square 
166 Sauchiehall Street 




182 Cathcart Square 
185 Hamilton 



















237 Mid Calder 
243 Muirkirk 
248 Newmains 
250 Newport -on -Tay 
256 Oldmeldrum 
258 High Street 
263 St John Street 
250 
Clydesdale Bank (continued) 
264 Peterhead 
270 Prestwick Airport 
272 Rhynie 








304 West Kilbride 
305 Whitburn 
3. Royal Bank of Scotland 
A random sample of 150 (without duplicates) was taken from 
a population of 453. The sample started in column 1, 
line 801 using the last three digits and moving vertically 
down a column. The branches selected were as follows: 
001 Armadale 
04 George Place, Bathgate 
06 Gastlegate, Berwick -Upon -Tweed 
10 Broxburn 
11 Chirnside 
13 63 High Street, Dalkeith 
20 Castle Street, Edinburgh 
23 Colinton, Edinburgh 
27 Davidson's Mains, Edinburgh 
33 Leven Street, Edinburgh 
34 Lothian Road, Edinburgh 
35 Murrayfield, Edinburgh 
37 St Andrew Square, Edinburgh 
39 Shandon Crescent, Edinburgh 
41 Stockbridge, Edinburgh 
50 Almondvale, Livingston 
53 Bridge Street, Musselburgh 
56 Newtongrange 
57 North Berwick 
62 Uphall 
63 West Calder 
65 Annan 
71 Blackford, Edinburgh 
75 Craigentinny, Edinburgh 
82 Granton, Edinburgh 
89 North Leith, Edinburgh 
90 Mayfield, Edinburgh 
91 Newhaven, Edinburgh 
93 Nicolson Street, Edinburgh 
96 Portobello, Central, Edinburgh 
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Royal Bank of Scotland (continued) 
97 Portobello, East, Edinburgh 
100 St James Centre, Edinburgh 
101 Salisbury, Edinburgh 
103 University, Edinburgh 
104 Warrender Park, Edinburgh 
109 Tower, Hawick 
113 Langholm 
117 New Cumnock 






139 Bridgeton, Glasgow 
145 Cathcart, Glasgow 
148 Charing Cross West, Glasgow 
149 Crosshill, Glasgow 
150 Dalmarnock Road, Glasgow 
155 394 Dumbarton Road, Glasgow 
157 Fruit Market, Glasgow 
161 Gordon Street Office, Glasgow 
165 1558 Great Western Road, Glasgow 
168 Hyndland, Glasgow 
172 Mount Florida, Glasgow 
177 Renfield Street, Glasgow 
178 Riddrie, Glasgow 
180 272 Stonelaw Road, Rutherglen 
183 36 St Enoch Square, Glasgow 
184 St Rollox, Glasgow 
185 140 St Vincent Street, Glasgow 
189 Stobcross, Glasgow 
191 West George Street, Glasgow 
19.6 Netherlee 
198 Broomlands, Paisley 
201 The Cross, Paisley 
202 Well Street, Paisley 
205 Bond Street, London 
206 Kingsway, London 
207 Knightsbridge, London 
210 Piccadilly Circus, London 
212 Victoria, London 
213 Western, London 
214 Bridge of Don, Aberdeen 
218 Queen's Cross, Aberdeen 
220 Southern, Aberdeen 
223 Alyth 
224 Brothock Bridge, Arbroath 
226 Banchory 
229 Carnoustie 
234 High Street, Dundee 
236 Kingsway Circus, Dundee 
238 Murraygate, Dundee 
239 Overgate, Dundee 
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Royal Bank of Scotland (continued) 
241 Reform Street, Dundee 
242 Stobswell, Dundee 
246 Kirriemuir 
249 Monifeith 
252 Bridgend, Perth 
253 High Street, Perth 
254 Methven Street, Perth 
255 South Street, Perth 
259 Portlethen 
261 Westhill 





277 Grantown -on -Spey 
278 Huntly 
281 Academy Street, Inverness 
















363 116 Cowgate, Kirkintilloch 
366 Leslie 
369 Lundin Links 
373 Milnathort 
376 South Street, St Andrews 
377 Stenhousemuir 
379 Murray Place, Stirling 
383 Bank Street, Airdrie 
387 Beresford Terrace, Ayr 
390 58 High Street, Biggar 




398 Main Street, Coatbridge 
399 Whifflet, Coatbridge 
400 Cumnock 
408 Westwood, East Kilbride 
409 Forth 
410 Girvan 
415 50 Cadzow Street, Hamilton 
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Royal Bank of Scotland (continued) 
418 Irvine 
421 John Finnie Street, Kilmarnock 





442 Dykehead, Shotts 
446 Stonehouse 
449 Tighnabruaich 
451 West Kilbride 
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APPENDIX C 
COPY OF RESULTS FOR RESPONDENTS 
Questionnaire Survey 
The primary objective of this questionnaire survey was to 
determine what Scottish bankers think about management 
auditing. Bankers were selected as the group to be 
surveyed because at present they use financial statements 
in their lending decisions and are therefore familiar with 
the financial audit report. The three Scottish joint 
stock banks (the Bank of Scotland, the Clydesdale and the 
Royal Bank of Scotland) were approached and all agreed to 
participate in this research project. All three banks 
supplied a full list of branch managers and a random sample 
was taken for each bank. Table 1 summarises the number of 
bankers surveyed. 
TABLE 1 
Number of bankers surveyed 
Total 
Bank of Clydesdale Royal Bank 
Scotland Bank of Scotland 
Head office staff 
surveyed 66 21 15 30 
Branch managers 
surveyed 400 150 100 150 
Total number 
surveyed 466 171 115 180 
The questionnaire with my covering letter and with the 
letter from the bank was posted during 1983 to all 466 
participants in this survey. At the request of the banks, 
because this was to be a two stage project with a simulated 
lending decision exercise after this questionnaire, a 
follow -up letter was not sent for this questionnaire. The 
number of responses and the percentage response rates are 
given in Table 2. 
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TABLE 2 
Number of respondents and response rates 
Total Bank of Clydesdale Royal Bank 
Scotland Bank of Scotland 
Number of 
head office 
respondents 37 13 10 14 
Number of 
branch manager 
respondents 258* 95 71 92 
Total number of 
respondents 295* 108 81 106 
% total response 63% 63% 70% 59% 
4 responses were blank with a coveringletter. 
Given the response rate of recent postal surveys in 
Great Britain (such as Santocki with 10.3 %), the nature of 
the topic being researched and the fact of no follow -up 
letter, an overall response rate of 63% was extremely 
encouraging. Furthermore, from the number of detailed 
comments on the returned questionnaires it was apparent 
that many respondents had spent a considerable amount of 
time on completing the questionnaire. One hundred and 
three respondents (35% of all respondents) also indicated 
a continuing interest in this project by requesting a copy 
of the results of the survey. 
Summary of background factors 
In summary a 'typical' respondent to this questionnaire 
was between 40 and 49 years old, male, employed by a bank 
for at least 20 years, a user of financial information for 
between 10 and 19 years, an Associate of the Institute of 
Bankers and experienced in either the commerical or 




The main findings of this survey are: 
1. Given previous research findings on the use of the 
financial audit report, the support for it from the 
responding bankers in this survey was surprising. For 
example, 93% of respondents claim to always read the 
financial audit report, approximately 80% replied that 
they have used the financial audit report as part,of the 
data on which they have based their lending decisions to 
both small and large companies and 80% also find the audit 
report useful in helping them to make their lending 
decisions about both small and large limited liability 
companies. 
2. Despite this support for the existing financial audit 
report, over 50% of respondents still consider that it 
could contain more information for both small and large 
companies. 
3. 89% of respondents always assess the management when 
making lending decisions about small companies but only 
69% do this for large companies. 
4. Over 50% of respondents always use the annual 
financial statements, practical experience of management, 
personal knowledge of management and financial audit 
report when assessing the managements of both small and 
large companies. 
5. Less than 10% of respondents consider that they always 
have sufficient information to assess the managements of 
either small or large companies. 
6. Over 95% of respondents would always or sometimes use 
the management audit report as part of the information on 
which they would assess the management of both small and 
large companies. Furthermore, over 85% of respondents 
agree that they would find a management audit report 
useful in relation to their lending decisions about small 
and large companies. 
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7. Comparing the answers to questions from the two parts 
of the questionnaire, over 75% of respondents consider 
that both the financial and management audit reports 
would be useful in relation to their lending decisions 
about both small and large companies. 
8. Less than 70% of respondents support the management 
audit being required by the banks; whereas approximately 
90% of respondents consider that it should be paid for by 
the company and, again in contrast, approximately 50% of 
the respondents favour an annual management audit. 
9. Over 80% of respondents wish assessments of the 
following reported in a management audit report: 
(a) efficiency and effectiveness of management 
in achievement of company objectives; 
(b) budgetary control system; 
(c) company objectives; 
(d) performance of the management of the finance, 
accounting, marketing and production functions. 
10. The respondents consider that the management and 
financial audit reports would be equally useful in 
helping them to make their lending decisions about 
companies. 
The results of this questionnaire survey indicate 
support for both the financial and management audit 
reports from the responding bankers. The answers indicate 
that it is certainly not a question of replacing the 
financial audit with a management audit. However, despite 
the fact that bankers have experience of using financial 
audit reports but not management audit reports, as much 
support exists for the management audit as for the 
financial audit. The findings of this survey therefore 
suggested that it would be worthwhile to continue with the 
second stage of this project which was a simulated lending 
decision exercise to try to determine whether or not the 
addition of a management audit report might affect 
bankers' lending decisions. 
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APPENDIX D 
77 individual and 38 comparative questions 
As discussed in Chapter 6, excluding the background 
variables, 77 individual questions and 38 comparative 
questions (for small and large companies) can be 
identified in the first stage questionnaire. In the 
following list, the first number is for the individual 
question and the second number in brackets denotes the 
comparative question. 
l.( -) Do you read the financial audit report on the 
financial statements of your customer companies? 
2.(1) Have you used the financial audit report as part 
of the data on which you have based any of your 
lending decisions to SMALL limited liability 
companies? 
3.(1) Have you used the financial audit report as part 
of the data on which you have based any of your 
lending decisions to LARGE limited liability 
companies? 
4..(2) In general, you find the financial audit report 
useful in helping you to make your lending 
decisions about SMALL limited liability 
companies. 
5.(2) In general, you find the financial audit report 
useful in helping you-to make your lending 
decisions about LARGE limited liability 
companies. 
6.(3) Do you consider that the financial audit report 
could contain more information for SMALL limited 
liability companies? 
7.(3) Do you consider that the financial audit report 
could contain more information for LARGE limited 
liability companies? 
8.(4) Do you assess management when making your lending 
decisions about SMALL limited liability 
companies? 
9.(4) Do you assess management when making your lending 
decisions about LARGE limited liability 
companies? 
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10.(5) For SMALL limited liability companies do you use 
the annual financial statements in assessing 
management? 
11.(5) For LARGE limited liability companies do you use 
the annual financial statements in assessing 
management? 
12.(6) For SMALL limited liability companies do you use 
the financial audit report in assessing 
management? 
13.(6) For LARGE limited liability companies do you use 
the financial audit report in assessing 
management? 
11.(7) For SMALL limited liability companies do you use 
the qualifications of management in assessing 
management? 
15.(7) For LARGE limited liability companies do you use 
the qualifications of management in assessing 
management? 
16.(8) For SMALL limited liability companies do you use 
the practical experience of management in 
assessing management? 
17.(8) For LARGE limited liability companies do you use 
the practical experience of management in 
assessing management? 
18.(9) For SMALL limited liability companies do you use 
your own personal knowledge of management in 
assessing management? 
19.(9) For LARGE limited liability companies do you use 
your own personal knowledge of management in 
assessing management? 
20.(10) For SMALL limited liability companies do you use 
any other information in assessing management? 
21.(10) For LARGE limited liability companies do you use 
any other information in assessing management? 
22.(11) Do you consider that sufficient information is 
available to you at present to make an adequate 
assessment of management for SMALL limited 
liability companies? 
23.(11) Do you consider that sufficient information is 
available to you at present to make an adequate 
assessment of management for LARGE limited 
liability companies? 
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24.(12) Would you use a management audit report as part 
of the information on which you would assess the 
management of SMALL limited liability companies? 
25.(12) Would you use a management audit report as part 
of the information on which you would assess the 
management of LARGE limited liability companies? 
26.(13) You would find a management audit report useful 
in relation to your lending decisions about 
SMALL limited liability companies. 
27.(13) You would find a management audit report Useful 
in relation to your lending decisions about 
LARGE limited liability companies. 
28.(14) Do you consider that a management audit should 
be voluntary for SMALL limited liability 
companies? 
29.(14) Do you consider that a management audit should 
be voluntary for LARGE limited liability 
companies? 
30.(15) Do you consider that a management audit should 
be required by the professional accounting bodies 
for SMALL limited liability companies? 
31.(15) Do you consider that a management audit should 
be required by the professional accounting bodies 
for LARGE limited liability companies? 
32.(16) Do you consider that a management audit should 
be required by law for SMALL limited liability 
companies? 
33.(16) Do you consider that a management audit should 
be required by law for LARGE limited liability 
companies? 
34.(17) Do you consider that a management audit should 
be required by the banks for SMALL limited 
liability companies? 
35.(17) Do you consider that a management audit should 
be required by the banks for LARGE limited 
liability companies? 
36.(18) Do you consider that a management audit should 
be paid for by the company for SMALL limited 
liability companies? 
37.(18) Do you consider that a management audit should 
be paid for by the company for LARGE limited 
liability companies? 
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38.(19) Do you consider that a management audit should 
be paid for by the government for SMALL limited 
liability companies? 
39.(19) Do you consider that a management audit should 
be paid for by the government for LARGE limited 
liability companies? 
40.(20) Do you consider that a management audit should 
be paid for by the users (eg. bankers) for 
SMALL limited liability companies? 
41.(20) Do you consider that a management audit should 
be paid for by the users (eg. bankers) for 
LARGE limited liability companies? 
42.(21) For SMALL limited liability companies how often 
do you think that a management audit should be 
conducted? 
43.(21) For LARGE limited liability companies how often 
do you think that a management audit should be 
conducted? 
44.(22) For SMALL limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of company objectives 
specifically reported upon in a management audit 
report? 
45.(22) For LARGE limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of company objectives 
specifically reported upon in a management audit 
report? 
46.(23) For SMALL limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of management in achievement of 
company objectives specifically reported upon in 
a management audit report? 
47.(23) For LARGE limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of management in achievement of 
company objectives specifically reported upon in 
a management audit report? 
48.(24) For SMALL limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the organisational 
structure specifically reported upon in a 
management audit report? 
49.(24) For LARGE limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the organisational 
structure specifically reported upon in a 
management audit report? 
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50.(25) For SMALL limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the budgetary control 
system specifically reported upon in a 
management audit report? 
51.(25) For LARGE limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the budgetary control 
system specifically reported upon in a 
management audit report? 
52.(26) For SMALL limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the management information 
system specifically reported upon in a 
management audit report? 
53.(26) For LARGE limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the management information 
system specifically reported upon in a 
management audit report? 
54.(27) For SMALL limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of any other item specifically 
reported upon in a management audit report? 
55.(27) For LARGE limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of any other item specifically 
reported upon in a management audit report? 
56.(28) For SMALL limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the performance of the 
management of the finance function specifically 
reported upon in a management audit report? 
57.(28) For LARGE limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the performance of the 
- management of the finance function specifically 
reported upon in a management audit report? 
58.(29) For SMALL limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the performance of the 
management of the purchasing function 
specifically reported upon in a management audit 
report? 
59.(29) For LARGE limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the performance of the 
management of the purchasing function 
specifically reported upon in a management audit 
report? 
60.(30) For SMALL limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the performance of the 
management of the production function 
specifically reported upon in a management audit 
report? 
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61.(30) For LARGE limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the performance of the 
management of the production function 
specifically reported upon in a management audit 
report? 
62.(31) For SMALL limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the performance of the 
management of the marketing function 
specifically reported upon in a management audit 
report? 
63.(31) For LARGE limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the performance of the 
management of the marketing function 
specifically reported upon in a management audit 
report? 
64.(32) For SMALL limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the performance of the 
management of the personnel function 
specifically reported upon in a management audit 
report? 
65.(32) For LARGE limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the performance of the 
management of the personnel function 
specifically reported upon in a management audit 
report? 
66.(33) For SMALL limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the performance of the 
management of the training function specifically 
reported upon in a management audit report? 
67.(33) For LARGE limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the performance of the 
management of the training function specifically 
reported upon in a management audit report? 
68.(34) For SMALL limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the performance of the 
management of the accounting function 
specifically reported upon in a management audit 
report? 
69.(34) For LARGE limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the performance of the 
management of the accounting function 
specifically reported upon in a management audit 
report? 
70.(35) For SMALL limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the performance of the 
management of the computing function 
specifically reported upon in a management audit 
report? 
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71.(35) For LARGE limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the performance of the 
management of the computing function 
specifically reported upon in a management audit 
report? 
72.(36) For SMALL limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the performance of the 
management of the research and development function 
specifically reported upon in a management audit 
report? 
73.(36) For LARGE limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the performance of the 
management of the research and development function 
specifically reported upon in a management audit 
report? 
74.(37) For SMALL limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the performance of the 
management of any other function specifically 
reported upon in a management audit report? 
75.(37) For LARGE limited liability companies would you 
like an assessment of the performance of the 
management of any other function specifically 
reported upon in a management audit report? 
76.(38) Do you consider that the management audit report 
would be more useful than the financial audit 
report in helping you to make your lending 
decisions about SMALL limited liability companies? 
77.(38) Do you consider that the management audit report 
would be more useful than the financial audit 
report in helping you to make your lending 
decisions about LARGE limited liability companies? 
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APPENDIX E 
Answers to questionnaire by background variables 
As discussed in Chapter 6, a test was carried out to check 
whether any answers to the questionnaire might be related 
to background variables. The following are those of the 
924 cross -tabulations (between the answers to the question- 
naire and the individual background variables listed in 
Chapter 6) with chi -squares significant at the 5 %'level and 
meeting the two chi- square rules of thumb of Yeomans.5 
Cross -tabulations of 'row' by age 
(< 50 or > 50 years) significant at 5% level 
Row 
1. Use qualifications of management 
in assessing management for 
small companies 
2. Consider that sufficient 
information is available to 
bankers at present to make an 
adequate assessment of manage- 




3. Would like assessment of 
performance of management of 
accounting function specific - 
ally reported in a management 
audit report for small companies 261 
4. Would like assessment of 
performance of management of 
computing function specific- 
ally reported in a management 
audit report for small companies 241 
5. Would like assessment of 
performance of management of 
research and development 
function specifically reported 
in a management audit report 
for small companies 249 
X2 df p 
7.02 2 .03 
6.45 2 .04 
8.82 2 .01 
7.99 2 .02 
12.78 2 .00 
(Note: As in the tables in the main text x2 is 
corrected X2 where necessary) 
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Notes on background variable of age (<50 or > 50 years): 
1. 48% of respondents 50 years old and over compared to 
only 33% of those under 50 use the qualifications of 
management in assessing the management of small companies. 
2. 14% of respondents 50 years old and over compared to 
5% of those under 50 consider that sufficient information 
is always available to bankers at present to make an 
adequate assessment of the management of small companies. 
3. 78% of respondents 50 years old and over compared to 
90% of those under 50 would like an assessment of the 
performance of the management of the accounting function 
in a management audit report for small companies. 
4. 25% of respondents 50 years old and over compared to 
43% of those under 50 would like an assessment of the 
performance of the management of the computing function 
in a management audit report for small companies. 
5. 41% of respondents 50 years old and over compared to 
65% of those under 50 would like an assessment of the 
performance of the management of the research and 
development function in a management audit report for 
small companies. 
Cross -tabulations of 'row' by number of years employed 
by a bank (<30 or >30 years) significant at 5% level 
Row 
6. Consider that sufficient 
information is available to 
bankers at present to make an 
adequate assessment of manage- 
ment for small companies 
v2 
A df p 
277 11.15 2 .00 
Notes on background variable of number of years employed 
by a bank (<30 or >30 years): 
6. 13% of respondents employed by a bank for 30 or more 
years compared to 4% of those employed by a bank for under 
30 years consider that sufficient information is always 
available to bankers at present to make an adequate 
assessment of management of small companies. 
267 
Cross -tabulations of 'row' by number 
of years using financial information 
(<10 or > 10 years) significant at 5% level 
Row n X2 df p 
7. Have used the financial audit 
report as part of the data on 
which based a lending 
decision for large companies 224 4.27 .1 .04 
8. Consider that the financial 
audit report could contain 
more information for small 
companies 272 6.83 2 .03 
9. Use own personal knowledge of 
management in assessing 
management for large 
companies 
10. Consider that sufficient 
information is available to 
bankers at present to make 
an adequate assessment of 
management for small 
companies 
206 6.99 2 .03 
277 7.72 2 .02 
Notes on background variable of number of years using 
financial information (< 10 or > 10 years): 
7. 86% of respondents using financial information for 10 
or more years compared to 70% of those using financial 
information for under 10 years have used the financial 
audit report as part of the data on which they have 
based a lending decision for large companies. 
8. 74% of respondents using financial information for 10 
or more years compared to 56% of those using financial 
information for under 10 years consider that the 
financial audit report could contain more information for 
small companies. 
9. 71% of respondents using financial information for 10 
or more years compared to 52% of those using financial 
information for under 10 years use their own personal 
knowledge of management in assessing the management of 
large companies. 
268 
10. 2% of respondents using financial information for 10 
or more years compared to 14% of those using financial 
information for under 10 years consider that sufficient 
information is never available to bankers at present to 
make an adequate assessment of management for small 
companies. 
Cross -tabulations of 'row' by qualifications (paper 
qualification or none given) significant at 5% level 
R ow 
11. Consider that financial audit 
report could contain more 
information 
(a) for small companies 
(b) for large companies 
12. Use qualifications of manage- 
ment in assessing management 
for large companies 
13. Would like assessment of 
company objectives specific- 
ally reported in a management 
audit report 
(a) for small companies 
(b) for large companies 
14. Would like assessment of 
organisational structure 
specifically reported in a 
management audit report 
(a) for small companies 
(b) for large companies 
15. Would like assessment of 
performance of management 
of purchasing function 
specifically reported in a 
management audit report 
for large companies 
16. Would like assessment of 
performance of management 
of production function 
specifically reported in a 
management audit report 
for large companies 
269 
n X2 df p 
286 11.68 2 .00 
241 7.85 2 .02 
219 7.60 2 .02 
264 14.30 2 .00 
230 11.17 2 .00 
257 6.33 2 .04 
226 8.01 2 .02 
222 16.51 2 .00 
231 13.45 2 .00 
Cross -tabulations of 'row' by qualifications (paper 
qualification or none given) significant at 5% level 
Row 
17. Would like assessment of 
performance of management 
of accounting function 
specifically reported in a 
management audit report 
for small companies 
18. Would like assessment of 
performance of management 
of computing function 
specifically reported in a 
management audit report 
for small companies 
n Xz df p 
273 6.05 2 .05 
253 6.94 2 .03 
19. Would like assessment of 
performance of management 
of research and develop- 
ment function specifically 
reported in a management 
audit report 
(a) for small companies 260 6.97 2 .03 
(b) for large companies 230 13.51 2 .00 
Notes on background variable of qualifications (paper 
qualification or none given): 
11.(a) 7% of respondents with qualifications compared to 
21% of those without qualifications did not know whether 
or not the financial audit report could contain more 
information for small companies. 
(b) 16% of respondents with qualifications compared to 
31% of those without qualifications did not know whether 
or not the financial audit report could contain more 
information for large companies. 
12. 69% of respondents with qualifications compared to 
51% of those without qualifications sometimes use the 
qualifications of management in assessing the management 
of large companies. However, if we combine the 'always' 
and 'sometimes' answers, 94% of respondents with 
qualifications compared to 88% of those without 
270 
12. (continued) 
qualifications either always or sometimes use the 
qualifications of management in assessing the management 
of large companies. By combining these two answers, the 
difference between respondents with qualifications and 
those without qualifications becomes less important. 
13.(a) 88% of respondents with qualifications compared to 
77% of those without qualifications would like an assess- 
ment of company objectives specifically reported upon in 
a management audit report for small companies. 
(b) Similarly, 91% of respondents with qualifications 
compared to 79% of those without qualifications would like 
an assessment of company objectives in a management audit 
report for small companies. 
14.(a) 64% of respondents with qualifications compared to 
53% of those without qualifications would like an assess- 
ment of organisational structure specifically reported 
upon in a management audit report for small companies. 
(b) Similarly,76% of respondents with qualifications 
compared to 61% of those without qualifications would like 
an assessment of organisational structure in a management 
audit report for large companies. 
15. 70 of respondents with qualifications compared to 
57% of those without qualifications would like an assess- 
ment of the performance of the management of the 
purchasing function specifically reported upon in a 
management audit report for large companies. 
16, 90% of respondents with qualifications compared to 
72% of those without qualifications would like an assess- 
ment of the performance of the management of the 
production function specifically reported upon in a 
management audit report for large companies. 
17. 87% of respondents with qualifications compared to 84% 
of those without qualifications would like an assessment 
of the performance of the management of the accounting 
function specifically reported upon in a management audit 
271 
17. (continued) 
report for small companies. These percentages are very 
similar and indeed the main reason for this cross - 
tabulation giving a chi- square significant at the 5% 
level is the fact that 2% of respondents with 
qualifications compared to 8% of those without 
qualifications answered 'don't know' to this question. 
18. 42% of respondents with qualifications compared to 
27% of those without qualifications would like an assess- 
ment of the performance of the management of the 
computing function specifically reported upon in a 
management audit report for small companies. 
19.(a) 62% of respondents with qualifications compared to 
46% of those without qualifications would like an assess- 
ment of the performance of the management of the research 
and development function specifically reported upon in a 
management audit report for small companies. 
(b) Similarly, 80% of respondents with qualifications 
compared to 61% of those without qualifications would 
like an assessment of the performance of the management 
of the research and development function in a management 
audit report for large companies. 
Cross -tabulations of 'row' by banking 
experience significant at 5% level 
Row n X 2 df 1J 
Agricultural (Yes or not stated) 
20. Find financial audit report 
useful in helping bankers to 
make lending decisions about 
small companies 291 8.28 3 .04 
21. Would you like assessment of 
company objectives 
specifically reported in a 
management audit report for 
large companies 230 9.75 2 .01 
272 
Cross -tabulations of 'row' by banking 
experience significant at 5% level 
Row 
Commercial (Yes or not stated) 
22. Consider that the financial 
audit report could contain 
more information 
(a) for small companies 
(b) for large companies 
Fishing (Yes or not stated) 
23. Consider that sufficient 
information is available to 
bankers at present to make 
an adequate assessment of 
management for large 
companies. 
Industrial (Yes or not stated) 
24. Used financial audit report 
as part of data on which 
based lending decisions to 
(a) small companies 
(b) large companies 
25. Find financial audit report 
useful in helping bankers 
to make lending decisions 
about small companies 
26. Consider that the financial 
audit report could contain 
more information 
(a) for small companies 
(b) for large companies 
27. Assess management when 
making lending decisions 
about large companies 
28. Use qualifications of 
management in assessing 
management for large 
companies 
273 
n X2 df p 
286 9.15 2 .01 
241 11.47 2 .00 
233 8.71 2 .01 
290 9.03 1 .00 
236 11.96 1 .00 
291 10.03 3 .02 
286 18.34 2 .00 
241 33.69 2 .00 
236 15.61 2 .00 
219 8.20 2 .02 
Cross -tabulations of 'row' by banking 
experience significant at 5% level 
Row n 
X2 df p 
Industrial (continued) 
29. Use practical experience of 
management in assessing 
management for large 
companies 218 6.72 2 .03 
30. Would like assessment of 
company objectives 
specifically reported in a 
management audit report 
for large companies 230 6.09 2 .05 
31. Would like assessment of 
performance of accounting 
function specifically 
reported in a management 
audit report for small 
companies 273 6.90 2 .03 
Notes on background variable of industrial banking 
experience (yes or not stated): 
20. 83% of respondents with agricultural banking 
experience compared to 76% of those without such 
experience either strongly agree or agree that they find 
the financial audit report useful in helping them to make 
lending decisions about small companies. 
21. 90% of respondents with agricultural banking 
experience compared to 79% of those without such 
experience would like an assessment of company objectives 
specifically reported upon in a management audit report 
for large companies. 
22.(a) 62% of respondents with commercial banking 
experience compared to 41% of those without such 
experience consider that the financial audit report could 
contain more information for small companies. 
274 
22. (continued) 
(b) Similarly, 54% of respondents with commercial 
banking experience compared to 26% of those without such 
experience consider that the financial audit report could 
contain more information for large companies. 
23. 26% of respondents with fishing banking experience 
compared to 12% of those without such experience consider 
that sufficient information is never available to them at 
present to make an adequate assessment of management for 
large companies. 
24.(a) 89% of respondents with industrial banking 
experience compared to 75% of those without such 
experience have used the financial audit report as part 
of the data on which they have based their lending 
decisions to small companies. 
(b) Similarly, 81% of respondents with industrial 
banking experience compared to 58% of those without such 
experience have used the financial audit report as part 
of the data on which they have based their lending 
decisions to large companies. 
25. 85% of respondents with industrial banking 
experience compared to 74% of those without such 
experience either strongly agree or agree that they find 
the financial audit report useful in helping them to make 
their lending decisions about small companies. 
26.(a) 64% of respondents with industrial banking 
experience compared to 50% of those without such 
experience consider that the financial audit report could 
contain more information for small companies. 
(b) Similarly, 59% of respondents with industrial 
banking experience compared to 33% of those without such 
experience consider that the financial audit report 
could contain more information for large companies. 
27. 73% of respondents with industrial banking 
experience compared to 58% of those without such 
experience always assess management when making lending 
decisions about large companies. 
275 
28. 32% of respondents with industrial banking 
experience compared to 24% of those without such 
experience always use the qualifications of management in 
assessing the management of large companies. 
29. 98% of respondents with industrial banking 
experience compared to 89% of those without such 
experience either always or sometimes use the practical 
experience of management in assessing the management of 
large companies. 
30. 90% of respondents with industrial banking 
experience compared to 78% of those without such 
experience would like an assessment of company objectives 
specifically reported upon in a management audit report 
for large companies. 
31. 11% of respondents with industrial banking 
experience compared to 6% of those without such 
experience would not like an assessment of the accounting 
function specifically reported upon in a management audit 
report for small companies. 
Cross -tabulations of 'row' by large companies 
as customers (yes or no) significant at 5% level 
Row n ñ2 df p 
32. Have used the financial audit 
report as part of the data on 
which based a lending 
decision for large companies 236 11.93 1 .00 
33. Consider that the financial 
audit report could contain 
more information for large 
companies 241 24.62 2 .00 
34. Consider that sufficient 
information is available to 
bankers at present to make 
an adequate assessment of 
management for large 
companies 
276 
233 8.25 2 .02 
Notes on background variable of large companies as 
customers (yes or no): 
32. 81% of respondents with large companies as customers 
compared to 59% of those without large companies as 
customers have used the financial audit report as part of 
the data on which they have based lending decisions to 
large companies. This result has two possible inter- 
pretations. A first interpretation is that the 45 
respondents with no large companies as customers and 
who claimed to have used the financial audit report of 
large companies in their lending decisions - may have 
given the same answer for large companies as for small 
companies. A second interpretation is that some or even 
all of these 45 respondents may have had large companies 
as customers in the past (for example at another branch) 
and may indeed have used the financial audit report of 
large companies in their lending decisions. 
33. 12% of respondents with large companies as customers 
compared to 38% of those without large companies as 
customers do not know whether the financial audit report 
could more information for 
34. 85% of respondents with large companies as customers 
compared to 72% of those without large companies as 
customers consider that sufficient information is 
sometimes available to bankers at present to make an 
adequate assessment of management for large companies. 
277 
APPENDIX F 
Answers to questionnaire by bank 
This Appendix gives the answers to each of the questions 
in the first stage questionnaire by each of the three 
banks and also for the three banks in total. The number 
of respondents with usable replies totalled 291 with 104 
from the Bank of Scotland, 81 from the Clydesdalè Bank 
and 106 from the Royal Bank of Scotland. However, the 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Reasons given in reply to question 16 
The following are some of the reasons given in answer 
to the question: 
Do you consider that the management audit report 
would be more useful than the financial audit 
report in helping you to make your lending 
decisions about small and large companies? 
(a) Management audit report MORE useful than 
financial audit report 
'Would give a deeper insight into the capabilities of 
management.' 
'A great many lending proposals are very dependent on 
the individuals concerned with management.' 
'The audited accounts reflect the company's position 
at a given date, and this allows a degree of window - 
dressing. An assessment of management, on the other 
hand, would represent a review of the performance of 
those in charge of the company's fortunes over a 
period of time.' 
'Principally because the financial audit report deals 
with the past and we as bankers should want to know 
what future the company has under the present 
management structure.' 
'Because of the greater detail which would be available.' 
'Benefit of outside and independent views of professional 
appraisers.' 
'There should always be value in an independent assess- 
ment - if no more, it at least provides food for 
thought.' 
'Anything that gives a more complete picture must be 
useful as one can only look forward with an intelligent 
guess based on all the facts available from the past 
and present.' 
369 
(b) Management audit report LESS useful than 
financial audit report 
'Few auditors have the expertise or practical background 
to express opinions on the management of large 
companies.' 
'I believe that the financial situation of the company 
must be the primary consideration, as this will to a 
degree reflect the ability of management.' 
'In a small company the management is usually well 
known to their bankers.' 
'It would have its place in the overall picture. It 
would never replace the financial audit.' 
'I would consider the report only to be a useful addition 
to the traditional financial audit.' 
'The financial audit report would, I consider, continue 
to be essential and whereas the management audit report 
may be less useful, I see it as being a welcome 
addition in providing more information which would 
enable a company's overall performance to be better 
assessed.' 
'I find it difficult to envisage enough people with the 
background, expertise and time to be available to 
properly carry out management audits.' 
'Some businesses succeed in spite of management rather 
than because of it.' 
'Management personnel may change and as a result 
invalidate recent reports. Financial reports in 
themselves effectively pass judgment on management.' 
'As a banker finance comes first with other information 
as a useful adjunct.' 
(c) Management audit report EQUALLY as useful 
as financial audit report 
'A management audit report would along with an up -to -date 
financial audit be most useful in providing a complete 
background for decision making.' 
'I feel the two would be complementary.' 
'The one should complement the other - not replace it.' 
'In borderline cases a decision could be more easily 
reached if it was known who, and what type of people, 
were at the management level.' 
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'The management audit report would be equally useful 
in helping to make lending decisions because it 
would give information not available in the annual 
financial statements.' 
'Management audit and financial audit combined would 
make a more useful tool than only one.' 
'Management audit reports would give hitherto unavailable 
insight into aspects of companies which are not covered 
by statutory financial audits.' 
'Viewed together they would give a better insight into 
the company and could be utilised to supplement 




Comments given in reply to question 17 
The following are some of the comments given in answer 
to the question: 
Please use the space below for any additional 
comments which you may wish to make on 
management auditing. 
'Banks are sometimes accused of adopting harsh attitudes 
from a narrow base. A view from a different angle must 
add to our perception.' 
'Spare industry and commerce from any future legislation. 
There is already far too much.' 
'The idea of a management audit appeals to me strongly.' 
am not convinced that it will not simply increase 
costs for little real benefit.' 
'I have strong reservations regarding the necessity for 
or usefulness of a management audit. The quality of 
management can be assessed to some extent by track 
record and published data. Accounting data is prepared 
in accordance with standards broadly accepted by both 
the accounting profession and their clients. I think 
it would be very difficult to devise widely accepted 
standards for a management audit. It would be expensive 
and in my view would require to be so subjective that at 
the end of the day it would probably only serve to 
create uncertainty.' 
'I foresee considerable problems in employing suitable 
auditors to carry out management audits which prove 
acceptable to the majority of financial accounts' users. 
This apart, any information which leads to a more 
comprehensive view of the management of a company must 
be welcome.' 
'If management is to be more professional and competent 
in an increasingly competitive environment, then it 
should welcome a management audit report on the lines 
envisaged as a necessary constructive criticism of 
objectives and how these are being achieved.' 
'This all hinges on the cost of the exercise.' 
'The management audit report is only as good as those 
writing it.' 
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'A management audit report could give additional 
information which might help to indicate weaknesses 
and strengths of businesses and result in taking steps 
to resolve management problems before they turn into 
financial problems.' 
'Excellent idea but much would depend on the adequacy of 
the auditor in giving assessment.' 
'It would provide independent confirmation or otherwise 
of personal feelings about a company.' 
'It could be of considerable benefit.' 
'Provided that the proposed audit is presented in a well 
devised manner and is not too detailed, it should be 
possible to make an accurate and meaningful assessment.' 
'I feel that the introduction of a management audit 
would be of little benefit to potential lenders in the 
vast majority of cases.' 
'Management auditing is in principle a good idea and 
would provide some useful information but such a 
report should not become too involved and lengthy.' 
373 
APPENDIX I 
Judgment sample of branch managers 
The following branches were selected by top management 
officials of the three banks as all having managers with 
experience of this type of lending decision. The numbers 
indicate the information received by the branch manager: 
1 = Financial audit report only 
2 = 'Favourable' management audit report 
3 = 'Adverse' management audit report 
The branches are listed in the order given by the three 
banks. 
1. Bank of Scotland 
(a) Branches with managers who had received the first 
stage questionnaire: 
1 Bridge of Don, Aberdeen 
2 George Street, Aberdeen 
3 Kittybrewster, Aberdeen 
1 Market Street, Aberdeen 
2 Mile End, Aberdeen 
3 Queen's Cross, Aberdeen 
1 West End, Aberdeen 
2 Stirling Street, Airdrie 
3 Killoch Place, Ayr 
1 Bathgate 







3 Queensberry Square, Dumfries 
1 Dunbar 
2 Murraygate, Dundee 
3 Panmure Street, Dundee 
1 82 High Street, Dunfermline 
2 Brunswick Place, Edinburgh 
3 Head Office, Edinburgh 
1 Drumsheugh, Edinburgh 
2 Frederick Street, Edinburgh 
3 George Street, Edinburgh 
1 Morningside, Edinburgh 
2 New Town, Edinburgh 
3 North Morningside, Edinburgh 
1 Polwarth, Edinburgh 
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Bank of Scotland (continued) 
2 St Andrew Square, Edinburgh 
3 Tollcross, Edinburgh 
1 Waterloo Place, Edinburgh 
2 West End, Edinburgh 
3 Vicar Street, Falkirk 
1 Forfar 
2 Galashiels 
3 Anniesland, Glasgow 
1 Bothwell Street, Glasgow 
2 Hyndland, Glasgow 
3 Merrylee, Glasgow 
1 Queen Street, Glasgow 
2 West George Street, Glasgow 
3 Grangemouth 
1 Jedburgh 
2 Bank Street, Kilmarnock 
3 Kirkwall 
1 Loanhead 
2 London Chief Office 
3 Oxford Street, London 
1 Piccadilly Circus, London 
2 Motherwell 
3 George Street, Perth 
1 Port Glasgow 
2 Renfrew 
3 2 King Street, Stirling 
1 Wooler 
2 High Street, Ayr 
3 Glasgow Chief Office 
(b) Branches with managers who did not receive the first 
stage questionnaire: 
1 Castle Street, Aberdeen 
2 Torry, Aberdeen 
3 40 Union Street, Aberdeen 
1 201 Union Street, Aberdeen 




3 Sandgate, Ayr 
1 Barrhead 
2 Roman Road, Bearsden 





2 South Tay Street, Dundee 
3 East Port, Dunfermline 
1 East Kilbride 
2 Chambers Street, Edinburgh 
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Bank of Scotland (continued) 
3 Corstorphine, Edinburgh 
1 Corstorphine West, Edinburgh 
2 George IV Bridge, Edinburgh 
3 Minto Street, Edinburgh 
1 Palmerston Place, Edinburgh 
2 Princes Street, Edinburgh 
3 Queen Street, Edinburgh 
1 Shandwick Place, Edinburgh 
2 Sighthill, Edinburgh 
3 Elgin 
1 Forres 
2 Fort William 
3 Girvan 
1 Bath Street, Glasgow 
2 Cardonald, Glasgow 
3 Charing Cross, Glasgow 
1 George Square, Glasgow 
2 Gordon Street, Glasgow 
3 Hutchesontown, Glasgow 
1 Ibrox, Glasgow 
2 Sauchiehall Street, Glasgow 
3 Waterloo Street, Glasgow 
1 Glenrothes 
2 Cathcart Street, Greenock 
3 Cadzow Street, Hamilton 
1 New Cross, Hamilton 
2 High Street, Inverness 
3 Irvine 




2 Haymarket, London 
3 Manchester 
1 The Cross, Paisley 
2 St John Street, Perth 
3 St Andrews 
1 54 King Street, Stirling 
2 The Cross, Uddingston 
3 Carlisle 
2. Clydesdale Bank 
(a) Branches with managers who had received the first 
stage questionnaire: 
1 Mile End 
2 Tullos 
3 Arbroath 




Clydesdale Bank (continued) 
1 Buccleuch Street 
2 Dyce 
3 Princes Street 
1 Falkirk 
2 Anderston 
3 Bothwell Street 
1 India Street 
2 Moore Place 
3 Parkhead 
1 Partick 
2 St Enoch Square 
3 Sauchiehall Street 
1 Scotland Street 





(b) Branches with managers who did not receive the first 
stage questionnaire: 
1 81 High Street 
2 Bridge of Don 
3 Great Western Road 
1 Harbour 
2 Market 
3 Queen's Cross 
1 King Street 
2 Rosemount 
3 St Nicholas 
1 Airdrie 
2 Albert Square 
3 West End 
1 Buchanan Street 





1 St Rollox 
2 Shettleston 
3 The Foregate 
1 Perth 
2 South Methven Street 
3 Wishaw 
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3. Royal Bank of Scotland 
(a) Branches with managers who had received the first 
stage questionnaire: 
1 Armadale 
2 George Place, Bathgate 
3 Castlegate, Berwick -upon -Tweed 
1 Broxburn 
2 63 High Street, Dalkeith 
3 Castle Street, Edinburgh 
1 St Andrew Square, Edinburgh 
2 Almondvale, Livingston 
3 Bridge Street, Musselburgh 
1 Annan 
2 Granton, Edinburgh 
3 North Leith, Edinburgh 
1 Nicolson Street, Edinburgh 
2 Tower, Hawick 
3 Langholm 
1 Newton Stewart 
2 Bridgeton, Glasgow 
3 Fruit Market, Glasgow 
1 Renfield Street, Glasgow 
2 36 St Enoch Square, Glasgow 
3 140 St Vincent Street, Glasgow 
1 Stobcross, Glasgow 
2 West George Street, Glasgow 
3 Bond Street, London 
1 Knightsbridge, London 
2 Piccadilly Circus, London 
3 Victoria, London 
1 Western, London 
2 Queen's Cross, Aberdeen 
3 Southern, Aberdeen 
1 Brothock Bridge, Arbroath 
2 Carnoustie 
3 High Street, Dundee 
1 Reform Street, Dundee 
2 High Street, Perth 
3 South Street, Perth 
1 Banff 
2 Dingwall 









3 116 Cowgate, Kirkintilloch 
1 Stenhousemuir 
2 Murray Place, Stirling 
3 Bank Street, Airdrie 
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Royal Bank of Scotland (continued) 
1 58 High Street, Biggar 
2 Carluke 
3 Main Street, Coatbridge 
1 50 Cadzow Street, Hamilton 
2 Irvine 
3 John Finnie Street, Kilmarnock 
1 Dykehead, Shotts 
2 Stonehouse 
3 West Kilbride 




3 Corstorphine West, Edinburgh 
1 Gorgie, Edinburgh 





1 Whitesands, Dumfries 
2 Cannonmills, Edinburgh 







1 Argyle Street, Glasgow 
2 Bath Street, Glasgow 
3 Buchanan Street, Glasgow 
1 Cambuslang, Glasgow 
2 Central, Glasgow 
3 Charing Cross, Glasgow 
1 Goven Central, Glasgow 
2 22 St Enoch Square, Glasgow 
3 Johnstone 
1 Renfrew 
2 Lombard Street, London 
3 Mayfair, London 
1 Central, Aberdeen 
2 Harbour, Aberdeen 
3 St Nicholas, Aberdeen 
1 Brechin 







Royal Bank of Scotland (continued) 
2 Lerwick 





2 North, Cowdenbeath 
3 Town Centre, Cumbernauld 
1 Crossgate, Cupar 
2 Central, Dunfermline 
3 High Street, Falkirk 
1 Central, Kirkcaldy 
2 High Street, Markinch 
3 Pitt Terrace, Stirling 
1 Sandgate, Ayr 
2 Princes Square, East Kilbride 
3 West Blackhall Street, Greenock 
1 The Cross, Kilmarnock 
2 Lanark 
3 Main Street, Wishaw 
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APPENDIX J 
Covering letter for second -stage 
simulated overdraft decision 
Head Office 
P 0 Box 31 
42 St Andrew Square 
Edinburgh EH2 2YE 
1 June 1983 
THE ROYAL BANK 
OF SCOTLAND LIMITED 
Dear Sir 
We have been approached by Mr John Innes, a Lecturer in 
the Department of Accounting and Business Method at 
Edinburgh University to assist him in connection with a 
project he is undertaking on the auditing of Management 
performance in Companies from the viewpoint of those 
people who use Companies' Audited Accounts. 
We have studied Mr Innes's project and feel there is 
genuine merit in what he is doing. We, therefore, are 
happy for our Managers and other lending Officials to 
become involved and while you are under no obligation 
to participate, we hope you will be willing to assist. 
You will observe that you will not be identified in any 
way unless you wish a copy of the final report. 
Thank you in anticipation of your co- operation. 
Yours sincerely 
Norman J Lang 




COPY OF RESULTS FOR RESPONDENTS 
Development of Simulated Overdraft Decision 
The results of the questionnaire survey showed support 
from the responding bankers for the proposed external 
management audit report. This is strong evidence in 
favour of the external management audit. I therefore 
decided to attempt to determine whether or not the 
addition of an external management audit report might 
affect the lending decisions of bankers. A simulated 
overdraft decision was devised with the help of several 
bankers who agreed that the data given for AB Limited 
would make it a good (but not too good) proposition if it 
was requesting overdraft facilities of £350,000 for 
working capital purposes. The profit and loss account, 
balance sheet, funds statement, clean (ie normal) 
financial audit report and the various assumptions 
relating to AB Limited can be obtained from me if you do 
not have a copy already. 
The bankers selected to receive this exercise were 
divided into 3 groups with one group receiving only the 
above information for AB Limited. However, a second 
group received the above information plus a 'favourable' 
management audit report and a third group received the 
above information plus an 'adverse' management audit 
report. Copies of these favourable and adverse 
management audit reports are attached. 
The bankers receiving the favourable management 
audit report could act as a control group. For this 
group of bankers, if a similar percentage of bankers 
granted overdraft facilities compared to the group 
receiving the data with only the financial audit report, 
it could be argued that the addition of a management 
audit report by itself did not affect the bankers' 
decisions. However, if a smaller percentage of the group 
receiving the adverse management audit report granted 
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overdraft facilities compared to the other two groups, 
then it could be concluded that the adverse management 
audit report had affected the bankers' decisions. The 
objective was to attempt to determine whether or not an 
adverse management audit report might affect bankers' 
lending decisions. 
Results of Simulated Overdraft Decision 
The simulated overdraft decision was posted during 1983 to 
the 354 participants in the survey with 118 participants 
receiving each of the three different types of information. 
The number of responses and the percentage response rates 















30 11 7 12 
respondents 176* 72* 35 69 
Total number of 
respondents 206* 83* 42 81 
% response from 
head office 
staff 45% 52% 47% 40% 
% response from 
branch managers 61% 60% 73% 58% 
% total response 58% 59% 67% 54% 
1 decision sheet was blank with a covering letter. 
The overall results of this simulated overdraft decision 
are given in Table 2. 
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TABLE 2 







Financial audit report only 63 70 17 13 
Favourable management audit 
report 72 72 ' 24. 4 
Adverse management audit 
report 70 54 37 9 
205 
As expected, although given exactly the same 
information bankers did make different overdraft decisions. 
For example, on the basis of the financial audit report 
only, 70% granted the overdraft and 30% did not. Even 
within the same bank, bankers did make different over- 
draft decisions although given exactly the same 
information. The reasons for such differences would be 
an interesting area of research but the objective of this 
particular exercise was to examine whether or not 
different audit reports might affect bankers' overdraft 
decisions. Little difference exists between the over- 
draft decisions with the financial audit report only and 
the addition of the favourable management audit report. 
On the basis of the financial audit report only, 30% of 
respondents answered no or don't know to this overdraft 
decision compared to 28% on the basis of the favourable 
management audit report. Given the fact that this 
simulated overdraft decision was devised in such a way 
that it was expected that most bankers would lend to this 
particular company, these two results imply that an 
additional piece of information by itself (ie a management 
audit report) has not greatly affected the responding 
bankers' decisions. 
However, the main conclusion from Table 2 is that 
the adverse management audit report has affected the 
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bankers' decisions. Instead of at least 70% of the 
responding bankers lending to this company given the 
financial audit report only or the favourable management 
audit report, only 54% of responding bankers would lend 
to this same company given the adverse management audit 
report. The adverse management audit report appears to 
make a difference to the lending decision of the bankers 
in this simulation exercise. 
Reasons for Overdraft Decisions 
In addition to asking the bankers to make this overdraft 
decision, the decision sheet also asked the bankers for 
the reasons for their decision. All 205 respondents gave 
at least one reason for their particular lending decision 
and most gave several reasons. An attempt has been made 
to classify such reasons into general categories although 
a degree of interpretation is involved. 
As with the financial audit report only, the four 
main reasons given for granting the overdraft facility on 
the basis of the favourable management audit report are 
adequate shareholders' interest relative to the overdraft 
requested, experienced directors, reasonable profitability 
and adequate security. Of the 52 respondents who would 
grant overdraft facilities on the basis of the information 
with the favourable management audit report, a number 
expressed the two reservations of the need for a floating 
charge (19 respondents) and the question of the high 
dividends (15 respondents). Furthermore, of these 52 
respondents replying, 37 emphasised the need to correct 
the weaknesses mentioned in the management audit report. 
It is interesting that some bankers have interpreted 
'a minor weakness' in the favourable management audit 
report as being more than minor. Indeed it is the most 
common reason expressed (by 13 out of 17 respondents) for 
not granting the overdraft facility on the basis of the 
favourable management audit report. 
Of the 38 respondents who would grant overdraft 
facilities on the basis of the information with the 
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adverse management audit report, 19 respondents desired a 
floating charge and 11 respondents mentioned the high 
level of dividends. However, all 38 respondents stated 
that, although they would grant the overdraft facility, 
the weaknesses outlined in the management audit report 
would be investigated. To be more specific, 14 of the 38 
respondents who would grant overdraft facilities to AB 
Limited made it a condition of their lending that the 
weaknesses mentioned in the management audit report 
should be corrected. Furthermore, all of the remaining 
24 respondents granting overdraft facilities stated that 
the contents of this management audit report would be 
discussed with the directors of AB Limited. 
Of those 26 bankers refusing to grant overdraft 
facilities on the basis of the information with the 
adverse management audit report, all 26 mentioned the 
weaknesses outlined in the management audit report as 
being one reason for their decision. Similarly, all 6 of 
the bankers answering don't know also gave these weak- 
nesses as being one of the reasons for their decision. 
In summary, the adverse management audit report appears 
to have an effect not only in influencing the decision 
outcome of those bankers refusing the overdraft facility 
but also in causing those bankers who would still grant 
this overdraft facility to take an extra precaution such 
as adding a condition to the overdraft or discussing the 
management audit report with the directors of the company. 
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AB Limited 
MANAGEMENT AUDITORS' REPORT 
for the year ended 31 December 1982 
The following summarised report indicates that a generally 
satisfactory situation existed with AB Limited: 
1. The corporate objectives of AB Limited are clearly 
stated and are being achieved efficiently and 
effectively by management. 
2. The organisational structure of the company is 
satisfactory. 
3. The general management information system provides 
adequate information on which management can base 
decisions. 
4. The following minor weaknesses in the performance of 
the individual business functions were discovered: 
(a) Finance - Customers' cheques are sometimes 
held for one week before being 
banked. 
(b) Purchasing - Very few written competitive bids 
are obtained by the Purchasing 
Department. 
(c) Production - Time sheets, which are used as the 
basis for the bonus scheme, are 
not approved by the foremen. 
(d) Selling - Control over the issue of credit 
notes is inadequate. 
MN 
Management Auditors 
24 January 1983 
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AB Limited 
MANAGEMENT AUDITORS' REPORT 
for the year ended 31 December 1982 
A number of areas were found where potential cost savings 
and improvements in operational and financial controls 
could be implemented as summarised below: 
1. The corporate objectives of AB Limited are not clearly 
stated and as a result disagreement exists within 
management on the most important objectives. 
2. The organisational structure of the company requires 
review and amendment. For example, the lack of 
coordination between the Sales and Production Departments 
is detrimental to the proper running of the business. 
3. No budgetary control system operates within the company 
and the general management information system is inadequate. 
For instance, with no slow- moving stock report, management 
cannot take corrective action on slow- moving finished goods. 
4. The following major weaknesses in the performance of 
the individual business functions were discovered: 
(a) Finance - Control over cheque payments is inadequate: 
1) some invoices have been paid twice; 
2) blank cheques have been signed; 
3) with no independent review of the 
monthly bank reconciliation, errors 
have remained undetected. 
(b) Purchasing - Central Purchasing and Plant Purchasing 
independently negotiate raw material 
contracts (in total worth over 
£1 million p.a.) with the same suppliers 
at different unit costs. 
(c) Production - Use of an alternative raw material would 
produce important cost savings (approxi- 
mately £100,000 p.a.) and would 
eliminate an existing supply problem. 
(d) Selling - The credit terms given to customers, 
which are decided by the salesmen, are 




24 January 1983 
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APPENDIX L 
Overdraft decisions - 
Clydesdale Bank respondents 
With the possibility, discussed in Chapter 6, of the 
overdraft decisions of the respondents from the 
Clydesdale Bank being different from the decisions of the 
respondents from the Bank of Scotland and the Royal Bank 
of Scotland, further analysis was carried out'in relation 
to the following null hypotheses Holla, Hollb and Rolle: 
Ho11 Bankers' overdraft decisions 
(a) On the basis of the financial 
audit report only 
(b) On the basis of the favourable 
management audit report 
(c) On the basis of the adverse 
management audit report 
are not significantly related to a 
particular bank. 
Firstly, cross -tabulations were calculated for the 
overdraft decisions by bank (with the Bank of Scotland 
and the Royal Bank of Scotland combined) for the three 
sets of information with the no and don't know decisions 




Cross -tabulations of overdraft decisions 
by bankt controlling for information 
Financial audit 
n ; 2 df p 
report only 63 1.62 1 0.20 
Favourable management 
audit report 72 0.85 1 0.36 
Adverse management 
audit report 70 2.27 1 0.31 
205 
( No and don't know decisions are combined) 
(Bank of Scotland and Royal Bank of 
Scotland respondents are combined) 
The above chi -squares are not significant even at the 
10% level. 
Secondly, cross -tabulations were also calculated for 
the overdraft decisions by bank for the three sets of 
information for each bank against with again 
the no and don't know overdraft decisions combined. The 
resulting chi -squares are shown in Table B. 
TABLE B 
Cross -tabulations of overdraft decisions 
by two banks controlling for information 
X2 df p 
Clydesdale Bank and 
Bank of Scotland 
Financial audit report only 40 1.28 1 0.26 
Favourable management 
audit report 41 1.34 1 0.25 
Adverse management 
audit report 43 2.25 1 0.13 
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Clydesdale Bank and 
Royal Bank of Scotland 





Bank of Scotland and 
Royal Bank of Scotland 





n X2 df p 
38 0.92 1 0.34 
45 0.22 1 0.64 
40 1.37 1 0.24 
48 0.00 1 1.00 
58 0.41 1 0.52 
57 0.16 1 0.90 
( Answers no and don't know are combined) 
None of the above chi- squares is significant even at the 
10% level. The conclusion is that at the 10% significance 
level there is no reason to reject the null hypotheses 
Holla, Hollb and Hollc. The overdraft decisions of the 
respondents from the Clydesdale Bank are not statistically 
significantly different from the decisions of the 




Overdraft decisions - Bank of Scotland 
and Royal Bank of Scotland respondents 
As discussed in Chapter 8, the results of the simulated 
overdraft decisions of the Clydesdale Bank respondents 
were different (although not statistically significantly 
different) from the decisions of the Bank of Scotland 
and the Royal Bank of Scotland respondents. Therefore, 
it was considered worthwhile to examine the null 
hypotheses of Holy, H016 and Holz in relation to the 
decisions from the respondents from the Bank of Scotland 
and the Royal Bank of Scotland only. 
The null hypothesis to be tested for the overall 
results (excluding the Clydesdale Bank respondents) 
is: 
Holy There are no significant differences 
between bankers' overdraft decisions 
on the basis of 
(a) The financial audit report only 
(b) The favourable management audit 
report 
(c) The adverse management audit 
report. 
With the no and don't know overdraft decisions combined, 
the cross- tabulation of overdraft decisions by 
information for the 163 respondents gives a chi- square 
of 8.59 with two degrees of freedom with a significance 
of 0.01. The null hypothesis of H015 in relation to the 
respondents from the Bank of Scotland and the Royal Bank 
of Scotland must therefore be rejected at the 5% level 
of significance. 
The null hypotheses to be tested for H016 and H017 
(excluding the Clydesdale Bank respondents) are: 
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Ho16 There are no significant differences 
between bankers' overdraft decisions 
on the basis of 
(a) The financial audit report only 
(b) The favourable management audit 
report 
Ho17 There are no significant differences 
between bankers' overdraft decisions 
on the basis of 
(a) The financial audit report only 
(b) The adverse management audit 
report. 
Regarding Ho16 and Ho17 for the Bank of Scotland and 
the Royal Bank of Scotland, the no and don't know 
overdraft decisions were again combined and the cross - 
tabulations of the financial audit report only by the 
favourable management audit report and also by the 
adverse management audit report are given in Table A. 
TABLE A 
Cross -tabulations of overdraft decisions by information 
for Bank of Scotland and Royal Bank of Scotland 
n 
Financial audit report 
only by favourable 
X 
2 df p 
management audit report 106 0.22 1 0.64 
Financial audit report 
only by adverse 
management audit report 105 6.29 1 0.01 
( No and don't know decisions are combined) 
At the 5% level of significance, therefore, for the Bank 
of Scotland and the Royal Bank of Scotland we have no 
reason to reject H016 but we would reject H017. This 
compares with the results for all three banks (including 
the respondents from the Clydesdale Bank) discussed in 
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Chapter 8 that at the 10% level of significance we have 
no reason to reject H016 but we would reject H017. If 
we exclude the respondents from the Clydesdale Bank we 
are more confident of our conclusion, but the overall 
conclusions of rejecting H0l5, not rejecting H016 and 
rejecting Holz remain the same whether the analysis 




Quotations from reasons for overdraft decisions 
The following are a selection of direct quotations from 
the respondents' reasons for their overdraft decisions 
relating to the management audit reports. 
1. Favourable management audit report 
(a) Reasons for YES decision 
(i) Bank of Scotland respondents: 
'The advance is granted on the understanding that the 
various points raised in (4) of the Management Auditors' 
Report will receive attention.' 
'Would ensure that steps had been taken to ensure all 
matters raised under point 4 in the Management Auditors' 
Report had been dealt with in a satisfactory manner.' 
'The minor weaknesses mentioned in the Management 
Auditors' Report should be rectified forthwith.' 
'Some pressure would be exerted to have guarantees from 
the Directors in view of the Auditors' note 4.' 
'The reservations contained in the Management Auditors' 
Report are more than offset by the company's track 
record.' 
'Management Auditors' Report highlights only minor 
weaknesses which would be easily remedied.' 
'We would of course insist on their controls being 
tightened up.' 
'The Auditors' Report paragraph 4 should be drawn to the 
attention of the Directors and their assurances obtained 
that the weaknesses will be thoroughly investigated and 
remedial action taken.' 
'Would insist that the four minor weaknesses listed were 
remedied immediately.' 
'The minor weaknesses mentioned in the management 
auditors' report could turn into major weaknesses if not 
rectified.' 
'The rather lax internal controls disclosed in the 
Management Auditors' Report would suggest further 
enquiry.' 
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(ii) Clydesdale Bank respondents: 
'I would like to see them give attention to clause 4 
brought out in the Management Auditors' Report. Indeed 
I would very much welcome seeing this as a standard 
procedure in audit reports.' 
'Report indicates a well- managed company.' 
'The failure to pay in to the bank customers' cheques 
when received is a symptom of poor financial control.' 
'All of these measures would assist in tightening up the 
company's financial control.' 
'The points mentioned in the Auditors' Report should be 
discussed in more depth.' 
'I would wish confirmation that the items 4 and 5 in the 
management audit report had already received management 
attention.' 
'We would point out the advantages of correcting the 
weaknesses disclosed in the Auditors' Report and 
endeavour to ensure that action was taken.' 
'Regarding the minor weaknesses in the individual business 
functions we would hope that we would have built up a 
sufficiently close relationship with the Directors to 
enable us to discuss with them their proposals for 
improvements.' 
'The minor weaknesses in paragraph 4 of the Management 
Auditors' Report can be easily rectified.' 
'It would be expected that the Directors would heed the 
Auditors' criticisms.' 
'The various items mentioned at clause 4 on page g of the 
Auditors' Report are considered to be relevant.' 
(iii) Royal Bank of Scotland respondents: 
'Directors told to tighten up on various items of 
financial control (see management audit report 
4a, b, c and d). 
'In confirming agreement, would suggest to the company 
that the weaknesses highlighted by the Auditors were 
tightened up.' 
'Provided greater control was exercised over the obvious 
areas of weakness in finance and production management, 
the overdraft can be agreed.' 
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'The content of the Management Auditors' Report would also 
be discussed with the Directors, particularly item 4, 
with a view to more frequent lodgements being made to 
the Bank. The purchasing, production and selling 
weaknesses would be covered also to ascertain what action 
the Directors are taking in these areas to improve the 
company's performance further.' 
'We would be insisting that the weaknesses are not minor 
from a financial point of view and we would expect the 
Directors to tighten up on all the points made 
immediately.' 
'We would want steps taken to rectify the adverse 
features highlighted in paragraph 4 of the Management 
Auditors' Report. 
'The "minor" weaknesses in the performance of the 
individual business functions disclosed in the Management 
Auditors' Report rather surprised me and these 
shortcomings would seem to indicate a general slackness 
in control in the areas involved. .. The information 
contained in the Management Auditors' Report is 
certainly very interesting and would be of great value 
to bank managers in reviewing lending positions.' 
'The Directors should heed the advice given in the 
Management Auditors' Report.' 
(b) Reasons for NO decision 
(i) Bank of Scotland respondents 
'Points 4(a),(b),(c) and (d) would require full discussion. 
This area is not viewed as minor and may in fact be the 
cause of the facilities now sought. Positive steps will 
be required to correct these.' 
'We would be looking for a tightening up of the financial 
control.' 
'Points raised under 4 "minor weaknesses" are not minor 
in our opinion.' 
'Management Auditors' Report - consider minor weaknesses 
to be more than minor.' 
'We would reconsider the situation if attention was given 
to the points raised in the Management Auditors' Report.' 
(ii) Clydesdale Bank respondents 
'The failure to pay into the Bank customers' cheques when 
received is a serious weakness?. 
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'If immediate steps are taken to sort out the weaknesses 
noted in the Management Auditors' Report then benefits 
should quickly become apparent.' 
(iii) Royal Bank of Scotland respondents: 
'Customer should lodge cheques on a more regular basis 
than once per week.' 
'Consider requirements excessive in light of cash flow 
and terms of management auditors' report. Feel 
discussion necessary with Directors on tightening up of 
the administration and cash flow management.' 
'As a temporary measure we might help out with facilities 
in 1983, but only if the Directors agreed to put their 
own house in order.' 
'There is evidence of lack of control per Management 
Auditors' Report which we would not consider minor.' 
'It cannot be said that the items under number 4 in the 
Management Auditors' Report are of a minor nature in 
view of the Directors' backgrounds.' 
'We would not agree that the weaknesses pointed out in the 
Management Auditors' Report are minor.' 
(c) Reasons for DON'T KNOW decision 
Bank of Scotland respondent: 
'The auditors comments regarding purchasing and 
production would indicate a tightening up in the 
monitóring of costs is needed.' 
2. Adverse management audit report 
(a) Reasons for YES decision 
(i) Bank of Scotland respondents: 
'The various points raised in the Management Auditors' 
Report are disquieting and obviously also require 
attention as a matter of urgency.' 
'Conditional upon implementation of Management Auditors' 
recommendations.' 
'The problems pinpointed by Auditors can be resolved and 
if so should lead to higher level of profit.' 
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'Condition attaching to approval: 
All the points raised in the Management Auditors' 
Report to receive urgent attention with appropriate 
action.' 
'Assurances should also be received that the areas 
highlighted in the Management Auditors' Report would be 
fully discussed and suggestions implemented.' 
'The Management Auditors' Report could not be ignored 
completely - particularly as it appears to be making 
very constructive and beneficial recommendations.' 
'We would counsel the Directors that it was in their best 
interest to take cognisance of the Management Auditors' 
Report and when a review of the borrowing takes place in 
a year's time, it would be expected that most of the 
recommendations would have been implemented.' 
'I would also wish to discuss the Management Auditors' 
Report with the Directors and to have their assurances 
that the recommendations would be brought into operation 
immediately.' 
'Agreement conditional upon receiving undertaking from 
Directors that recommendations of Management Auditors 
will be implemented.' 
(ii) Clydesdale respondents: 
'I would also discuss the management of the business, in 
particular the finance side.' 
'At the lending interview the highlighted points would be 
discussed in depth and I would require to be satisfied 
that remedial policies and action would be adopted.' 
'Implementing the proposals would be a condition of 
granting the overdraft facility.' 
'Assurances would be sought from the Directors that they 
would take action to improve the operational and 
financial controls criticised in the Management 
Auditors' Report.' 
'The Management Auditors' Report was of great interest 
and various steps would require to be implemented with 
stronger control. Assurances from the Directors to this 
end are required.' 
'Would obviously wish to have certain assurances from the 
Directors, before we lend, that they will take immediate 
steps to put their house in order.' 
399 
'The points brought out in the Management Auditors' 
Report are all very valid but due to the strength of the 
company we would probably advise rather than insist that 
these areas be looked at very closely by the management.' 
'Whilst agreeing the facility, I would wish disucssions 
concerning assurances from the Directors that the 
weaknesses shown in the Management Auditors' Report will 
be attended to.' 
'It is a condition of the Bank's support that strict 
control is exercised over: 
1) Payments to creditors 
2) Purchasing policy to be reviewed 
3) Implementation of alternative raw material 
4) Collection of debtors.' 
'We would wish to see all their finance /purchasing/ 
production /selling systems tightened up.' 
(iii) Royal Bank of Scotland respondents: 
'The Management Auditors' Report highlights a number of 
areas of concern, and these would be ventilated fully 
during the discussions, when assurances would be sought 
from the Directors that the various points raised would 
have their attention.' 
'Management Auditors' points should be brought to the 
Directors' attention and their assurance obtained that 
these will be attended to.' 
'However, I am disturbed by the unbusinesslike attitude 
of the Directors.' 
'It would be suggested to the Directors that they take 
immediate action to implement the recommendations 
contained in the Management Auditors' Report.' 
'Company appears to be successful despite management 
weaknesses. I was interested in major weakness areas 
particularly under production.' 
'There would be certain conditions attached to my agreeing 
to the borrowing, these conditions taking into account 
the details given in the Management Auditors' Report.' 
'The Bank to be assured that the Auditors' recommendations 
are to be implemented effectively.' 
'It would be a condition of the overdraft being granted 
that the matters referred to by the Auditor were 
corrected.' 
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(b) Reasons for NO decision 
(i) Bank of Scotland respondents: 
'At this stage a firm stand should be taken after reading 
the Management Auditors' Report.' 
'Would give further consideration when evidence submitted 
that the items listed in the Auditors' Report had been 
rectified. Otherwise the business has the inherent 
seeds of trouble.' 
'Deficiences brought out in Management Auditors' Report 
are serious and suitable evidence of putting them in 
order would be required before further consideration by 
the Bank.' 
'I do consider the company worthy of support if the 
suggestions outlined in the Management Auditors' Report 
are implemented with the Directors' backing and subject 
to close control.' 
'From the Management Auditors' Report it is obvious that 
considerable savings could be effected by the Directors.' 
'I would be seeking assurances from the Directors that the 
criticisms contained in the Management Auditors' Report 
were being remedied.' 
'I would not make a decision regarding the provision of 
overdraft facilities until I had been satisfied that the 
Directors had taken action to rectify the weaknesses in 
the company's performance which were detailed in the 
Management Auditors' Report.' 
'The Management Auditors' Report highlights the weaknesses 
of the company's position.' 
'Looking to the critical remarks made in the Management 
Audit Report regarding the internal organisation of the 
company, I consider it would be folly to encourage the 
Directors to continue their policies by granting 
overdraft facilties to the extent requested.' 
(ii) Clydesdale Bank respondents: 
'We would wish to see some acceptance by the Directors of 
the criticisms contained in the Management Auditors' 
Report and action taken to remedy them.' 
'The Management Auditors' Report points to many areas 
where costs could be reduced to improve profits and 
negative cash flow.' 
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(iii) Royal Bank of Scotland respondents: 
'The Directors require to put their own house in order to 
sort out their differing attitudes as to what is best 
for the company. The company is not well managed on the 
Management Auditors' Report.' 
'Apparent poor management record as revealed in the 
management auditors' report.' 
'The Directors would be well advised to consider the cost 
savings outlined in the Auditors' Report and the 
tightening of credit terms.' 
'We would require assurances that corrective action had 
been taken where necessary to rectify weaknesses as 
highlighted by the Management Auditors' Report.' 
'The Management Auditors' Report leads us to decide 
against granting this loan until matters have been 
rectified.' 
'This general weakness in the management is supported by 
the remarks in the Management Auditors' Report.' 
'I would be prepared to reconsider the application on 
receiving satisfactory assurances that, as a matter of 
urgency, steps would be taken to remedy the deficiencies 
highlighted in the Management Auditors' Report.' 
'The Management Auditors' Report highlights many 
important internal company problems.' 
'It would appear that changes should be made in accordance 
with the Management Auditors' Report.' 
(c) Reasons for DON'T KNOW decision 
(i) Bank of Scotland respondents: 
'The management audit raises questions regarding the 
efficiency of management which would require to be 
investigated before a positive decision could be made.' 
'The Management Auditors' Report places the proposals very 
much in doubt and we would wish certain assurances that 
the weaknesses brought to light therein had been 
rectified before we could confidently agree to the 
facility requested.' 
(ii) Clydesdale Bank respondent: 
'The most helpful thing we can do is to assist the 
Directors to put their house in order.' 
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(iii) Royal Bank of Scotland respondent: 
'A lender would require to know if the Comprehensive 
Management Auditors' Report is to be implemented and 
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